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In the nearly sixty years since reformulating the jurisdictional
1
calculus in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme Court
has issued only two holdings on a defendant’s amenability to suit
predicated solely on its forum activities unrelated to the plaintiff’s
2
causes of action. Unfortunately, neither decision provided much
illumination regarding the due process strictures for general in
personam jurisdiction, as the Court never developed either a
3
theoretical foundation or a framework for resolving this query.
Commentators have intermittently proposed various theories to
1

326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
3
See, e.g., LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (noting that the “Supreme Court has never outlined a test for
determining whether a defendant’s activities within a state are sufficient for general
jurisdiction”); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It’s Not General
Jurisdiction, or Specific Jurisdiction, But Is It Constitutional?, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559,
567 (1998) (opining that Supreme Court’s holdings provide little guidance on the
requisite criteria for general jurisdiction). “General jurisdiction” is the term used to
describe the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant for any cause of action based
on activities unrelated to the plaintiff’s claims. See Arthur von Mehren & Donald
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 113637 (1966).
2
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4

fill the vacuum. Some of these theories espouse that a corporate
defendant should only be subject to general jurisdiction in its
5
principal place of business or place of incorporation, while others
contend that such jurisdiction might also be proper if the defendant
6
either “adopts” the forum as its sovereign or maintains a “branch”
7
8
facility or corporate office in the forum. But this prevailing
academic view that a defendant should only be subject to general
jurisdiction in a comparatively limited number of forum states cannot
be reconciled with even the narrowest jurisdictional holdings of
9
federal and state courts.
The academic commentary is thus of minimal assistance to the
judiciary, which desperately needs a doctrinal formulation to illume

4

See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 119, 137 (proposing that general jurisdiction is only appropriate in the
states in which the corporate defendant has a place of incorporation, principal place
of business, or “branch facility,” but not where the defendant conducts activities such
as sales, purchases, or advertisements); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 87 [hereinafter Brilmayer,
How Contacts Count] (proposing that the appropriate test is whether the defendant is
enough of a “political insider” to invoke the political processes of the state); Sarah R.
Cebik, “A Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma”: General Personal Jurisdiction and
Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 33-36 (propounding a “realist” theory
of sovereignty for general jurisdiction under which a defendant would be amenable
to general jurisdiction if it is incorporated, shapes its corporate policy, or conducts its
core activities in the forum); B. Glenn George, In Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL.
L. REV. 1097, 1129 (1990) (suggesting the requisite minimum contacts for general
jurisdiction exist only if a corporate office is in the forum); Allan R. Stein, Styles of
Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689,
758 (1987) [hereinafter Stein, Interstate Federalism] (urging that the appropriate
standard is whether the “defendant has adopted the forum as its sovereign” by
treating it as its home for most purposes); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General
Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 676 (1988) [hereinafter Twitchell, Myth of General
Jurisdiction] (advocating that general jurisdiction should be restricted to the
defendant’s place of incorporation and principal place of business).
5
See, e.g., von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1141-44. Compare Twitchell,
Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 676 (advocating limitation of general
jurisdiction to defendant’s principal place of business and place of incorporation),
with Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171 [hereinafter Twitchell, Doing-Business Jurisdiction] (discussing a
“change of heart” since her earlier article on such a limited conception of general
jurisdiction).
6
See, e.g., Stein, Interstate Federalism, supra note 4, at 758.
7
See Borchers, supra note 4, at 137. Dean Borchers acknowledged, however, that
“the notion of what counts as a ‘branch’ is not self-evident.” Id. Accordingly, he
recommended that the term “branch” be defined, “perhaps in terms of a fraction of
the defendant’s total economic activity,” in order to “prevent twigs from being
treated as branches.” Id. at 137-38.
8
See George, supra note 4, at 1129.
9
See infra Part IV.
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the incoherent “morass” of conflicting decisions that Judge Learned
10
Hand described over seventy years ago. The decisions continue to
“evince a bewildering array of seemingly inconsistent results,” as the
courts “appear to summon one line of decisions and then another to
11
support the varying moods of their opinions.” The resulting lack of
predictability contravenes notions of both fairness and efficiency, as
plaintiffs and defendants repeatedly litigate the propriety of
subjecting a foreign defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum for
any cause of action without guidance or notice as to the requisite
forum activities allowing the sovereign to exercise such power.
Perhaps, though, an approach out of this quagmire may be
found within it.
As Professor Mary Twitchell suggested, a
methodology to formulate a better theoretical understanding of
12
general jurisdiction might be to scrutinize past judicial decisions.
Such decisions, she hypothesized, “may reveal a great deal about
when states feel that a nonresident business entity should be treated
13
like an ‘insider’ for any and all judicial purposes.” Agreeing with
her premise, the author and his research assistant reviewed
approximately three thousand federal and state court decisions
discussing this jurisdictional basis in an attempt to clarify the due
14
process limitations on general jurisdiction.
10

Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930)
(describing the impossibility of divining “any rule from the decided cases; we must
step from tuft to tuft across the morass”).
11
Severinsen v. Widener Univ., 768 A.2d 200, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
12
Twitchell, Doing-Business Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 206.
13
Id.
14
We identified the cases through two broad Westlaw searches in individual state
and federal databases: (1) “general jurisdiction” & continu!, and (2) general w/3
jurisdiction & contact!. Additionally, we also ran Key Cite reference searches for
cases finding general jurisdiction and discussing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). We primarily concentrated on appellate court
opinions after 1984 (when the Supreme Court first explicitly adopted the general
and specific jurisdiction terminology), but we also conducted additional research to
locate significant federal district decisions and pre-1984 state and federal appellate
court opinions. Of course, by employing such broad searches, we unearthed a
number of cases that mentioned—but did not apply—general jurisdiction, including
cases involving procedural determinations such as the need for more discovery or the
waiver of a jurisdictional challenge. See, e.g., Szafarowicz v. Gotterup, 68 F. Supp. 2d
38, 42 (D. Mass. 1999) (need for more discovery); Jacobs v. Walt Disney World Co.,
707 A.2d 477, 485 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (same).
Additionally, many of the opinions we located that reached general
jurisdictional holdings were not within the scope of this Article. This Article focuses
on the due process limitations on amenability for a non-consenting, nonresident
defendant whose forum activities are not related to the litigation. As discussed in
Part II, infra, numerous purported general jurisdiction decisions involved a
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The Article first analyzes the Supreme Court decisions
establishing the modern conception of general adjudicatory
15
jurisdiction, concluding that contemporary general jurisdiction
doctrine emanates from the pre-International Shoe fictional premise of
a corporation’s constructive presence through doing business in the
16
forum.
The Article then recounts the judiciary’s continued
difficulty in appropriately delimiting the parameters of general
jurisdiction before identifying the approaches employed by the
Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state courts in resolving
17
general jurisdictional queries.
Concluding that none of these
approaches is satisfactory, the Article proposes a new principle to
clarify the general jurisdiction analysis that comports not only with
the holdings of the Supreme Court and most federal circuit courts,
but also with a number of federal district courts and state courts as
18
well.
Under this principle, the requisite minimum contacts
supporting general jurisdiction exist when the nonresident defendant
is engaging in continuous activities in the forum similar in nature
and volume to the in-state activities of an enterprise domiciled or
19
based in the forum. This minimum contacts analysis incorporates
two components—first, a qualitative aspect that the nature of the
defendant’s forum activities are analogous to those activities that
typically define a commercial domiciliary, and second, a quantitative
aspect that such forum activities occur at a comparable frequency to
at least some local businesses. If the necessary minimum contacts are
extant, the third and final consideration is whether the exercise of
jurisdiction in a given case comports with “traditional notions of fair

defendant with forum activities that are actually related to the litigation. Still other
decisions were not included because they primarily considered a state long-arm
statute, statutory service of process requirements, or common-law alter ego theories.
See, e.g., White v. Pepsico, Inc., 568 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1990) (long-arm statute);
Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Can., Ltd., 466 N.E.2d 217, 221-23 (Ill. 1984)
(parent-subsidiary relationship). While personal jurisdiction over a non-consenting,
nonresident defendant does require authorization for the service of summons on the
defendant and adequate notice to the defendant, see Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v.
Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987), this Article addresses only the due
process aspect of the general jurisdiction calculus.
No discussion of the
interpretation of long-arm statutes, the adequacy of service of process, or the
problems of related business entities has been included.
15
See infra Part I.
16
See id; see also infra Parts III.E-IV.A.
17
See infra Parts II-III.
18
See infra Part IV.
19
See id.
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20

play and substantial justice.”
After delineating the mechanics of this proposed three-pronged
approach, the Article examines the theoretical foundation of general
adjudicatory jurisdiction. It first proposes, relying in part on an
analogy to traditional substantive due process doctrine, that the
constitutional limitations on a state’s jurisdictional reach are
premised on both fairness and state sovereign interests. The Article
thereafter submits that the principal underpinning of the due
process constraints on a state’s exercise of general in personam
jurisdiction is the absence of sovereign authority over those
nonresident defendants that do not engage in forum activities closely
21
analogous to the activities of those owing allegiance to the state.
I.

THE MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION

Pre-twentieth century jurisdictional theory predominantly
focused on the state’s power over the defendant or the defendant’s
22
property. For instance, if the defendant was either actually or at
least deemed present in the forum, the court could exercise
jurisdiction over any cause of action against that defendant, despite
the absence of any nexus between the forum and the cause of
23
action.
Subsequently, the courts established additional theories
allowing a state to exercise jurisdiction over certain claims related to
the forum, but this jurisdictional basis was limited to the specific
24
dispute at issue.
In the mid-twentieth century, International Shoe Co. v. Washington
reformulated the jurisdictional touchstone from a state’s power over
those present within its territory to an analysis of the fairness or
reasonableness of an exercise of jurisdiction premised on the

20

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation
omitted).
21
See infra Part V.
22
See Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L.
REV. 569, 569-74 (1958); Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 614-15.
23
See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136 (noting “American practice
for the most part [has been] to exercise power to adjudicate any kind of controversy
when jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or indirect, between the forum
and the person or persons whose legal rights are to be affected”); see also Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917) (holding that, because the
defendant was engaged in business in the forum, “jurisdiction does not fail because
the cause of action sued upon has no relation in origin to the business here
transacted”).
24
See Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 622-23.
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25

defendant’s forum contacts. Yet International Shoe’s new conception
still incorporated elements of the preexisting American jurisdictional
26
theories. The Court first explained that due process was satisfied
when the defendant’s continuous forum activities actually gave rise to
27
the claimed liabilities at issue.
The Court then noted that
jurisdiction alternatively could be premised on a defendant’s
continuous activities with the forum “thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising
28
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”
25

326 U.S. at 316. The Court explained:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person. Hence
his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was
prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But
now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service or
other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject
a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”
Id. (citations omitted).
26
Id. at 317-18.
27
Id. at 317.
28
Id. at 318 (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921); St.
Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1915); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.,
115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917)). Seven years later, in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 n.6 (1952), the Court explained that its citation to Reynolds did
“not disclose the significance of this decision but light is thrown on it by the opinions
of the state court below.” Id. (citing Reynolds v. Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co., 117 N.E.
913 (Mass. 1917); Reynolds v. Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co., 113 N.E. 413 (Mass. 1916)).
Perkins also cited three other pre-International Shoe holdings as additional support for
the concept of jurisdiction based on forum contacts unrelated to the litigation. Id.
(citing Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 268-69 (1917); Pa. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917); Barrow S.S. Co. v.
Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898)).
The relevant pre-International Shoe cases cited by the Court as supporting the
exercise of jurisdiction for causes of action unrelated to the defendant’s forum
contacts all involved defendants who had employees or at least an independent agent
who conducted some business for the defendant from a physical location within the
forum state. In Reynolds, the Court affirmed by a memorandum opinion the holdings
of the Massachusetts state court. Reynolds, 255 U.S. at 261. The state court had held
that a Kansas railroad was subject to jurisdiction in Massachusetts for a suit based
upon promissory notes made, issued, and negotiated in another state merely because
the railroad appointed a Boston independent passenger agent who also conducted
business on his own account and for another company from the office he paid for
himself. Reynolds, 117 N.E. at 914-15; see also Reynolds, 113 N.E. at 413. Tauza held
that New York could exercise jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania coal company for a
cause of action having no relationship to New York because the coal company had a
branch sales office in New York staffed by a sales agent, eight salesmen, and clerical
assistants from which it regularly solicited and obtained orders for continuous coal
shipments from Pennsylvania to New York. Tauza, 115 N.E. at 916-18. Barrow
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The Court subsequently relied on the defendant’s unrelated
forum activities to establish the required constitutional connection
29
for jurisdiction in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. Benguet
Mining, a company created under the laws of the Philippine Islands,
had ceased operating its gold and silver mines in the Philippines
30
during the Japanese occupation of the Islands.
The company’s
president, general manager, and principal stockholder then returned
to his home in Ohio where he established a company office staffed by
two secretaries, maintained two bank accounts for the company, paid
salaries and other expenses for the company, held directors’
meetings, corresponded on the company’s behalf, and supervised the
31
rehabilitation of the company’s properties in the Philippines.
Hence, as the Court noted, the company’s president “carried on in
Ohio a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily
32
limited wartime activities of the company.” Based on the company’s
conduct of such a “continuous and systematic, but limited part of its
general business” in the state, the Court summarily concluded Ohio
could exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction over the company, even
though the plaintiff’s claims “arose from activities entirely distinct”
33
from the company’s Ohio operations.
The jurisdictional theory supporting Perkins became known as
general jurisdiction, while the exercise of jurisdiction based on
contacts connected to the cause of action was called specific
34
The Supreme Court first explicitly recognized this
jurisdiction.
concluded a British corporation was amenable to jurisdiction in New York for an
altercation in Britain because the corporation was doing business in New York
“through a mercantile firm, its regularly appointed agents.” Barrow, 170 U.S. at 105.
In contrast, in McKibbin, the Court held a Pennsylvania railroad could not be sued in
New York for an injury occurring in New Jersey when the railroad merely sent loaded
freight cars into New York over connecting carriers and a local carrier sold coupon
tickets on its behalf. McKibbin, 243 U.S. at 267-69.
The relevance of the other two earlier decisions cited by the Court in
International Shoe and Perkins is not as clear. The defendant’s forum contacts in
Alexander were related to the litigation as the plaintiff’s claim arose in part from his
dealings with the defendant’s agents in the forum. Alexander, 227 U.S. at 223, 226.
Pennsylvania Fire appeared primarily to consider amenability for an unrelated cause
of action predicated on service of process on a designated agent, although the lower
state court had held the defendant was doing business in the state. Gold Issue
Mining & Milling Co. v. Pa. Fire Ins. Co., 184 S.W. 999, 1020 (Mo. 1916), aff’d, 243
U.S. 93 (1917).
29
342 U.S. 437 (1952).
30
Id. at 438, 447.
31
Id. at 447-48.
32
Id. at 448.
33
Id. at 438, 447-48.
34
See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136.
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dichotomy in terminology in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
35
Hall, where it held that a foreign corporation was not amenable to
36
general jurisdiction in Texas.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (“Helicol”), a
Colombian corporation, provided helicopter transportation in South
37
America for oil and construction companies. One of its helicopters
crashed in Peru as it was transporting employees of a Peruvian
38
consortium that was the alter ego of a Texas joint venture. The
representatives and heirs of the four United States citizens who
39
perished in the crash then sued Helicol in Texas. Since the parties
both supposedly conceded that the claims neither arose from nor
40
were related to Helicol’s Texas contacts, the Court examined
whether such contacts were sufficient for jurisdiction when Helicol’s
41
activities were unrelated to the asserted causes of action.
The Court posited that the nature of Helicol’s contacts was not
similar to the “continuous and systematic general business contacts”
42
The Court described three primary types of
extant in Perkins.
43
contacts Helicol had with Texas, discounting each in turn. First,
while the chief executive officer of Helicol traveled to Houston for a
negotiating session with representatives of the Peruvian consortium
and its Texas alter ego, the Court reasoned that this singular trip was
neither continuous nor systematic as required for the exercise of
44
general jurisdiction. Second, the Court deemed insignificant the
fact that Helicol received over $5 million in payments drawn upon a
Houston, Texas bank because it was a unilateral act of the drawer not

35

466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9 (1984). The Supreme Court had, the month before,
used the term “general jurisdiction” in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984), but
the Court did not mention the term “specific jurisdiction.”
36
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416-18.
37
Id. at 409.
38
Id. at 410.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 415. However, this supposed concession is questionable. As Justice
Brennan pointed out in his dissent, some portions of the briefs filed on behalf of
Hall suggested that their claims were related to Helicol’s activities within Texas. Id.
at 425 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Additionally, Hall’s oral argument, as some
commentators have noted, “invited the Court to consider the nature and extent of
the contacts and their relation to the cause of action.” GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET
AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL CASES AND MATERIALS 236 (8th ed.
1999) (citing Tr. of Oral Argument at 20-21, 27).
41
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 409, 416.
42
Id. at 416.
43
Id. at 416-18.
44
Id. at 410-11, 416.
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45

imputable to Helicol. Finally, the Court determined that Helicol’s
purchase of over $4 million in equipment (including eighty percent
of its helicopter fleet) along with training and technical consultation
for pilots, management, and maintenance personnel from Bell
Helicopter in Fort Worth, Texas, was “not enough to warrant . . . in
46
personam jurisdiction.”
While certainly these activities could be
described as “continuous and systematic,” the Court concluded, by
relying on a pre-International Shoe case, Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis
47
Brown Co., that mere purchases and related trips were insufficient to
support the exercise of general jurisdiction consonant with the
48
constraints of due process.
The Court’s determination that Helicol’s ongoing purchases and
related trips did not establish its amenability to suit in Texas
demonstrates that general jurisdiction requires more than merely
“continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum. In other words,
as the Court has remarked on other occasions, the test for
49
jurisdiction is not merely quantitative. Instead, there is a qualitative
aspect to the analysis as well, requiring that the defendant’s forum
contacts must be “thought so substantial and of such a nature” to
50
support the exercise of general jurisdiction.
But a question left
unanswered by both Perkins and Helicopteros is the type of forum
activities that satisfy the qualitative aspect of this analysis.
Perkins exhibits the unremarkable proposition that the situs of
defendant’s “principal, if temporary, place of business” is a contact of
45

Id. at 411, 416-17.
Id. at 411.
47
260 U.S. 516 (1923). In Rosenberg, the plaintiff’s cause of action was related to
the defendant’s forum activities. Id. at 518. Nevertheless, the Court held that “the
fact that the alleged cause of action arose in New York is immaterial” as jurisdiction
at that time required a finding that “defendant was doing business within the state . .
. in such manner and to such extent to warrant the inference it was present there.”
Id. at 517-18. In other words, the Court was concerned only with what today would
be characterized as general jurisdiction. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 421 n.1
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“If anything is clear from Justice Brandeis’ opinion for the
Court in Rosenberg, however, it is that the Court was concerned only with general
jurisdiction over the corporate defendant.”).
48
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417-18.
49
See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (pronouncing
that jurisdictional criteria “cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative” but instead
must depend “upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause
to insure”).
50
See id. at 318 (explaining that a defendant could be subject to jurisdiction
based on continuous contacts with the forum “thought so substantial and of such a
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities”).
46
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51

a sufficiently substantial nature.
Helicopteros establishes that
52
purchases and related trips, on the other hand, are not enough.
These decisions provide the extent of the Supreme Court’s postInternational Shoe interpretation of the qualitative aspect of the
general jurisdictional calculus, other than cryptic references in two
other opinions: one not disputing the proposition vital to the
decision below that a major insurance company “doing business” in
all fifty states could be amenable under general jurisdiction
53
principles in each state, and the other suggesting that defendant’s
sale of 10,000 to 15,000 magazines a month in the forum might not
54
support general jurisdiction. But the sum of these decisions lends
de minimis assistance in resolving the substantiality of a host of other
types of contacts.
The Supreme Court’s decisions have also not articulated any
type of theoretical approach underlying general jurisdiction, instead
merely employing an ad hoc comparative analysis to prior
55
precedent.
Intriguingly, though, such precedential comparisons
include decisions predating, not just postdating, International Shoe.
International Shoe itself cited several prior holdings that supported
predicating jurisdiction on a defendant’s continuous, substantial
56
forum activities unrelated to the plaintiff’s cause of action.
Likewise, Perkins referenced pre-International Shoe opinions as
57
illustrative of the same doctrine.
And, most significantly, the
Helicopteros Court primarily relied on a 1923 opinion authored by
Justice Brandeis to reach its holding that purchases and related trips
58
were insufficient for general jurisdiction. The Court’s continued
51

See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.11 (1984).
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 411-18.
53
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 330 (1980).
54
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779-80 & n.11.
55
See, e.g., Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416 (exploring the nature of the defendant’s
forum contacts “to determine whether they constitute the kind of continuous and
systematic general business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins”); Keeton, 465
U.S. at 779-80 & n.11 (opining Hustler Magazine’s sale of 10,000 to 15,000 magazines
a month in New Hampshire “may not be so substantial as to support jurisdiction over
a cause of action unrelated to those activities” based on comparison to defendant’s
contacts in Perkins).
56
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S.
565 (1921); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1915); Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917)); see supra note 28.
57
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 n.6 (1952) (citing
Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 268-69 (1917); Pa. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170
U.S. 100 (1898)); see supra note 28.
58
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417-18 (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown
52
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reliance on these antecedent opinions demonstrates that the
contemporary doctrine of general jurisdiction emanates from preInternational Shoe jurisprudence. Nonetheless, this connection does
not resolve the conundrum of the appropriate framework or
theoretical basis for general jurisdiction because the constructs
underlying these earlier opinions were explicitly disavowed as fictions
59
in International Shoe.
As a result, any further judicial guidance must be sought from
the lower federal and state courts. But unfortunately, these courts
often purport to find general jurisdiction by relying on the
60
relationship of the defendant’s forum contacts to the dispute. Thus,
the appropriate parameters of general jurisdiction must be
demarcated before embarking on a doctrinal analysis.
II. THE PARAMETERS OF DISPUTE-BLIND JURISDICTION
The distinction between specific and general jurisdiction
appears rudimentary. Helicopteros articulated that specific jurisdiction
is appropriate “in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum,” whereas general jurisdiction exists for the
assertion of jurisdictional power in suits “not arising out of or related
61
to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”
Yet alone these
definitions are inadequate because they pretermit the discrepancy in
the state’s jurisdictional power over the defendant in each
circumstance.
As discussed previously, International Shoe incorporated two preexisting jurisdictional concepts into its new model, one based solely
on the relationship of the defendant to the forum providing
jurisdiction for any cause of action and the other predicated on the
62
nature of the specific dispute at issue. To clarify the alterity between
these two types of jurisdictional power, Professors von Mehren and
Trautman, in an influential article, proposed employing the
terminology “general jurisdiction” and “specific jurisdiction,” which
63
of course was later adopted by the Supreme Court. Under their
formulation, general jurisdiction referred to the exercise of
jurisdiction over all claims against the defendant based solely on the

Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)).
59
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
60
See infra Part II.
61
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 nn.8-9.
62
See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
63
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9
(1984) (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136-64).
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nature of the contacts between the defendant and the forum.
Specific jurisdiction, in contrast, granted adjudicatory power only
“with respect to issues deriving from, or connected with, the very
65
controversy that established jurisdiction to adjudicate.”
Accordingly, a more precise distinction between general and
specific jurisdiction is whether the relationship of the defendant’s
contacts to the dispute impacts the court’s analysis of the requisite
constitutional connection for jurisdiction. If the relationship of the
defendant’s forum activities to the dispute influences the court’s
jurisdictional holding, the court is exercising specific jurisdiction,
66
which grants only limited adjudicative power over the defendant.
On the other hand, if the court does not rely upon any connection
between the forum and the causes of action asserted, but instead
bases its jurisdictional finding only on the defendant’s relationship
with the forum, the court is exercising general adjudicative authority
67
over any cause of action asserted against the defendant.
Professor Twitchell proposed alternative nomenclature that
would make this difference more pellucid in her seminal article, The
68
Myth of General Jurisdiction.
She advocated that the exercise of
general jurisdiction should be termed “dispute-blind” because the
exercise of jurisdiction does not depend on the nature of or the facts
69
involved in the dispute.
In contrast, she urged that jurisdiction
predicated on the nature of the controversy should be referenced as
70
“dispute-specific.”
Professor Twitchell also proffered an insightful analytical device
to ascertain whether a court is actually relying on true dispute-blind
71
general jurisdiction. Under this device, a court should construct a
hypothetical claim without any forum connection to insure that any
related forum activities of the defendant are not improperly
72
infiltrating the dispute-blind query.
As an example: are the
64

von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136.
Id; see also id. at 1144-45 (noting specific jurisdiction “is limited to matters
arising out of—or intimately related to—the affiliating circumstances on which the
jurisdictional claim is based”).
66
In fact, some courts refer to this basis of jurisdiction as “limited jurisdiction” or
“transactional jurisdiction” rather than specific jurisdiction for this reason. See, e.g.,
Hesse v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74, 76-77 (Ct. App. 1995).
67
Cf. FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.5, at 72 (5th ed. 2001); id.
§ 2.8, at 87; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1136.
68
Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 613, 680.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 642; Twitchell, Doing-Business Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 205.
72
See supra note 71.
65
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corporate defendant’s actual activities in California so pervasive and
extensive that it should be amenable to the adjudicatory jurisdiction
of California for a hypothetical employment discrimination claim
filed by a New York citizen employed at corporate headquarters in
New York? Or, with respect to a foreign corporation, do the
corporation’s actual California contacts support jurisdiction even for
a hypothetical cause of action arising from its sale of a product in
Germany that injured a German citizen? By constructing such a
hypothetical, the court insures that the relationship between the
defendant’s forum activities and the dispute does not influence the
jurisdictional query.
Unfortunately, however, many courts do not employ this simple
analytical device, which would assist in restoring doctrinal purity to
73
adjudicatory jurisdiction.
Instead, courts still often purport to
employ general jurisdiction precepts while relying on the relationship
74
of the litigation to the defendant’s forum contacts. This arises both
in circumstances in which the defendant’s related contacts are
sufficient to satisfy current constitutional doctrine for specific
jurisdiction and those in which the resolution of the specific
jurisdiction query is not as certain.
A. Decisions Purporting to Find General Jurisdiction by Relying on the
Defendant’s Contacts Clearly Giving Rise to the Litigation
Amenability decisions frequently conflate dispute-specific and
dispute-blind concepts even when the defendant’s forum contacts
75
actually give rise to the litigation. The courts in these cases either
ignore the dispute-blind nature of general jurisdiction or at least
confuse its proper application.
In some of these instances, the court itself appears uncertain as
76
to the proper basis for its holding.
These courts detail the
defendant’s contacts with the forum, some giving rise to the litigation
while others do not, before concluding that the defendant’s
73

But see Dickson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 339 (5th Cir.
1999) (relying on “dispute-blind” nature of general jurisdiction query); cf. Sternberg
v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1117 n.23 (Del. 1988) (noting Professor Twitchell’s
proposed “dispute-blind” terminology).
74
See Twitchell, Doing-Business Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 190.
75
See infra notes 76-90.
76
See, e.g., Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc. v. G & G Auto Sales, Inc., 512 So. 2d 1334,
1335-36 (Ala. 1987) (holding Alabama court had “jurisdiction” over nonresident
corporation without specifically articulating whether general or specific jurisdiction
existed); Waters v. Deutz Corp., 479 A.2d 273, 274-76 (Del. 1984) (holding foreign
corporation was “doing business” within Delaware sufficient to satisfy the minimum
contacts requirement for due process without iterating the basis).
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“continuous and systematic” contacts establish the purposeful
availment of the privilege of conducting business within the forum
77
necessary to support jurisdiction. Although these decisions cannot
be properly considered dispute-blind because of the pervasive
reliance on related contacts sufficient to support specific jurisdiction,
subsequent courts, citing the “continuous and systematic” language,
sometimes incorrectly interpret them as general jurisdiction
78
decisions. This misconception is unfortunate, especially for those
courts that rely on precedential comparisons on the quantity and
quality of contacts, because the defendant’s activities in the forum
79
often are insufficient to establish true dispute-blind jurisdiction.
Another even more common pitfall is to decree that general
jurisdiction exists by relying, at least in part, on contacts giving rise to
the litigation that are sufficient under current constitutional doctrine
80
for specific jurisdiction. Occasionally, the courts even iterate that
77

See, e.g., Atlanta Auto Auction, 512 So. 2d at 1334-36 (holding that nonresident
corporation’s repeated wholesale auction sales of automobiles to dealers in Alabama,
including the automobile at issue in the underlying lawsuit, was purposefully
directed forum activity that constituted a “‘continuous and systematic’ course of
conduct in Alabama” supporting jurisdiction); Waters, 479 A.2d at 274-76 (holding
German corporation was “doing business” in Delaware by shipping its manufactured
tractors, including the tractor injuring the Delaware plaintiff, through its wholly
owned American subsidiary into Delaware).
78
See, e.g., Ex parte Phase III Constr., 723 So. 2d 1263, 1264-65 (Ala. 1998)
(interpreting Atlanta Auto Auction, 512 So. 2d 1334, as a general jurisdiction case); Ex
parte United Bhd. of Carpenters, 688 So. 2d 246, 251-52 (Ala. 1997) (same).
79
Compare Atlanta Auto Auction, 512 So. 2d at 1334-36 (holding that nonresident
corporation’s repeated wholesale auction sales of automobiles to dealers in Alabama,
including the automobile at issue in the underlying lawsuit, was purposefully
directed, “‘continuous and systematic’ course of conduct in Alabama” supporting
jurisdiction), with Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80 (1984)
(noting in dictum that business contacts of 10,000 to 15,000 magazine sales in the
forum a month might be insufficient for general jurisdiction).
80
See, e.g., Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co. v. Aerenson, 603 F. Supp. 323, 326-27 (D.
Del. 1985) (holding general jurisdiction appropriate in Delaware over Pennsylvania
bank for cause of action arising from one of the bank’s Delaware mortgages); Ex parte
Phase III Constr., 723 So. 2d at 1265 (finding general jurisdiction in Alabama over
Virginia construction management corporation based solely on contacts related to
underlying breach of contract action, the sole transaction the corporation ever
conducted in Alabama); Nichols v. Paulucci, 652 So. 2d 389, 391-94 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (finding general jurisdiction in Florida over Kentucky corporation and
individual in part because of contacts “regard[ing] the subject matter of this lawsuit,”
such as their execution of guarantees on a mortgage on real property in Florida
when they were being sued for breach of the loan agreement); Zivalich v. Int’l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 662 So. 2d 62, 64-65 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (finding general jurisdiction
over union in part because union job allegedly offered to plaintiff that was the basis
of plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was to be partially performed in Louisiana);
Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co., 532 S.E.2d 215, 219 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Florida subject
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general jurisdiction is appropriate because either the suit arises from
the defendant’s contacts with the forum or the state has an interest in
81
adjudicating disputes related to the forum.
Of course, by
incorporating dispute-related contacts into the analysis, especially
contacts alone sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction, these cases
82
fall outside the ambit of true dispute-blind jurisdiction.
More importantly, however, by relying on contacts giving rise to
the litigation while purporting to find general jurisdiction, such
decisions infuse a doctrinal impurity into the jurisdictional analysis.
The harm is not limited to the particular decision, since a common
methodology for resolving general jurisdiction queries is to compare
the quantity and quality of contacts to those contacts found sufficient
83
in prior cases.
Thus, subsequent cases contemplating a truly
dispute-blind situation analogize to the contacts from a prior
purported general jurisdiction case that, in fact, involved related
84
contacts adequate to establish specific jurisdiction. This inevitably
dilutes the quantum and quality of activity necessary for dispute-blind
general jurisdiction, culminating in “an impoverished body of
general jurisdiction case law that fails to explore the question of the
85
state’s general adjudicatory power over nonresident defendants.”
Finally, still other courts rely on general jurisdiction as an
to general jurisdiction in North Carolina in part because one of the real estate
broker plaintiffs was a resident of North Carolina and the property for which the
plaintiffs sought compensation was located in North Carolina); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Brown & Ross Int’l Distribs., Inc., 804 S.W.2d 527, 531-32 (Tex. App. 1990) (finding
New York corporation amenable to general jurisdiction in Texas based on the
substantial sales of counterfeited GE parts in Texas when the basis for the lawsuit was
the defendant’s counterfeiting and theft of trade secrets).
81
See, e.g., Ex parte Phase III Constr., 723 So. 2d at 1264 (finding general
jurisdiction in Alabama when plaintiff’s “breach-of-contract action arises from
[defendant’s] contacts with Alabama”); Nichols, 652 So. 2d at 392 (relying on contacts
“regard[ing] the subject matter of this lawsuit” in general jurisdiction analysis);
Bruggeman, 532 S.E.2d at 219-20 (explaining “less extensive contacts” necessary for
general jurisdiction because of forum’s interest when plaintiff was a resident of
forum state and case allegedly arose from contract to locate property in the state).
82
See Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 613.
83
See infra Part III.B.
84
Compare Temperature Sys., Inc. v. Bill Pepper, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 669, 676 (Tex.
App. 1993) (citing Design Information Systems v. Feith Systems & Software, Inc., 801
S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App. 1990), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 813 S.W.2d
481 (Tex. 1991), as support for general jurisdiction holding), and Nikolai v. Strate,
922 S.W.2d 229, 238-39 (Tex. App. 1996) (same), with Michel v. Rocket Eng’g Corp.,
45 S.W.3d 658, 673 (Tex. App. 2001) (recognizing that the holding in Design Info. Sys.
was based on the plaintiff being “a Texas resident whose cause of action arose out of
and was directly related to the sale and shipment of the allegedly defective product
to him in Texas by the nonresident defendant”).
85
Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 612.
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86

alternative holding.
While judicial opinions commonly embrace
alternative holdings, alternative findings on general jurisdiction are
often dubious, apparently influenced by the relatedness of the
87
contacts. As an extreme example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
86

See, e.g., Replacements, Ltd. v. MidweSterling, 515 S.E.2d 46, 51 (N.C. Ct. App.
1999) (holding in the alternative, if specific jurisdiction did not exist, general
jurisdiction was appropriate because of Missouri defendant’s business contacts with
North Carolina plaintiff corporation, such as selling and shipping $65,000 in
merchandise, purchasing merchandise on ten occasions, placing telephone calls, and
participating in joint programs); Cherry Bekaert & Holland v. Brown, 394 S.E.2d 651,
656-57 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (holding individual had sufficient “‘systematic and
continuous’ contacts with North Carolina” to establish general jurisdiction after
finding jurisdiction based on execution of North Carolina partnership agreement
that gave rise to the litigation); Fraser v. Littlejohn, 386 S.E.2d 230, 232-37 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that judgment debtor was subject to general jurisdiction in
North Carolina after concluding that prior Florida judgment against debtor was
subject to full faith and credit in North Carolina, the only state in which the debtor
had property); Ferrell v. Prairie Int’l Trucks, Inc., 935 P.2d 286, 288 n.2 (Okla. 1997)
(refusing to address distinction between specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction
in suit against truck dealer because sufficient contacts existed for the exercise of
either based on dealer’s advertisements and evidence of two forum sales); Ahadi v.
Ahadi, 61 S.W.3d 714, 719-21 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding Michigan resident subject
to general jurisdiction in Texas for guaranteeing twenty-three loans in Texas made to
her husband’s business after concluding that she was subject to specific jurisdiction
because the plaintiff’s claim arose out of her alleged promise made on the phone to
him while he was in Texas); Transportacion Especial Autorizada, S.A. de C.V. v.
Seguros Comercial Am., S.A. de C.V., 978 S.W.2d 716, 719-21 (Tex. App. 1998)
(holding Mexican transportation company amenable to both general and specific
jurisdiction in Texas in suit arising from company’s issuance of a bill of lading to
transport equipment from Austin, Texas to Mexico City using itself and two Texas
corporations when half of its business was derived from imports crossing the Texas
border).
87
See, e.g., Cherry Bekaert & Holland, 394 S.E.2d at 657 (holding in the alternative
that there was general jurisdiction over an individual based on his participation in
North Carolina accounting partnership); Fraser, 386 S.E.2d at 235-37 (holding in the
alternative that individual was subject to general jurisdiction in North Carolina based
primarily on his activities when he was residing in the forum two years before the suit
was filed); Ahadi, 61 S.W.3d at 719-21 (finding general jurisdiction and specific
jurisdiction over Michigan resident who personally guaranteed twenty-three loans in
Texas made to her husband’s business). These holdings are not dubious merely
because they subject individuals to general jurisdiction based on continuous and
systematic business activities, but also because their rationales collapse under reductio
ad absurdum. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
plurality) (“It may be that whatever special rule exists permitting ‘continuous and
systematic’ contacts to support jurisdiction with respect to matters unrelated to
activity in the forum applies only to corporations . . . .”) (citations omitted). The
rationale of Cherry Bekaert & Holland would support general jurisdiction in North
Carolina over a partner in a Washington branch office of a North Carolina-based law
firm. 394 S.E.2d at 657. Fraser would allow general jurisdiction in North Carolina
over an individual who resided and worked in North Carolina for several years who
was still trying to sell his North Carolina home, although he moved to Alaska two
years ago. 386 S.E.2d at 235-37. Ahadi apparently would support general jurisdiction
over a father in Michigan guaranteeing loans and leases for his children attending
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found general jurisdiction over a corporation based on
88
advertisements in Oklahoma and evidence of two forum sales. But
this finding cannot properly be uncoupled from the court’s judgment
on the appropriateness of specific jurisdiction when one of the forum
sales actually gave rise to the litigation—indeed, the court provided a
89
unitary analysis for its dual holding. And certainly, advertisements
and evidence of two sales is not truly substantial enough, either
90
qualitatively or quantitatively, for general jurisdiction.
Such
insignificant activities should not render the nonresident corporation
amenable to jurisdiction on any cause of action having absolutely no
connection to Oklahoma, such as an employment discrimination
claim filed by an employee hired and working in another state.
Hence, holdings finding general jurisdiction after finding
specific jurisdiction are of practically no value in clarifying general
jurisdiction. These decisions, along with those in which the basis of
the holding is ambiguous or in which related contacts exist sufficient
to establish specific jurisdiction, are not incorporated into this
Article’s doctrinal analysis of general adjudicatory jurisdiction
decisions. Such judicial determinations cannot be adjudged disputeblind when dispute-specific contacts justified their holdings.
B. General Jurisdiction Cases Involving Contacts Tenuously Related to
the Dispute
The more difficult question is the appropriate categorization of
those cases involving at least one dispute-related contact, although
the relationship might be insufficient under current constitutional
doctrine for specific jurisdiction. Rather than finding jurisdiction
predicated on the problematic specific jurisdiction question, the
91
court embarks on a general jurisdiction query. The quandary such

college in Texas. 61 S.W.3d at 719-21. Such tenuous business contacts by an
individual with the forum are not sufficient to force them to defend a wholly
unrelated matter in the forum.
88
Ferrell, 935 P.2d at 288 & n.2.
89
Id.
90
Cf. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80 (1984) (noting in
dictum that business contacts of 10,000 to 15,000 magazine sales in the forum a
month might be insufficient for general jurisdiction); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut,
Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 624 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding mail-order New Hampshire limited
liability company not subject to general jurisdiction in South Carolina based on sales
made to twenty-six South Carolina customers, although finding jurisdiction
appropriate under RICO’s nationwide service provision).
91
See, e.g., Thomason v. Chem. Bank, 661 A.2d 595, 605 n.9 (Conn. 1995)
(noting that disposition of case on general jurisdiction grounds obviated need to
resolve specific jurisdiction issue).
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cases pose for this Article is whether they should be incorporated into
the dispute-blind doctrinal analysis when the dispute-related contacts
perhaps, even subconsciously, influenced the court’s decision. This
Article reaches a compromise solution for these cases, depending on
whether the court’s ratio decidendi explicitly relies on the related
contact.
In many of these cases, the courts’ holdings rely on the
92
relationship of the contacts to the dispute. An example is Glover v.
93
Western Air Lines, Inc. The nonresident defendant, Avis U.S., was a
franchisor licensing the Avis name and exercising “considerable
control” over its franchisees, including several in Alaska, one of which
94
paid Avis U.S. approximately $11,000 during a single year. Avis U.S.
also placed advertising in national and international publications
calculated to reach Alaskan consumers and maintained a toll-free
number for Alaskans to make reservations for a rental car anywhere
95
in the world. The Alaska Supreme Court held that these contacts
with Alaska were “of a continuing, systematic, routine and substantial
96
nature,” subjecting Avis U.S. to general jurisdiction in Alaska. The
court then continued that it was not unreasonable to subject Avis to
the jurisdiction of Alaska’s courts when the Alaskan plaintiffs alleged
97
its advertising in Alaska caused them to rent the car in Mexico. Of
course, advertising in Alaska that caused the plaintiffs to rent the car
was an activity at least related to the dispute, a contact that some (but

92

See, e.g., Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 779 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding that, although individual’s business contact was not sufficient to support an
exercise of specific jurisdiction, “the fact that some connection exists between
[plaintiff], the forum, and the controversy involved in the instant case is nevertheless
relevant to our determination [of general jurisdiction]”); Johnson Worldwide
Assocs., Inc. v. Brunton Co., 12 F. Supp. 2d 901, 910-13 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (finding
general jurisdiction in Wisconsin over Wyoming corporation when its forum
connections, although not giving rise to the litigation, “relate[d] to the sale of
compasses—the heart of this very case”); Hurlston v. Bouchard Transp., Co., 970 F.
Supp. 581, 582-83 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding general jurisdiction appropriate over
nonresident owner and manager of vessel for claim arising from a personal injury
suffered by the ship’s engineer off the coast of Florida in part because “the voyage at
issue originated in Texas”); Jones v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 995 S.W.2d 767, 773 (Tex.
App. 1999) (relying in part on “contacts with Texas related to this suit,” such as the
plane that crashed in New Zealand killing six foreign nationals was originally sold to
Texas residents and then allegedly defectively modified in Texas, in finding general
jurisdiction over Kansas aircraft manufacturer), disapproved on other grounds, BMC
Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002).
93
745 P.2d 1365 (Alaska 1987).
94
Id. at 1366-67.
95
Id. at 1367.
96
Id. at 1369.
97
Id. at 1370.

826

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:807

not most) courts have held under analogous circumstances to be
98
sufficient to support specific jurisdiction.
The courts’ reliance in such cases on a contact related to the
dispute precludes their inclusion as paradigmatic dispute-blind
decisions. Would the Alaska Supreme Court have found Avis U.S.
amenable to jurisdiction if the dispute had not involved alleged
misrepresentations, fraudulent omissions, and unfair trade practices
directed at Alaskan residents, but instead involved plaintiffs residing
in Florida receiving Avis’s advertising in that state? But, on the other
hand, categorizing the decisions as quintessential specific jurisdiction
cases is difficult when the courts may have correctly disavowed any
99
reliance on specific jurisdiction principles.
Thus, these cases actually form a mutated, hybrid jurisdiction,
neither truly specific nor truly general. Certainly, an argument can
100
be made in favor of recognizing a hybrid jurisdictional basis.
A
fundamental focus of the minimum contacts analysis is fairness, and a
sliding scale, one could argue, is more fair and just than a rigid

98

See, e.g., Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 383-84 (9th Cir.
1990), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Rutherford v. Sherburne Corp., 616
F. Supp. 1456, 1460-61 (D.N.J. 1985); Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549, 554
(Mass. 1994). But see Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264, 26768 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (citing several cases rejecting Shute rationale); Hesse v. Best W.
Int’l, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74, 76 (Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting advertisements to and
solicitation of forum residents as a basis for specific jurisdiction when the injury
occurred in another jurisdiction); Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 610 N.W.2d
670, 676-77 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (same). Additional factors besides defendant’s
advertising may also have supported specific jurisdiction in the Glover case. The
plaintiffs were injured by Mexican bandits as they were driving a vehicle rented from
a Mexican Avis franchisee. Glover, 745 P.2d at 1366. The plaintiffs’ suit alleged that
Avis U.S. committed unfair trade practices, made misrepresentations and fraudulent
statements, and failed to warn of the hazards of renting a car in Mexico. Id. If any of
these alleged misrepresentations or fraudulent statements had been directed at the
plaintiffs while in Alaska, specific jurisdiction might have been proper on this basis.
See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984); Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey, Inc., 460
F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir. 1972).
99
See, e.g., Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 777-79 (5th Cir. 1986)
(rejecting existence of specific jurisdiction in Texas as a result of contract executed
with Texas resident but then determining “the fact that some connection exists
between [plaintiff], the forum, and the controversy involved in the instant case is
nevertheless relevant to our determination [of general jurisdiction]”).
100
See William M. Richman, A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between
General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1328, 1345 (1984) (proposing a sliding
scale approach to jurisdiction under which, “[a]s the quantity and quality of the
defendant’s forum contacts increase, a weaker connection between the plaintiff’s
claim and those contacts is permissible; as the quantity and quality of the defendant’s
forum contacts decrease, a stronger connection between the plaintiff’s claim and
those contacts is required”).
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101

application of two categories.
Nevertheless, there are difficulties
inherent in such an approach. First, and most importantly, the
Supreme Court at least implicitly rejected the existence of hybrid
102
jurisdiction in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.
Helicopteros did not consider the nature of the dispute in any fashion
in denying Texas general adjudicatory jurisdiction, even though a
number of the defendant’s Texas activities were at least tangentially
103
related to the lawsuit.
Second, as Professor Twitchell articulated,
such a hybrid, or conditional, basis for jurisdiction inevitably dilutes
the requirements for general jurisdiction and weakens the
jurisprudential foundations of both specific and general
104
Instead of discerning the outer limits of specific
jurisdiction.
jurisdiction, courts invoke the hybrid analysis as a convenient
fallback. Then subsequent cases contemplating a truly dispute-blind
situation analogize to the contacts from prior hybrid cases, diluting
the corporate activity necessary for dispute-blind jurisdiction and
hindering the development of a cogent theoretical basis for either
105
general or specific jurisdiction. As a result of these difficulties, the
better reasoned decisions reject the existence of a hybrid
106
jurisdictional basis.
In any event, such hybrid holdings are omitted from this
Article’s doctrinal analysis. At most, a hybrid holding only illustrates
that the court deemed jurisdiction appropriate in that particular case
predicated on a mixture of dispute-related and unrelated contacts.
101

See id.; cf. Holt Oil & Gas, 801 F.2d at 779 n.5 (noting that, although “the
distinction between ‘general’ and ‘specific’ jurisdiction provides a useful analytic
device, the use of these categories does not alter the fundamental [fairness] focus of
the minimum contacts inquiry”).
102
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
103
Id. at 416-18. The related contacts included a trip to Texas by the defendant’s
chief executive officer for a negotiating session on the helicopter services contract by
which the defendant was transporting plaintiffs’ decedents, payments under this
same contract from a Texas bank, purchases of almost all the helicopters in
defendant’s fleet (including the one involved in the crash) from the forum, and
training for defendant’s pilots (including the pilot of the crashed helicopter) in Fort
Worth, Texas. Id. at 410-12; see also id. at 425-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But,
despite the related nature of these contacts, the Court never allowed relatedness to
enter its general jurisdiction calculus. See Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra
note 4, at 651 (averring Helicopteros Court thus “implicitly reaffirmed the principle
that it will not look to the nature of the dispute in considering the propriety of
subjecting a defendant to general jurisdiction in the forum”).
104
See id. at 612-13, 650; see also Simard, supra note 3, at 580.
105
See Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 612-13, 650.
106
See, e.g., RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1278 (7th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting the existence of “a hybrid between specific and general jurisdiction” based
on Supreme Court precedent).
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Due to this partial reliance on contacts related to the dispute to
justify the assertion of jurisdiction, these decisions do not assist in
demarcating a state’s general adjudicative authority over causes of
action with no relationship to the defendant’s forum activities.
In other decisions with tenuously connected contacts, however,
the courts disavow any reliance on the related contacts. Despite
reciting an asserted, but debatable, basis for specific jurisdiction, the
107
courts either reject or refuse to address the contention. The courts
then conduct an appropriate dispute-blind analysis, ignoring the
108
arguable relatedness of the contacts to the litigation. Because these
courts properly omit any consideration of relatedness in the general
jurisdiction query, the traditional criteria for dispute-blind
jurisdiction are satisfied. The court’s holding is apparently based
solely on the defendant’s relationship with the forum, justifying
jurisdiction for any cause of action irrespective of any potential
relationship of the litigation to the defendant’s forum activities.
Nevertheless, it is still possible that the tenuously related contacts may
109
have had some underlying, unstated impact on the court.
This Article hence adopts a compromise with respect to these
decisions, incorporating them in the analysis of general jurisdiction
decisions, but at least footnoting the existence of related contacts that
might have influenced the court. In contrast, any decisions in which
the court explicitly relied on the relatedness of the defendant’s
107

See, e.g., Hesse v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74, 76-77 (Ct. App. 1995)
(holding general jurisdiction, but not “transactional” or specific jurisdiction, existed
over defendant with California sales office for California resident’s claim that he
received advertisement and made reservation in California for defendant’s hotel in
Mexico where he was injured); Thomason v. Chem. Bank, 661 A.2d 595, 605 & n.9
(Conn. 1995) (refusing to consider specific jurisdiction over New York trustee bank
based on finding of general jurisdiction); Verdin v. Morania Oil Tanker Corp., 655
So. 2d 542, 543-44 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding Louisiana recruitment efforts of
Delaware shipping corporation with principal place of business in New York too
attenuated to plaintiff’s employment to support specific jurisdiction, but that general
jurisdiction existed because of transportation services provided in Louisiana);
Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 610 N.W.2d 670, 676-77 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding general jurisdiction proper, rather than specific jurisdiction, over a
Wisconsin resort that directed an advertisement at a Minnesota resident who was
injured while vacationing at the resort); Bachman v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 724 P.2d 858,
860-61 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (holding Washington resident who suffered continued
pain from alleged torts after moving to Oregon had to establish general jurisdiction
in Oregon, not specific jurisdiction, over nonresident doctors, hospital, and medical
equipment manufacturer who often served Oregon residents).
108
See, e.g., Hesse, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 76-77; Thomason, 661 A.2d at 605; Verdin, 655
So. 2d at 543-44; Marshall, 610 N.W.2d at 676-77; Bachman, 724 P.2d at 860-61.
109
Cf. John T. McDermott, Personal Jurisdiction: The Hidden Agendas in the Supreme
Court Decisions, 10 VT. L. REV. 1 (1985) (maintaining the Supreme Court’s personal
jurisdiction decisions are often influenced by hidden agendas).
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forum contacts have been omitted from the subsequent doctrinal
analysis.
III. DOCTRINAL APPROACHES TO GENERAL JURISDICTION
The federal and state courts utilize several disparate approaches
to resolving dispute-blind jurisdiction queries. While the parameters
of these models are not well defined—indeed, it is not uncommon
110
for a single decision to incorporate more than one approach —six
basic patterns may be divined from a review of the case law. Some
111
courts use a conclusory, ipse dixit approach, while others rely
112
Additional methods
primarily on comparisons to precedent.
include evaluating either a factor index or the defendant’s principal
113
business activities.
Still other jurisdictions employ foundational
114
But, as discussed
constructs such as presence or quid pro quo.
below, none of these approaches is satisfactory.
A. The Ipse Dixit Approach
A misguided, yet unfortunately common, state court approach to
evaluate general jurisdiction is merely to list the defendant’s forum
contacts and hold that such contacts, without considering either their
quality or nature, demonstrate the requisite “continuous and
115
systematic” business activities. The court’s “rationale” is, in essence,
the assertion that the contacts are sufficient for jurisdiction. For
instance, the Louisiana court’s ratio decidendi in Verdin v. Morania Oil
116
Tanker Corp. was solely the dictate that “defendant’s overall contacts
with this state [of having a ship repaired at a Louisiana shipyard and
110

See, e.g., Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284
F.3d 1114, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on precedent and constructive presence
theory); Soma Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296
(10th Cir. 1999) (employing a list of factors and comparisons to precedent); Haas v.
A.M. King Indus., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 644, 650 (D. Utah 1998) (same); Am. Type
Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 808-09 (Tex. 2002) (using a
reciprocal benefits theory and precedential comparisons).
111
See infra Part III.A.
112
See infra Part III.B.
113
See infra Parts III.C-D.
114
See infra Parts III.E-F.
115
Federal district courts on rare occasions are also guilty of employing this
approach. See, e.g., Resnick v. Manfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 462, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(holding summarily that a law firm with its sole office in Chicago was subject to
general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania solely because its client list revealed that it had
assisted fifty-four past and present Philadelphia clients on legal matters, although the
court did not consider either the method of solicitation of the clients or the relative
quantity or quality of the firm’s Philadelphia business).
116
655 So. 2d 542 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
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providing marine transportation to a Louisiana corporation three to
117
five times a year] . . . are sufficient to provide general jurisdiction.”
118
119
120
121
Courts in Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, and Texas, to name a
117

Id. at 544 (holding Delaware corporation with principal place of business in
New York subject to general jurisdiction in Louisiana for workplace injury in New
Jersey of Louisiana domiciliary hired in New York).
118
See, e.g., Thomason v. Chem. Bank, 661 A.2d 595, 605 (Conn. 1995) (holding
New York trustee bank with no offices in Connecticut performed “continuous and
systematic” business in Connecticut through “substantial credit card business,”
regular solicitation of “general banking business,” and mortgagee title to a
“substantial” amount of real property in claim for mismanagement of a trust).
119
See, e.g., Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize, 739 So. 2d 617, 619, 620-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding Belizean shrimping corporation engaged in the continuous and
systematic business activities with Florida necessary for general jurisdiction in lawsuit
filed by Belizean citizen injured in Costa Rica through selling eighteen percent of its
shrimp to Florida importers, moving almost all of its shipments through Florida
either by air or boat, purchasing a variety of equipment and supplies from Florida
sellers, using storage facilities in Florida when necessary, and utilizing a Florida
broker for customs and FDA approval). Achievers Unlimited, Inc. v. Nutri Herb, Inc.,
710 So. 2d 716, 720 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), employed a similar methodology in
holding that a California resident’s three-year business involvement as a distributor
for a Florida corporation and subsequent involvement as a distributor for a
competing company established continuous and systematic business contacts with
Florida. However, Achievers could have been decided as a specific jurisdiction case
since the defendant allegedly engaged in an organized campaign to defame and
disparage her former Florida distribution company and injure its business
relationship with its distributors. Id. at 718; cf. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789
(1984) (holding specific jurisdiction existed in California over Florida citizens
intentionally directing defamatory statements at forum); Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI
Telecomm. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that allegation that
Mexican telecommunications corporation violated United States antitrust law by
intentionally canceling a telephone line to harm a Texas business was sufficient to
grant Texas courts specific jurisdiction over the claim).
120
See, e.g., Anthem Ins. Cos. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 730 N.E.2d 1227, 1238-40
(Ind. 2000) (holding Nevada corporation with principal place of business in
California subject to general jurisdiction in Indiana in suit alleging that one of its
subsidiaries had submitted fraudulent claims to an Indiana insurance company
through collective examination of parent corporation’s contacts, including twentyeight corporate business trips to visit hospitals owned by subsidiaries in Indiana,
$385,000 in business transactions with Indiana entities in a five-year period,
correspondence regarding Medicare and Medicaid audits to Indiana regulatory
agencies, and prior defense and settlement of a lawsuit in Indiana).
121
See, e.g., Temperature Sys., Inc. v. Bill Pepper, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 669, 676 (Tex.
App. 1993) (holding Wisconsin corporation distributing HVAC equipment in
Wisconsin, Michigan, and northern Illinois amenable to general jurisdiction in Texas
in suit arising out of alleged breach of employee recruitment contract because of
corporation’s purchases in Texas of equipment and an inter-distributor relationship
with all authorized United States distributors, including those in Texas); Project
Eng’g USA Corp. v. Gator Hawk, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 716, 722 (Tex. App. 1992) (finding
general jurisdiction in suit alleging tortious conversion in California over a California
corporation that had served as a sales representative or distributor in California for
three Texas companies); Lujan v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 798 S.W.2d 828, 83132 (Tex. App. 1990) (holding New Mexico corporation subject to general
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few, have similarly exercised jurisdiction predicated on nothing more
than a conclusion.
This general jurisdiction template is fraught with difficulties.
First, many of the holdings are wrong, some even directly
contravening Supreme Court precedent. For instance, the most
significant forum contact in two Texas decisions appears to be the
122
nonresident corporation’s purchases from Texas businesses.
But
the Supreme Court held in Helicopteros that such purchases were
123
insufficient to establish general jurisdiction. A similar deficiency is
exhibited in those cases relying primarily on sporadic forum sales
despite the Supreme Court’s intimation that even more regular and
124
continuous sales are not enough for dispute-blind adjudication.
Such grave judicial errors eviscerate the fundamental constitutional
rights of the aggrieved litigants.
Yet even more importantly, a mere listing of contacts and
conclusory determination of sufficiency provides no guidance for
future cases as to the requisites for general jurisdiction. Indeed,
some cases are devoid of any specificity regarding the nature of the

jurisdiction in Texas for accident occurring in New Mexico to New Mexican
employee by relying on corporation’s occasional performance of work in Texas
under one of its two contracts to perform oil field services on an “as needed basis,” its
insurance coverage for any accidents in Texas, its occasional trips to Texas to
purchase supplies, and its advertisements in a trade publication distributed in Texas
and New Mexico). The only “rationale” in these cases is merely the question-begging
conclusion that the defendant should have “reasonably anticipated the call of a
Texas court” based on its contacts, without appreciating the distinction in general
jurisdiction cases that the contacts must be so substantial, both quantitatively and
qualitatively, that the defendant would expect that it would be required to defend in
Texas any cause of action arising anywhere in the world. See Temperature Sys., 854
S.W.2d at 674; Project Eng’g USA, 833 S.W.2d at 721-22.
122
See, e.g., Temperature Sys., 854 S.W.2d at 676 (involving corporation’s purchases
in Texas); Project Eng’g USA, 833 S.W.2d at 722 (involving a California corporation
acting as distributor for Texas companies, purchasing their products and selling in
California).
123
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417-18 (1984).
The Texas courts’ disregard of Helicopteros is quite remarkable considering the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Texas Supreme Court in that case. Id.
at 419.
124
Compare Verdin v. Morania Oil Tanker Corp., 655 So. 2d 542, 544 (La. Ct. App.
1995) (holding Delaware corporation with principal place of business in New York
subject to general jurisdiction in Louisiana for workplace injury in New Jersey of
Louisiana domiciliary hired in New York because corporation provided marine
transportation services and equipment to Louisiana corporation five or less times per
year and had one of its ships repaired at a Louisiana shipyard), with Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80 (1984) (noting in dictum that business
contacts of 10,000 to 15,000 magazine sales in the forum a month might be
insufficient for general jurisdiction).
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contacts at issue. For example, in Thomason v. Chemical Bank, the
court held a New York bank subject to general jurisdiction in
Connecticut, despite the lack of a Connecticut branch office, as a
result of the bank’s “substantial” forum credit card business and
127
“substantial” forum real property holdings as a mortgagee.
But
what did the court mean by the term “substantial”? Was this term
used in the qualitative or quantitative sense? If employed as a
quantitative yardstick, was it $11,000 in business, as some courts have
128
Or was it
found to be “substantial” enough for jurisdiction?
hundreds of thousands, or even millions of dollars? The court’s
129
opinion offers no indication, a quite “substantial” defect in its own
right.
A defendant is not amenable under even specific jurisdiction
principles unless it could reasonably anticipate being haled into the

125

See, e.g., Project Eng’g USA, 833 S.W.2d at 720-22 (finding general jurisdiction in
Texas over California corporation that had served as a sales representative or
distributor in California for three Texas companies without quantifying the business
performed for these Texas companies on either an absolute, transactional, or
percentage basis, other than to note that only one sale had been made for one of the
companies and that the agreement with another company had been terminated);
Lujan, 798 S.W.2d at 831-32 (holding New Mexico corporation subject to general
jurisdiction in Texas in large part because of performing “work in west Texas for
others” without specifying the amount of work performed).
126
661 A.2d 595 (Conn. 1995). The Thomason case involved some dispute-related
contacts in that the settlor of the trust at issue was a resident of Connecticut, the
beneficiaries were residents of Connecticut, and the trustee bank held informational
meetings in Connecticut regarding the trust. Id. at 597-98. But the settlor both
executed the trust in New York and directed that all communications related to the
administration of the trust be sent to him at his office in New York. Id. at 597.
Additionally, New York law governed the trust agreement and the trust assets were
always held and administered in New York. Id. As a result, the existence of specific
jurisdiction was at least a close question under Hanson v. Denckla, 352 U.S. 235, 252
(1958), which held that a foreign corporate trustee was not subject to specific
jurisdiction in the state in which the settlor and beneficiaries resided. The court in
Thomason explicitly refused to resolve the specific jurisdiction issue, instead relying
solely on dispute-blind contacts to find general jurisdiction over the trustee bank in
Connecticut. Thomason, 661 A.2d at 605 & n.9.
127
Id. at 598, 605; see also Verdin, 655 So. 2d at 544 (holding Delaware corporation
with principal place of business in New York subject to general jurisdiction in
Louisiana for workplace injury in New Jersey to Louisiana domiciliary hired in New
York because corporation provided marine transportation services and equipment to
Louisiana corporation five or less times per year without indicating either the
absolute or percentage of revenue generated from such services in Louisiana).
128
See, e.g., Glover v. W. Air Lines, Inc., 745 P.2d 1365, 1368 (Alaska 1987)
(holding collection of $10,985.12 from an Alaskan franchise contract was alone
“more than sufficient to characterize Avis U.S.’ business activities within Alaska as
‘substantial’”).
129
Thomason, 661 A.2d at 597, 605.
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130

state’s courts.
Of course, this concept applies a fortiari to general
131
jurisdiction.
If the defendant cannot reasonably anticipate that it
has submitted to the sovereign authority of the forum for all causes of
action, the defendant should not be amenable to general in personam
jurisdiction. But a mere listing of contacts, using perfunctory
adjectives such as “substantial” without providing any qualitative or
quantitative analysis, provides no basis for a defendant to predict
what activities will subject it to the sovereignty of the forum.
This offends the fundamental precept that corporations are
entitled to structure their transactions to avoid the sovereign
132
jurisdictional prerogative of a foreign state. As the Supreme Court
recognized, a corporation with notice that it is amenable to suits
within the forum can either act to alleviate the risk by procuring
insurance or passing its increased costs to consumers, or it can sever
its connection with the forum if it determines that the risks are too
133
substantial.
But if the corporation is without notice as to what
activities are sufficient for general jurisdiction, not only can it not
adequately factor the risk, it has no guidance on what is necessary to
sever the relationship. Therefore, the ipse dixit approach violates one
of the underlying premises of our current jurisdictional paradigm.
The final defect of this model is that a collective examination of
the contacts often ignores the quality or substantiality of any one
contact in contravention of the Helicopteros methodology, where the

130

See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); see
also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (delineating that
defendants must have “fair warning” that their activities subject them to the
jurisdiction of the forum’s courts).
131
See, e.g., Int’l Med. Group v. Am. Arbitration, 312 F.3d 833, 847 (7th Cir. 2002)
(holding exercise of general personal jurisdiction improper when nonresident
defendant “could not reasonably anticipate being haled into court” on the basis of its
forum activities); BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 798 (Tex.
2001) (same).
132
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (noting Due Process Clause
“allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit”);
Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1362 (5th Cir. 1990) (avowing that a
defendant’s “obvious intent to exercise its due process rights” by deliberately
executing its contracts outside of the forum state “should not be disregarded
lightly”); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 375-76 (5th Cir. 1987)
(acknowledging nonresident defendant’s “right to structure its affairs in a manner
calculated to shield it from the general jurisdiction of the courts of other states”);
Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex. 2002)
(explaining that a nonresident defendant that “purposefully structures transactions
to avoid the benefits and protections of a forum’s laws” is not amenable to general
jurisdiction).
133
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
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Court examined the nature of each contact separately.
As an
example, in Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare
135
Corp.,
the Indiana Supreme Court refused to consider the
individual substantiality of any of the defendant’s forum contacts,
instead describing all the contacts collectively and summarily holding
136
that they were sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction.
But while the sum of the contacts should eventually be examined, this
should not be accomplished without some consideration of the
137
qualitative nature of the particular contacts.
The sum of nothing
and nothing is still nothing; thus, the courts should scrutinize each
type of forum activity to determine that it equates to something
before collectively reviewing the defendant’s contacts.
In sum, the ipse dixit approach is without any redeeming virtue.
The decisions following this template are often specious. From a
jurisprudential perspective, the approach is even worse, because it
fails to provide any guidance for future decisions. It thus contravenes
the due process maxim that defendants must reasonably expect to be
amenable to the forum before the exercise of jurisdiction is
138
appropriate.
B. Precedential Comparisons
The most frequently adopted construct for resolving general
jurisdiction queries is comparing the quality and quantity of the
defendant’s forum activities to the quantum of activities in other
139
decisions. As an example, the Fifth Circuit’s rationale for rejecting
134

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-18 (1984).
730 N.E.2d 1227 (Ind. 2000).
136
Id. at 1238-40.
137
See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416-18.
138
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; see also Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (delineating that defendants must have “fair
warning” that their activities subject them to the jurisdiction of the forum’s courts).
139
See, e.g., United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 620 (1st Cir. 2001)
(concluding foreign defendant bank’s contacts of advertising and entering into
various contracts, including a joint venture with a forum bank and correspondent
banking relationships and accounts with four forum banks, were “less continuous
and systematic than contacts found to be insufficient for general jurisdiction in
previous cases”); Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 93 (1st Cir. 1998) (being
“guided by the types of contacts deemed sufficiently continuous and systematic in
other cases” to hold British corporation regularly soliciting business and obtaining
$585,000 in orders from a Massachusetts corporation was not amenable to general
jurisdiction in Massachusetts); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 624
(4th Cir. 1997) (holding mail-order New Hampshire limited liability company not
subject to general jurisdiction in South Carolina based on sales made to twenty-six
South Carolina customers because such contacts were much less extensive than the
contacts found sufficient in prior general jurisdiction decisions); Metro. Life Ins. Co.
135
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the existence of dispute-blind jurisdiction in Submersible Systems, Inc. v.
v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 571-73 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding adequate
minimum contacts for general jurisdiction in Vermont over Delaware corporation
with principal place of business in Pennsylvania for acts and omissions occurring in
Texas and Florida based on comparing its contacts, such as sales, relationships with
Vermont dealers, and deliberate targeted advertising in Vermont, to contacts held
sufficient for general jurisdiction in other federal cases before concluding exercise of
general jurisdiction would be unreasonable); Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Quality Dinette,
Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 464-66 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding an Alabama corporation was
subject to general jurisdiction in Michigan by equating its sales activities and
solicitation efforts in the state to activities held to be sufficient in prior Michigan
state court decisions); Robbins v. Yutopian Enters., Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 426, 439 (D.
Md. 2002) (rejecting the propriety of dispute-blind jurisdiction because the
nonresident defendant’s advertisements and forty-six forum transactions “pale[d] in
comparison even to those of defendants in other cases where the Fourth Circuit has
found general jurisdiction lacking”); Haas v. A.M. King Indus., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d
644, 649-50 (D. Utah 1998) (opining nonresident’s national and regional
advertisements, direct mailings to the forum, a website accessible in the forum, one
percent of its total sales to the forum, and presence of equipment in the forum were
“substantially less significant” contacts with the forum than existed in Helicopteros);
Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264, 270 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(holding New Jersey motor inn’s mailing of brochures to and solicitation of
Pennsylvania citizens was insufficient to establish general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania
because prior cases finding general jurisdiction “involved much more contact
between the defendant and the forum state than that involved here”); Travel
Opportunities of Fort Lauderdale, Inc. v. Walter Karl List Mgmt., Inc., 726 So. 2d
313, 314-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding Delaware corporation subject to
general jurisdiction in Florida, after finding that the contract at issue did not have
the required nexus to the forum for specific jurisdiction, by comparing its
broadcasting of infomercials on forty-eight Florida cable channels to prior cases
regarding television commercials and concerted mailings and by analogizing its
$1.75 million in annual sales to Florida residents via phone orders and mail to other
sales cases); Dunham v. Hunt Midwest Entm’t, Inc., 520 N.W.2d 216, 222 (Neb. Ct.
App. 1994) (concluding requirements of general jurisdiction had not been satisfied
against nonresident amusement park conducting forum advertising “based on
Helicopteros [and] other cases”); Ash v. Burnham Corp., 343 S.E.2d 2, 5 (N.C. Ct.
App.) (positing that Supreme Court precedent led to the conclusion that a
nonresident defendant’s $520,000 of annual sales to forum residents through
independent contractors was insufficient to establish jurisdiction when the plaintiff’s
cause of action did not arise out of such a sale), aff’d, 349 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1986)
(per curiam); Deerinwater v. Circus Circus Enters., 21 P.3d 646, 651 (Okla. Civ. App.
2001) (determining nonresident casino owner’s forum advertising contacts were
comparable to the contacts held insufficient for general jurisdiction in Ash and were
“less substantial than those of the non-resident corporation in Helicopteros”); Am.
Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Tex. 2002) (holding
that dispute-blind jurisdiction was inappropriate in Texas because the facts were
“more closely aligned with Helicopteros than with Perkins”); James v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.,
965 S.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Tex. App. 1998) (finding requisite minimum contacts
existed for general jurisdiction in Texas over Illinois railroad with office in Texas
generating $75 million in business annually through comparison to other cases
involving offices and sales in the forum, but holding the exercise of general
jurisdiction would violate conceptions of “fair play and substantial justice” as the
accident did not involve activities similar to any activities conducted by the railroad
in Texas and the injury occurred in Tennessee to a Tennessee resident).
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140

Peforadora Central, S.A. de C.V. was that the defendant’s forum
activities were “even less substantial than those of the Colombian
141
company with Texas in Helicopteros.”
Under this approach, then,
the courts primarily rely on precedential analogies to determine
whether the requisite substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts
are extant.
A factor favoring this approach is the Supreme Court’s iteration
that the test for jurisdiction is not “simply mechanical or
142
quantitative.”
Hence, according to the Court, “talismanic
jurisdiction formulas” and “clear-cut jurisdictional rules” are
143
unavailing. Instead, the quantity and quality of activities sufficient
144
Such
for jurisdiction must be determined in each case.
admonitions appear to counsel a case-by-case approach to
jurisdiction, relying on prior precedent for guidance, but without
applying mechanical rules. Indeed, the Supreme Court has itself
utilized a comparative approach in some of its general in personam
145
jurisdiction decisions.
Nevertheless, this model has its difficulties,
including the lack of meaningful guiding precedent and the absence
of a cogent rationale to aid the comparison.
The Supreme Court’s two major general jurisdiction
146
pronouncements, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. and
147
provide little
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
comparative guidance. The contacts in Perkins were extensive both
quantitatively and qualitatively, as the defendant used the forum as its
central office location for all the ongoing supervisory activities of the

140

249 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 420.
142
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); see also Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (noting that the “‘minimum contacts’ test of
International Shoe is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of
each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite ‘affiliating
circumstances’ are present”).
143
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485-86 & n.29 (1985).
144
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).
145
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)
(exploring the nature of the defendant’s forum contacts “to determine whether they
constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court
found to exist in Perkins”); see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772
& n.11 (1984) (asserting Hustler Magazine’s sale of 10,000 to 15,000 magazines a
month in New Hampshire “may not be so substantial as to support jurisdiction over a
cause of action unrelated to those activities” based on comparison to defendant’s
contacts in Perkins).
146
342 U.S. 437 (1952).
147
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
141
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148

corporation during the war.
Indeed, the Supreme Court
subsequently described the forum as the defendant’s “principal, if
149
temporary, place of business.” In contrast, none of the contacts in
Helicopteros involved either supervisory corporate activities or even the
conduct of revenue-generating activities in the forum; instead, the
defendant made purchases in the forum state, trained personnel in
the forum, and sent a corporate officer on a single trip to the forum
150
for contract negotiations.
Thus, a wide gulf exists between the
contacts found sufficient in Perkins and those decreed insufficient in
Helicopteros. And many cases fall somewhere between these extremes,
151
precluding meaningful analogies to Supreme Court precedent.
The absence of Supreme Court guidance thus requires
comparisons to other lower court decisions that, at best, are still the
152
conflicting “morass” depicted by Judge Learned Hand.
At worst,
153
the authority relied upon may be clearly wrong or inapposite. It is
not uncommon for a general jurisdiction opinion to draw parallels
154
on the substantiality of contacts from specific jurisdiction cases,
148

Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445-48; see supra Part I.
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780 n.11.
150
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 411-18; see supra Part I.
151
See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 571 (2d Cir.
1996) (noting that “[m]any cases, including this one, fall between Perkins and
Helicopteros”).
152
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand,
J.); see infra Part IV; cf. Metro. Life Ins., 84 F.3d at 572 (recognizing that two cases
relied upon by the defendant in urging that the requisite minimum contacts for
general jurisdiction did not exist were “arguably” analogous, but relying on two other
decisions holding that similar contacts were sufficient); Severinsen v. Widener Univ.,
768 A.2d 200, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (noting that, due to the factsensitive and somewhat subjective nature of the general jurisdiction query, “the
courts appear to summon one line of decisions and then another to support the
varying moods of their opinions”).
153
See, e.g., James v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 965 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tex. App. 1998)
(finding contacts at issue “were more systematic and continuous” than the contacts
in Project Engineering USA Corp. v. Gator Hawk, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 716, 721 (Tex. App.
1992), which held that a California company selling products in California was
subject to general jurisdiction in Texas because it was a distributor for three Texas
companies, despite Supreme Court’s holding in Helicopteros that purchases are
insufficient for general jurisdiction).
154
See, e.g., Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 465-66 (6th
Cir. 1989) (comparing quantity and quality of contacts in underlying case to prior
Michigan case, June v. Vibra Screw Feeders, Inc., 149 N.W.2d 480, 481 (Mich. Ct. App.
1967), in which the contacts were actually sufficiently related to the dispute to
support specific jurisdiction as the Michigan plaintiff sued his former employer for
breach of contract to recover commissions he was allegedly owed for selling the
defendant’s products in Michigan); Travel Opportunities of Fort Lauderdale, Inc. v.
Walter Karl List Mgmt., Inc., 726 So. 2d 313, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (relying
on eight cases that purportedly “control[led] the result” of its amenability
149
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despite the oft-recognized maxim that a more stringent test must be
155
employed for general jurisdiction.
Without a coherent decisional
foundation, precedential comparisons will only deepen the mire in
the swamp.
More importantly, however, this approach does not provide any
cogent underlying rationale for effecting a comparison. Businesses
engage in numerous disparate activities to accomplish a wide variety
156
of objectives.
As a result, discerning a reliable similitude from a

determination that general jurisdiction existed even though each of the cited cases—
Electro Engineering Products Co. v. Lewis, 352 So. 2d 862, 864 (Fla. 1977), Atlanta Gas
Light Co. v. Semaphore Advertising, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 715, 721-22 (S.D. Ga. 1990),
Casano v. WDSU-TV, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1130, 1138 (S.D. Miss. 1970), Cable Home
Communication Corp. v. Network Products, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 858 (11th Cir. 1990),
Logan Products, Inc. v. Optibase, Inc., 103 F.3d 49, 53 (7th Cir. 1996), Clark v. City of St.
Augustine, 977 F. Supp. 541, 543-44 (D. Mass. 1997), and Sollinger v. Nasco
International, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Vt. 1987)—involved specific rather than
general jurisdiction); Bachman v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 724 P.2d 858, 862 (Or. Ct. App.
1986) (citing two state court decisions, Laufer v. Ostrow, 434 N.E.2d 692 (N.Y. 1982),
and Labbe v. Nissen Corp., 404 A.2d 564 (Me. 1979), as holdings “on similar facts” even
though cases involved specific jurisdiction rather than dispute-blind jurisdiction).
155
See, e.g., Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 787
(7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he constitutional requirement for general jurisdiction is
‘considerably more stringent’ than that required for specific jurisdiction.”) (quoting
United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 618 (1st Cir. 2001)); ALS Scan,
Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing
that general jurisdiction entails a “more demanding standard than is necessary for
establishing specific jurisdiction”); Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews, 291 F.3d
738, 747 (11th Cir. 2002) (reiterating that “‘[t]he due process requirements for
general jurisdiction are more stringent than for specific personal jurisdiction’”)
(quoting Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2000));
Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 93 (1st Cir. 1998) (observing that “[t]he
standard for evaluating whether [the defendant’s] contacts satisfy the constitutional
general jurisdiction test ‘is considerably more stringent’ than that applied to specific
jurisdiction questions”) (quoting Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213, 216 (1st Cir.
1984)); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 1997)
(detailing that “the threshold level of minimum contacts to confer general
jurisdiction is significantly higher than for specific jurisdiction”); Metro. Life Ins., 84
F.3d at 568 (explaining that, “[b]ecause general jurisdiction is not related to the
events giving rise to the suit, courts impose a more stringent minimum contacts test,
requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant’s ‘continuous and systematic
general business contacts’”) (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416); Dalton v. R & W
Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1362 (5th Cir. 1990) (expressing that “contacts of a
more extensive quality and nature are required” for general jurisdiction); Am. Type
Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Tex. 2002) (iterating that
general jurisdiction entails a “more demanding minimum-contacts analysis than
specific jurisdiction”).
156
See, e.g., Ex parte United Bhd. of Carpenters, 688 So. 2d 246, 252 (Ala. 1997)
(detailing activities of national labor union designed to discourage “contractors who
do not provide union labor”); Health Indus. Mfg. Ass’n v. Crabb, No. 14-99-00402CV, 1999 WL 1080662, at *4 (Tex. App. Dec. 2, 1999) (discussing position advocacy
mission of medical device manufacturers trade association).
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prior decision is often difficult. So the courts resort to drawing
comparisons from dissimilar precedents, which metaphorically
resigns the courts, borrowing from Justice Scalia, to scrutinizing
157
“whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”
And, even after the comparison, all the court can do is conclude that
this is a little more, so general jurisdiction is present, or this is a little
less, so no general jurisdiction exists. The general jurisdiction
decisions thus take on the aura of obscenity decisions—the courts
purport to know it when they see it. But this is no way to resolve a
preliminary due process issue predicated in part on the defendant’s
158
reasonable expectations regarding the situs of suit.
Of course, there is nothing wrong in the abstract in relying on
precedent—on the contrary, precedent is a pillar of American
159
constitutional judicial decisionmaking.
But general jurisdiction
precedent is often no assistance because the decisions are conflicting
160
or inapposite.
This precludes defendants from structuring their
transactions to avoid the sovereign jurisdictional prerogative of a
foreign state. And, without an underlying rationale to serve as a
compass, a comparative precedential template will keep the courts
traipsing, as Judge Learned Hand remarked, “from tuft to tuft across
161
the morass.”
C. Factor Analysis
Some jurisdictions have adopted jurisdictional factors or
indicators for dispute-blind queries. Under one model, courts
162
employ a five-factor analysis, while the other approach inspects
whether the defendant’s forum activities satisfy certain traditional
163
general jurisdiction criteria.
But neither template bestows any
doctrinal clarification.

157

Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
158
See supra Part III.A.
159
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992)
(O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., plurality) (avowing “the very concept of the rule
of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a
respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable”).
160
See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
161
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand,
J.).
162
See infra Part III.C.1.
163
See infra Part III.C.2.

840

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
1.

Vol. 34:807

The Five-Factor “Whole-Hog” Approach

Some courts outline five factors for resolving all in personam
jurisdiction queries, examining (1) the quantity of the contacts with
the forum, (2) the nature and quality of the contacts, (3) the nexus
between the cause of action and the contacts, (4) the forum state’s
164
interest in the dispute, and (5) the parties’ convenience.
This
Article names this factor analysis the “whole-hog” approach because
the test collapses the general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction, and
165
fair play and substantial justice analysis into one sweeping inquiry.
The origins of this approach predate significant modern
refinements on amenability. The Eighth Circuit employed the
166
This
approach as early as 1965, in Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co.
sweeping test, then, is a precursor to the Supreme Court’s explicit
167
adoption of separate reasonableness or fairness factors and the
widespread acceptance of Professors von Mehren and Trautman’s
164

See, e.g., Sybaritic, Inc. v. Interport Int’l, Inc., 957 F.2d 522, 524 (8th Cir. 1992)
(analyzing constitutionality of an assertion of jurisdiction by carefully considering
“(1) the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of
the contacts with the forum state; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the
contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents;
and (5) the convenience of the parties”); Zumbro, Inc. v. Cal. Natural Prods., 861 F.
Supp. 773, 778 (D. Minn. 1994) (detailing the above-referenced “five separate
considerations . . . to be examined when determining whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction in any case comports with due process”); Covia v. Robinson, 507
N.W.2d 411, 415-16 (Iowa 1993) (applying test in case in which both general and
specific jurisdiction were raised); Vikse v. Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276, 282 (Minn. 1982)
(adopting test in Minnesota); Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 610 N.W.2d 670,
674 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (applying test in general jurisdiction case); Bruggeman v.
Meditrust Acquisition Co., 532 S.E.2d 215, 219 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (applying test to
hold nonresident defendant subject to general jurisdiction, even though case could
have been resolved under specific jurisdiction principles since the contacts were
related to the dispute).
165
Cf. Sybaritic, 957 F.2d at 524 (noting these five considerations incorporate both
the notions of minimum contacts and fair play and substantial justice); Zumbro, 861
F. Supp. at 778 (same).
166
343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965) (Blackmun, J.).
167
See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114-15 (1987)
(holding California’s exercise of jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer was
unreasonable because of the severe burden on the defendant, the minimal interest
of the plaintiff and the forum in California’s assertion of jurisdiction, and the
procedural and substantive policies of other nations); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985) (articulating factors, such as the defendant’s
burden, the interests of the plaintiff and sovereign, efficient judicial resolution, and
social policies, to consider in scrutinizing the reasonableness and fairness of an
assertion of jurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
292 (1980) (listing factors to consider in determining reasonableness of jurisdiction,
including the burden on the defendant and the interests of the plaintiff and the
forum, as well as the interests in resolving cases efficiently and advancing
fundamental substantive social policies).
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dichotomy between specific and general jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, then, this sweeping approach often fails to
adequately factor the quantitative and qualitative nature of contacts
necessary for an assertion of general jurisdiction. Indeed, the nexus
between the cause of action and the contacts, i.e., whether the case is
a specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction case, is only examined
after analyzing the quantity of the contacts and nature and quality of
169
170
the contacts.
For example, in Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island,
the court first concluded that the defendant’s forum activities
supported “personal jurisdiction” by relying on both specific and
general jurisdiction precedent, and thereafter contemplated the
171
relationship of the defendant’s forum activities to the suit.
Of
course, such a mode of analysis places the proverbial cart before the
horse. The court should first ascertain whether the defendant’s
forum contacts are related to the dispute to discern whether the
substantiality of the contacts are to be adjudged by the less stringent
specific jurisdiction standard or the more rigorous dispute-blind
criterion. Otherwise, the analysis of the quantity and quality of the
contacts will intermingle specific and general jurisdictional
172
principles, failing to provide an ascertainable standard for the more

168

See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 3, at 1135-36, 1164-66.
See, e.g., Estate of Rick v. Stevens, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032-34 (N.D. Iowa
2001) (concluding the nature, quality, and quantity of one defendant’s nine
contracts with forum residents and the other defendant’s dozens of forum trips
satisfied “due process” before determining that the contacts had no relationship to
the plaintiff’s cause of action); Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 610 N.W.2d 670,
674-76 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the quantity of the contacts and the
nature and quality of the contacts supported the exercise of “personal jurisdiction”
before considering the relationship of the contacts to the cause of action). Some
courts purport to follow the “whole-hog” factors, but actually fail to apply them,
instead engaging in a more traditional analysis separately considering specific
jurisdiction, general jurisdiction, and the reasonableness factors. See, e.g., Zumbro,
Inc. v. Cal. Natural Prods., 861 F. Supp. 773, 778 (D. Minn. 1994) (discussing the five
sweeping considerations, but separately scrutinizing the propriety of general
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction).
170
610 N.W.2d 670 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
171
Id. at 674-76. The Marshall case arguably could have been decided as a specific
jurisdiction case because the Minnesota resident learned about the Wisconsin
defendant Inn in a magazine directed at Minnesota readers, the Inn managed the
property in Wisconsin at which he was injured via a contract with the Minnesota
owners of the property, and the Inn contacted the resident in Minnesota after his
injury. Id. at 676; see supra note 98. However, the Minnesota court held that specific
jurisdiction did not exist. Marshall, 610 N.W.2d at 676-77.
172
Marshall, 610 N.W.2d at 675-76 (holding the nature and quality of contacts by
nonresident defendant of advertising in Minnesota publications and through direct
mail to Minnesota residents, contracting for its services with Minnesota residents,
and purchasing goods and services from Minnesota businesses supported “personal
169
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substantial contacts required for an assertion of general
173
jurisdiction.
This approach accordingly suffers from similar deficiencies as
the ipse dixit and precedential templates. While perhaps providing
some superficial semblance of a jurisdictional “test,” the purported
standard offers no insight on the substantiality of the contacts
necessary for general jurisdiction. Instead, courts employing this
approach often conflate dispute-specific and dispute-blind doctrine,
174
thereby impoverishing both.
This prevents defendants from
foreseeing the quality and quantity of forum activities establishing the
requisite predicate for the foreign sovereign to exercise its
jurisdictional prerogative over all causes of action.
2.

Contact Factors

Other courts utilize a non-exhaustive listing of contact factors,
sometimes referenced as the “traditional indicia” of general
jurisdiction, in analyzing amenability based on unrelated forum
175
contacts. The various factors employed by the courts include, inter
alia, whether the defendant has an office, bank account, phone
listing, or property in the state; whether the defendant continuously
employs individuals in the state to advance its interests; whether the
defendant serves the market or engages in business in the state
through sales or other activities; whether the defendant advertises or
solicits business in the state; whether the defendant has designated a
registered agent within the state or is licensed to do business there;
whether agents of the defendant travel to the state to visit customers
or solicit additional business; and whether the defendant recruits
176
employees in the state.
These jurisdictional indicia are then
jurisdiction” by relying on both specific and general jurisdiction precedent from
Minnesota courts and the United States Supreme Court). But see Fraser v. Littlejohn,
386 S.E.2d 230, 235-37 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (analyzing nature and extent of contacts
in light of prior United States and North Carolina precedent on general jurisdiction
in alternative holding that judgment debtor was subject to general jurisdiction).
173
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
174
Cf. Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 612.
175
See, e.g., Wiwa v. Dutch Royal Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2000)
(stating that court focuses “on a traditional set of indicia” in resolving general
jurisdiction).
176
See, e.g., Doering v. Copper Mountain, Inc., 259 F.3d 1202, 1210 (10th Cir.
2001) (considering four factors, including whether the defendant solicited business
in the forum through a local office or agent, sent agents to the forum on a regular
basis to solicit business, conducted substantial business in the forum, or represented
that it did business in the forum through advertisements, listings, or bank accounts,
to hold that a Delaware corporation with its sole place of business in Colorado was
not amenable to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey in suit filed by New Jersey
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compared to the defendant’s forum activities to appraise the
177
defendant’s amenability.
Courts employing these criteria create a narrow palladium from
the forum’s dispute-blind adjudicatory power because the defendant
is not amenable unless it conducts some of the delineated activities in
178
But to be certain of procuring this safe haven, the
the state.
residents for injury occurring in Colorado); Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 98 (opining that
traditional indicia of general jurisdiction include “whether the company has an office
in the state, whether it has any bank accounts or other property in the state, whether
it has a phone listing in the state, whether it does public relations work there, and
whether it has individuals permanently located in the state to promote its interests,”
and holding that foreign oil corporation satisfied such indicia through the presence
of a permanent office staffed by an employee); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta
Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (iterating that a court should
examine factors, such as “whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in
business in the state, serves the state’s markets, designates an agent for service of
process, holds a license, or is incorporated there,” in resolving general jurisdiction
query); Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Co., 90 F.3d 1523, 1533 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding Colorado law firm without a Michigan office that did not advertise or
hold itself out as doing business in Michigan was not amenable to general
jurisdiction, despite representing twenty-four Michigan residents on 104 matters,
because the “factors which are normally considered in making ‘continuous and
systematic’ determinations” were not implicated); Haas v. A.M. King Indus., Inc., 28
F. Supp. 2d 644, 650 (D. Utah 1998) (concluding nonresident corporations were not
amenable to jurisdiction based in part on the absence of any of the relevant
jurisdictional factors); Higgins v. Rausch Herefords, 609 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Neb. Ct.
App. 2000) (finding nonresident cattle selling operation not amenable to general
jurisdiction when it did not designate an agent for service of process, hold a forum
license, have employees in the state, or conduct any sales or solicitation in the state
other than sporadic advertisements); Buddensick v. Stateline Hotel, Inc., 972 P.2d
928, 930-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding Nevada casino with parking lots on the
Utah side of the Utah-Nevada border subject to general jurisdiction in Utah after
distilling from a survey of case law that the factors for the exercise of general in
personam jurisdiction include whether defendant is engaged in or registered to do
business in the state; generates a substantial percentage of its sales from residents of
the state; advertises or solicits business in the state; owns property in the state; has
offices, employees, shareholders, bank accounts, or phone listings in the state; visits
customers or potential customers in the state; recruits employees in the state; or pays
taxes in the state), cert. denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999).
177
Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 98.
178
See, e.g., Doering, 259 F.3d at 1210 (holding Delaware corporation with its sole
place of business in Colorado that advertised in national magazines and sent an
employee to two trade shows in New Jersey was not amenable to personal jurisdiction
in New Jersey in suit filed by New Jersey residents for injury occurring in Colorado as
it had no agents, employees, or offices in New Jersey); Soma Med. Int’l, Inc. v.
Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding British
bank not subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction in Utah as it performed none of the
twelve activities the court deemed to be relevant to the existence of general
jurisdiction); Gardemal v. Westin Hotel Co., 186 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a Mexican corporation not licensed to do business in Texas and that
did not have an office, employees, or property in Texas did not have the requisite
contacts for general jurisdiction in Texas); Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1533 (10th Cir.
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defendant must perform none of the described activities, essentially
requiring the defendant to sever all business relationships with the
forum. Otherwise, the defendant cannot predict its amenability to
the state’s general adjudicatory jurisdiction.
This uncertainty arises because these traditional indicia provide
no insight as to what general jurisdiction is. Most of the factors
viewed singularly are, according to the better-reasoned decisions, of
negligible jurisdictional import. For instance, owning property
within the state is clearly not sufficient, standing alone, to subject the
defendant to jurisdiction under the Supreme Court’s decision in
179
Shaffer v. Heitner. Similarly, a defendant’s forum bank account—
which is, of course, a species of property—should not justify general
180
181
jurisdiction. Nor is the existence of a phone listing in the forum,
1996) (averring Colorado law firm without a Michigan office that did not advertise or
hold itself out as doing business in Michigan was not amenable to general
jurisdiction); Ratliff v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971) (concluding
nonresident drug manufacturers without offices, property, or bank accounts in South
Carolina not subject to the forum’s dispute-blind adjudicatory jurisdiction); Wims v.
Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding New
Jersey motor inn that had not paid taxes, made purchases, advertised in publications,
maintained a telephone listing, owned property, or had agents in Pennsylvania was
not amenable to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts); Dean Mktg., Inc. v.
AOC Int’l (U.S.A.), Ltd., 610 F. Supp. 149, 152-53 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (finding
Taiwanese corporation not amenable to general jurisdiction in Michigan because it
had no property, employees, agents, phone listings, or bank accounts in Michigan
and because it did not solicit business nor was it registered or licensed to do business
in Michigan); Higgins, 609 N.W.2d at 718 (concluding nonresident cattle operation
without forum employees, agents, or sales not amenable to general jurisdiction); CSR
Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. 1996) (holding Australian corporation did
not have the continuous and systematic Texas contacts required for general
jurisdiction as it did not have an office, employees, bank accounts, or property in
Texas and it had not solicited business in Texas, paid taxes in Texas, or entered into
contracts in Texas); Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 771-74 (Tex.
1995) (finding Maryland corporation not amenable to general jurisdiction in Texas
when it had no office, employees, agents, assets, property, bank accounts, or place of
business in Texas).
179
433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977) (holding mere presence of property in forum,
standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction).
180
See id.; see also Transportes Aeros de Coahuila, S.A. v. Falcon, 5 S.W.3d 712, 71920 (Tex. App. 1999) (finding Mexican corporation’s maintenance of Texas bank
account did not support general jurisdiction), disapproved on other grounds, BMC
Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 n.1 (Tex. 2002); Primera Vista
S.P.R. de R.L. v. Banca Serfin S.A., 974 S.W.2d 918, 926 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding
Mexican corporation’s annualized deposits of over one billion dollars and thousands
of transactions a year at eleven Texas banks were insufficient to support the exercise
of general jurisdiction). But cf. Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
819 F.2d 434, 438 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding California bank without Pennsylvania
office or employees amenable to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania in part because
of zero-balance account with Pennsylvania bank that was central to the conduct of its
business); El Puerto de Liverpool, S.A. de C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero S.A. de C.V.,
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or the presence of an agent for service of process, significant to the
general jurisdiction query.
And even the more superficially
consequential factors, such as a forum office, forum sales, or forumtargeted advertisements and solicitations, are not always enough to
183
support dispute-blind jurisdiction.
Because the mere existence of one (or perhaps more) of these
traditional indicia is usually insufficient, either a methodology or
baseline for balancing the requisite jurisdictional criteria is essential.
But the cases finding general jurisdiction under this paradigm have
not elaborated on such a technique, instead being content to hold
that the defendant’s forum business activities at issue, which were at
least assisted by an office or business property within the forum,
184
established the required minimum contacts.
Thus, while a
traditional indicia analysis may reveal the defendant’s nonamenability due to the complete absence of the relevant factors, it
does not provide much assistance in demarcating the boundary
between some quantum of forum activities and those continuous and
systematic activities considered so substantial and of the requisite
nature to support dispute-blind adjudication.
This deficiency could perhaps be mitigated if the traditional
indicia were augmented by some justification for why these factors—
especially the relatively insignificant contacts of a phone listing or
registered agent for service of process in the state—are relevant to
the forum’s assertion of general jurisdiction over the defendant. But
the courts have never proffered such a justification. And without it,
this approach suffers from the same infirmity as the comparative

82 S.W.3d 622, 633 (Tex. App. 2002) (concluding Mexican corporation conducted
“‘substantial’ activities in Texas” through its Texas bank account, but not addressing
whether the bank account would alone provide an adequate basis for general
jurisdiction because other contacts existed).
181
See, e.g., Wolf v. Richmond County Hosp. Auth., 745 F.2d 904, 910 (4th Cir.
1984) (concluding listing in forum telephone directory not an activity supporting
dispute-blind jurisdiction); Johnson v. Summa Corp., 632 F. Supp. 122, 125 (E.D. Pa.
1985) (holding Nevada hotel not subject to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania
based on toll-free number in the forum); Van Pelt v. Best Workover, Inc., 798 S.W.2d
14, 17 (Tex. App. 1990) (finding telephone listing did not support general
jurisdiction).
182
See infra Part IV.A.
183
See infra Parts IV.B-C.
184
See, e.g., Wiwa v. Dutch Royal Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding foreign oil corporation satisfied “traditional indicia” of dispute-blind
jurisdiction through the presence of a permanent office staffed by an employee);
Buddensick v. Stateline Hotel, Inc., 972 P.2d 928, 930-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(holding Nevada casino with parking lots on the Utah side of the Utah-Nevada
border subject to general jurisdiction in Utah), cert. denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999).
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precedential model—all the court can do is compare to singularly
trivial criteria and conclude that this is enough, so general
jurisdiction is present, or this is not quite enough, so no general
jurisdiction exists.
D. Central Business Activities
Another general adjudicatory jurisdiction template is
scrutinizing whether the defendant’s forum activities are central to
185
the conduct of its business.
Under this approach, a defendant
conducts the requisite substantial business activities for general
jurisdiction if its forum activities are the “bread and butter of its daily
186
business.”
The Third Circuit adopted this model in Provident
187
National Bank v. California Federal Savings & Loan Association, where
it held that a California bank without offices or employees in the
forum was nevertheless amenable to dispute-blind jurisdiction
primarily because its maintenance of a zero-balance, controlled
disbursements bank account in the state was central to the conduct of
188
its business.
The efficacy of this approach depends, of course, on judicial
guidance regarding the methodology for adjudging which activities
are “central” to a corporation’s business. Unfortunately, however, the
courts following this construct have not provided consistent answers.
One court opined that the contemplated activity was “the day to day
189
operation of the defendant’s business, not the resultant sales.” On the
other hand, different courts have concluded that forum sales and
other revenue-generating activities are the requisite “bread and
190
butter” of a company’s business.
Further, the decisions conflate
185

See, e.g., Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 438
(3d Cir. 1987) (holding California bank subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania because it conducted forum activities central to the conduct of its
business); Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Geko-Mayo, GmbH, 56 F. Supp. 2d 559,
572 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (decreeing the dispositive general jurisdiction criterion—the
centrality of the nonresident’s forum activities to the conduct of its business—was
not satisfied when the principal business of the German corporation was selling
steam in Germany rather than Pennsylvania).
186
Provident Nat’l Bank, 819 F.2d at 438.
187
819 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1987).
188
Id. at 438.
189
Orange Prods., Inc. v. Winters, No. CIV. A. 94-CV-6004, 1995 WL 118461, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 1995) (emphasis added) (holding nonresident corporation not
subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction because its forum sales were not “central to its
business of producing precision plastic balls”).
190
See, e.g., Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Geko-Mayo, GmbH, 56 F. Supp. 2d
559, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (concluding defendant’s principal business was selling
steam in Germany, none of which occurred in the forum state of Pennsylvania);
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whether the standard depends on the importance of the activities to
the defendant’s forum business or whether the comparison is to the
191
defendant’s overall business activities.
These uncertainties
preclude defendants from obtaining needed guidance as to the
quality and quantity of forum activities required for general
jurisdiction.
The uncertainties emanate, in part, from the suspect rationale in
192
the case adopting this approach, Provident National Bank.
The
Third Circuit in that case distinguished Helicopteros on the basis that
Helicol’s purchase of helicopters and training from Bell Helicopter
was not central to the conduct of its business, while the zero-balance,
controlled disbursements account the California bank maintained
193
with a Pennsylvania bank was.
But this distinction is dubious.
Purchasing helicopters and training its pilots were just as central to
Helicol’s business of providing helicopter services as the maintenance
of a disbursements account for clearing checks was to the California
bank’s business of borrowing and lending money.
Although
purchasing helicopters and training pilots did not directly generate
revenue for Helicol, Helicol would not have been able to produce
income from its helicopter services without helicopters and trained
pilots. Similarly, the disbursements account itself did not generate
revenue for the California bank, but such an account was necessary to
support its activities that did. Thus, the Third Circuit’s purported
distinction between Provident National Bank and Helicopteros is
doubtful, making it difficult for courts to apply in subsequent
decisions.
The central business activities approach also suffers from the
absence of an underlying rationale. The Third Circuit never
explained why conducting activities in the forum central to the
defendant’s business supports the exercise of jurisdiction for causes
Modern Mailers, Inc. v. Johnson & Quin, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (iterating that sale of goods and services was “principal purpose” of marketing
and technology business, but finding that its forum sales were not daily or regular as
required for dispute-blind jurisdiction); Covenant Bank for Sav. v. Cohen, 806 F.
Supp. 52, 57-58 (D.N.J. 1992) (opining loans to and deposits from forum residents
were “bread and butter” of bank’s daily business, but holding that bank did not
engage in required regular contact with forum state to service these loans as required
for dispute-blind jurisdiction).
191
See Snyder v. Dolphin Encounters, Ltd., 235 F. Supp. 2d 433, 440-41 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (citing earlier case purportedly holding foreign defendant’s websites were not
“‘central’ to the defendant’s business in Pennsylvania,” but nevertheless conducting
its analysis based on the centrality of Pennsylvania to defendants’ overall business
activities) (emphasis added).
192
819 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1987).
193
Id. at 438.
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of action without any relationship to such activities.
While one
could argue that conducting principal business activities in the forum
enhances the defendant’s reasonable expectation of being subject to
the state’s judicial power for all causes of action, a difficulty arises
because of the previously discussed uncertainties regarding the
195
defining characteristics of central business activities.
Moreover, even if the courts marked the appropriate
boundaries, the reasonable anticipation rationale may not justify the
discrepant results expected under this model. As an example, if WalMart maintained two of its thousands of nationwide stores in Alaska,
its forum activities would not be central to the conduct of its overall
world-wide business, presumably precluding the exercise of general
196
jurisdiction by the Alaska courts.
In contrast, a closely-held
Washington corporation with only two stores, one in Washington and
another in Alaska, would be conducting activities central to its overall
business in Alaska. Even though the closely-held corporation is
conducting fewer activities in Alaska than Wal-Mart, its relatively
paltry total business activities mandates that its smaller quantum of
forum activities is more central to its overall business, subjecting it to
general jurisdiction. But what persuasive rationale could support this
incongruous result? It certainly is not fair or reasonable, as Wal-Mart
has more substantial resources to defend itself in Alaska and conducts
more of the same types of activities in the forum. Nor could it be said
that Alaska has a greater sovereign interest over the closely-held
corporation when the quantity and quality of Wal-Mart’s activities is
comparatively greater. Quite simply, this approach may offend
“‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,’” the very core
197
of our modern jurisdictional model.
Thus, equating central business activities with dispute-blind
jurisdiction is problematic. Not only have the courts failed to adopt a
consensus on the methodology for determining which activities are
pivotal to the conduct of the defendant’s business, the approach does
not offer a cogent underlying rationale. Both of these defects

194

Id.
See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
196
See, e.g., Snyder v. Dolphin Encounters, Ltd., 235 F. Supp. 2d 433, 440-41 (E.D.
Pa. 2002) (conducting its analysis based on the centrality of Pennsylvania to
defendants’ overall world-wide business activities); Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v.
Geko-Mayo, GmbH, 56 F. Supp. 2d 559, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (examining defendant’s
forum activities in light of its overarching principal business of selling steam in
Germany).
197
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
195
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preclude this approach from offering any meaningful insight
regarding the parameters of dispute-blind jurisdiction.
E. Constructive Presence
A number of courts utilize a constructive presence rationale in
198
scrutinizing a defendant’s amenability to general jurisdiction. Such
decisions typically evaluate whether a defendant’s forum contacts are
199
so extensive that they either “approximate physical presence” or
200
“take the place of physical presence.” In other words, these courts
analogize the defendant’s forum activities to a jurisdictional baseline
of a person’s actual physical presence in the forum.
This approach is grounded in antecedent jurisdictional doctrine.
Historically, the limits on personal jurisdiction were based on a
201
court’s power over the actual physical person of the defendant. Of
198

See, e.g., Purdue Research v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 787 (7th Cir.
2003) (finding no basis for exercising general jurisdiction when the defendant’s
forum contacts were not tantamount to it “being constructively present in the state to
such a degree that it would be fundamentally fair to require it to answer in an
Indiana court in any litigation arising out of any transaction or occurrence taking
place anywhere in the world”) (emphasis in original); Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V.
v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding
general jurisdiction was not proper over defendant because its forum contacts were
not “the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts that
‘approximate physical presence’”) (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta
Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000)); Vons Cos. v. Seabest Foods, Inc.,
926 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Cal. 1996) (stating that general jurisdiction requires wideranging contacts with the forum “that take the place of physical presence in the
forum as a basis for jurisdiction”); Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int’l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d
851, 853-54 (N.Y. 1967) (holding British hotel corporation conducted such
continuous and systematic business activities through its agent in New York to justify
its amenability to suit predicated on its “presence” in the forum); Bachman v. Med.
Eng’g Corp., 724 P.2d 858, 860-62 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (holding nonresident hospital
and doctors not “present” in Oregon as required for general jurisdiction, while
nonresident medical equipment manufacturer was deemed present).
199
See, e.g., Glencore Grain, 284 F.3d at 1124; Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1086.
200
Vons Cos., 926 P.2d at 1092; see also ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126
F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 1997) (articulating dispositive issue is whether defendant’s
forum activities are “so substantial that they amount to a surrogate for presence and
thus render the exercise of sovereignty just”); Stover v. O’Connell Assocs., Inc., 84
F.3d 132, 136-37 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding nonresident private investigation firm’s
telephone orders for investigation services from Maryland entities did not establish
its “presence” in the forum as required for an assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction);
Carretti v. Italpast, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126, 131 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding sporadic sales
to California users were “not the kind of wide-ranging contacts that take the place of
physical presence in the forum” as required to support general jurisdiction).
201
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“Historically the jurisdiction of courts to
render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the
defendant’s person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the
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course, corporations did not fit comfortably within such a regime,
because a corporation has no tangible physical presence. Unlike an
individual, a corporation’s “presence” could “be manifested only by
activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act
202
for it.”
Thus, the pre-International Shoe jurisdictional formula for
corporations typically depended on the corporation’s deemed
203
presence through its business activities in the forum.
International Shoe and its modern progeny relied on this earlier
“presence” jurisprudence in illustrating a corporation’s amenability
to suit based on substantial, continuous forum business activities
204
unrelated to the plaintiff’s claim. Indeed, Helicopteros predicated its
holding that purchases and related trips, standing alone, were
insufficient for dispute-blind jurisdiction on a pre-International Shoe
decision, reasoning that “Shoe acknowledged and did not repudiate
205
[this] holding.”
Because the Court still examines these earlier
decisions in evaluating general jurisdiction queries, contemporary
dispute-blind jurisdiction appears to be a direct descendant of the
206
pre-Shoe construct of presence.
Nevertheless, a constructive presence rationale is of little
assistance when perpending dispute-blind jurisdiction because a
corporation’s “presence” has always been a fiction merely begging the
207
question of amenability.
Since a corporation has no actual
corporeal existence, the only method to gauge “presence” is
evaluating the corporation’s ongoing forum activities to determine if
jurisdiction is appropriate. In other words, as International Shoe

court was a prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.”).
202
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
203
See, e.g., Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517 (1923)
(noting sole issue presented was whether “defendant was doing business within the
State of New York in such a manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference
that it was present there”); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 226
(1913) (analyzing whether Texas railroad was “present” in New York).
204
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-18 (1984);
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 n.6 (1952); Int’l Shoe, 326
U.S. at 318; see supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
205
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417-18 (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown
Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)).
206
Cf. Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 141, 151 (noting that “presence” implied general jurisdiction); Allan R.
Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction: From Isolation to Connectedness, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 373,
380 [hereinafter Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction] (iterating that “general jurisdiction is
derived from the power premise of Pennoyer, under which the exclusive test for state
authority is the presence of the defendant or his property at the time of the
litigation”).
207
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
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explained, the concept of “presence” is “used merely to symbolize
those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which
courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due
208
process.” Because “presence” is just a symbol of corporate activities,
courts must initially scrutinize the corporate defendant’s forum
conduct to determine if the corporation is “present” and thereby
amenable to jurisdiction, leading back to the original quandary of the
quality and quantity of forum activities necessary to support disputeblind jurisdiction.
While the Supreme Court accepted a fictional “presence”
rationale as the polestar for jurisdiction before International Shoe, Shoe
abandoned the construct in favor of directly examining the
reasonableness of an assertion of jurisdiction based on the
209
defendant’s forum activities.
As the Court realized, a quest for
“presence” leads nowhere because its ultimate resolution ipso facto
depends on the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction based on
210
the corporation’s underlying forum activities.
A deemed or constructive presence rationale hence moves us no
closer to clarifying general jurisdiction than simply reciting that such
jurisdiction is permissible if the forum’s exercise of jurisdiction is
reasonable in light of the corporation’s continuous, systematic, and
substantial activities in the forum. No matter which metaphor is
adopted, the underlying jurisdictional enigma has not been resolved.
F.

Quid Pro Quo

Another doctrinal framework for general jurisdiction queries is a
211
quid pro quo or reciprocal benefits rationale. Under this exchange
theory, a defendant’s business activities within the state provide a
benefit that justifies imposing a corresponding burden of amenability
212
for all causes of action in the forum.
In Ex parte Newco

208

Id. at 316-17.
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (recognizing Court’s
“continuing process of evolution” accepting and then abandoning “‘consent,’ ‘doing
business,’ and ‘presence’ as the standard for measuring the extent of state judicial
power” over corporations).
210
Cf. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
211
See, e.g., Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Burke/Triolo, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1183
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (finding nonresident defendant amenable to general jurisdiction
because it solicited and contracted with forum customers); Wise v. Lindamood, 89 F.
Supp. 2d 1187, 1193 (D. Colo. 1999) (iterating that the dispositive inquiry for
general jurisdiction is whether nonresident defendant enjoyed protections of
forum’s laws such that it must submit to the burdens of litigation).
212
See, e.g., Ex parte Newco Mfg. Co., 481 So. 2d 867, 869 (Ala. 1985).
209
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213

Manufacturing Co., for example, the Alabama Supreme Court held
that 2,000 sales made to Alabama residents in a five-year period in an
amount of $65,000 to $85,000 per year was sufficient to subject a
nonresident Missouri corporation to dispute-blind jurisdiction in
Alabama even though the title to all goods was transferred outside
214
the state. The court reasoned that in exchange for the “privilege of
making sales (and profits) in Alabama in a continuous and systematic
course of merchandising,” the defendant “must bear the burden
215
commensurate with the benefits received from its sales in Alabama.”
However, this hardly appears a reasonable exchange. Newco
Manufacturing undoubtedly received some benefits from its sales to
Alabama residents, but were such benefits really a fair bargain for
being subject to suit for any cause of action in Alabama, even for an
injury suffered by a Tennessee resident in Tennessee? Most would
216
probably think not. Indeed, in Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., a case
involving much more extensive sales to forum residents than Ex parte
Newco, the Fifth Circuit utilized an exchange rationale to reject the
217
existence of dispute-blind jurisdiction.
Reasoning that “general
jurisdiction is based on a concept of ‘exchange’” requiring the
defendant to invoke “the benefits and protections of the forum’s
laws,” the Fifth Circuit postulated the dispositive issue was whether
Beech Aircraft benefited from the forum’s law in conducting its
218
activities. Since Beech had meticulously negotiated, executed, and
performed its contracts worth several hundred million dollars with
forum residents outside the forum, the court determined that the
defendant had “calculatedly avoided” the forum’s laws such that it
219
was not amenable to general jurisdiction.
The difficulty is that even Bearry’s more realistic analysis does not
demonstrate what constitutes a fair exchange for a defendant’s
submission to the forum’s general adjudicatory power for all causes
of action. While Bearry correctly held that a defendant cannot be
amenable to dispute-blind jurisdiction in the absence of receiving
220
benefits and protections from the laws of the forum, which indeed
213

481 So. 2d 867 (Ala. 1985).
Id. at 869. The suit was based on a fatal accident involving equipment
manufactured in Missouri that was sold in Maryland and allegedly injured a
Tennessee resident in Tennessee. Id. at 868.
215
Id. at 869.
216
818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987).
217
Id. at 375-76.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
See id.; see also Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801,
214
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is a prerequisite for the lower threshold of activity necessary for
221
specific jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit did not answer how much
benefit and protection from the forum’s law is required for general
jurisdiction. Nor has any other court resolved this fundamental
question.
Instead, exchange theory is typically used—and it originated—to
justify specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction. International Shoe
first expressed the reciprocal benefits rationale explicitly in terms of
specific jurisdiction:
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protections of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege
may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out
of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure
which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to
enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be
undue.222
223

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
articulated a similar
conception, remarking that it was not unreasonable to subject a
manufacturer or distributor serving the state’s market to suit in that
state when its “allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source
224
of injury to its owner or to others.”
Such a quid pro quo justification for specific jurisdiction appears
appropriate. When a nonresident corporation conducts activities
within the state obtaining the benefits and protections of that state’s
laws, it seems a reasonable exchange to subject the corporation to the
risk of the state’s assertion of jurisdiction if its activities cause a forum
injury. In essence, as Professor Twichell noted, “The scope of the
225
defendant’s activity defines the scope of the risk.”
However, obtaining the same benefits and protections from the
state is hardly proportional to the burden of unlimited jurisdiction
226
for any cause of action arising anywhere in the world.
A greater
808 (Tex. 2002) (holding dispute-blind jurisdiction inappropriate when “a
nonresident defendant purposefully structures transactions to avoid the benefits and
protections of a forum’s laws”).
221
See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1957) (noting that adjudicatory
jurisdiction “requires some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws”).
222
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (emphasis added).
223
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
224
Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
225
Twitchell, Doing-Business Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 175.
226
See id.
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quantum of forum benefits would be necessary. But the cases
invoking this exchange rationale in the general jurisdiction context
have never accounted for the more substantial forum activities
required for dispute-blind jurisdiction, instead merely co-opting a
specific jurisdiction justification to support the exercise of general
227
jurisdiction.
The judiciary’s general jurisdiction exchange theory is therefore
facile. While commentators have proposed insightful alternatives
that acknowledge a distinction in the requisite forum activities
necessary for dispute-specific and dispute-blind jurisdiction, their
theories unfortunately depend on a more limited doctrinal
conception of general jurisdiction’s scope. For instance, Professor
Allan Stein, reasoning that the “fairness of a state’s jurisdiction over
its citizens is based on a perceived equitable exchange of the
privileges of citizenship for its burdens,” contended general
jurisdiction is therefore appropriate over those defendants
structuring a “citizen-like relationship” by adopting the forum as
228
home for most purposes.
But the general jurisdiction holdings of
federal and state courts do not employ such a limited “adoptive
229
home” theory. Professor Lea Brilmayer avowed a defendant should
be subject to general jurisdiction under the reciprocal benefits and
burdens rationale when “the defendant’s level of activity rises to the
level of activity of an insider, so that relegating the defendant to the
230
Under her rationale, corporate efforts to
political process is fair.”
influence the political process appear significant to the jurisdictional
231
calculus.
But, because the courts do not typically consider such
232
efforts as a relevant contact for general jurisdiction queries, there is
227

See supra notes 211-24 and accompanying text.
Stein, Interstate Federalism, supra note 4, at 758.
229
See infra Part IV.
230
Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 723,
742 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer et al., General Look]; see also Brilmayer, How
Contacts Count, supra note 4, at 87 (urging that a defendant’s systematic activity within
the forum, “such as domicile, incorporation, or doing business, suggests that the
person or corporate entity is enough of an ‘insider’ that he may safely be relegated to
the State’s political processes”).
231
Brilmayer et al., General Look, supra note 230, at 742 (noting that a
corporation’s decision to exert political influence in a state depends “on whether the
level of attachment in that state exceeds the threshold beyond which exerting
political influence is profitable”).
232
See, e.g., Hollar v. Philip Morris, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 794, 801-02 n.6 (N.D. Ohio
1998). Indeed, the only general jurisdiction decisions scrutinizing lobbying efforts
involved either businesses lobbying for governmental contracts or organizations
engaged primarily in position advocacy. See, e.g., Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v.
Geko-Mayo, GmbH, 56 F. Supp. 2d 559, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (lobbying of
228
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no jurisprudence supporting her innovative proposition.
The extant reciprocal benefits and burdens rationales are thus
not the solution. While obtaining the benefits and protections of the
forum’s laws is a necessary predicate for jurisdiction, it is not
sufficient by itself to establish dispute-blind jurisdiction. Something
more is required, but the contours of what this is have not been
adequately answered by any of the existing jurisdictional templates
233
employed by the state and federal courts. Another approach needs
to be adopted.
IV. THE QUEST FOR A NEW DISPUTE-BLIND PARADIGM
Because the existing doctrinal approaches to general jurisdiction
are deficient, a new guiding principle is essential. This theorem
should incorporate the Supreme Court’s directives that the requisite
forum activities must be of a substantial nature as well as continuous
234
and systematic.
Moreover, to the extent possible, a new principle
should reflect the better-reasoned determinations of the lower
federal and state courts. Accordingly, the Article first evaluates the
forum activities that have been decreed substantial enough for
dispute-blind jurisdiction before contemplating a new paradigm.
A. Judicial Appraisals of the Substantiality of Typical Forum Activities
An infinite variety of activities exist that a nonresident defendant
could potentially undertake in the forum. Nevertheless, the judicial
determinations on the requisite substantiality for dispute-blind
jurisdiction commonly appraise four primary categories of activities,
including the appointment of an agent for service of process, the
existence of a forum office, revenue-generating activities in or
attributable to the forum, and websites accessible to forum residents.

Pennsylvania politicians for government contracts was a form of business solicitation,
but not sufficient for dispute-blind jurisdiction); Health Indus. Mfg. Ass’n v. Crabb,
No. 14-99-00402-CV, 1999 WL 1080662, at *4 (Tex. App. Dec. 2, 1999) (holding nonprofit medical device manufacturers’ trade association registered in Delaware with
headquarters in Washington, D.C. amenable to general jurisdiction in Texas as a
result of lobbying efforts to Texas governmental bodies and submission of press
releases to the Texas news media in support of its business mission of “‘advocat[ing]
positions on issues that relate to medical device manufacturers’”).
233
See supra Parts III.A-F.
234
See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318-20 (1945). Of course,
another potential approach would be for the Supreme Court to adopt a new
jurisdictional paradigm. But an immediate foundational change in the Supreme
Court’s adjudicatory jurisprudence is unlikely. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 4, at
133; Juenger, supra note 206, at 167.
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Appointment of an Agent

The corporate laws of every state in the nation require foreign
corporations to register and appoint an agent for service of process
235
before transacting certain kinds of intrastate business.
Unfortunately, though, the jurisdictional effect of such a qualification
236
and appointment is somewhat confused.
The confusion emanates
from superficially conflicting holdings of the Supreme Court on
whether a foreign corporation’s qualification to do business in the
forum and appointment of an agent establishes its amenability for
causes of action unrelated to its forum activities.
Justice Holmes first addressed this question for the Court in
237
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co. In
Pennsylvania Fire, an Arizona corporation sued a Pennsylvania insurer
238
in Missouri state court to recover for a loss suffered in Colorado.
The Pennsylvania insurer previously obtained a license to conduct
business in Missouri and had filed with the insurance superintendent
“a power of attorney consenting that service of process upon the
superintendent should be deemed personal service upon the
company so long as it should have any liabilities outstanding in the
239
state.”
While the insurance superintendent was served in
accordance with the statute, the insurer contended that such service
240
violated due process. But the Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning
that the insurer performed a voluntary act consenting to such service
by executing the power of attorney, thereby “hardly leav[ing] a
241
constitutional question open.”
The Pennsylvania Fire decision is often cited for the proposition
that the qualification to do business and appointment of an agent
exercises as a consent to the forum’s jurisdiction for all causes of
242
action.
But the Court’s holding may not be this broad. The
235

CT CORPORATION SYSTEM, WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING BUSINESS 1 (1992).
See Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1110 (Del. 1988) (noting that federal
and state courts “are divided as to whether statutory registration can operate as an
express consent to personal jurisdiction in the absence of ‘minimum contacts’”).
237
243 U.S. 93 (1917).
238
Id. at 94.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 94-95.
241
Id. at 95-96.
242
See, e.g., Sondergard v. Miles, 985 F.2d 1389, 1397 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing
Pennsylvania Fire as support for holding that construing registration statute as a
consent to jurisdiction for causes of action unrelated to the defendant’s forum
activities did not violate due process); Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1109 (Del.
1988) (relying on Pennsylvania Fire for proposition that registration operates as a
consent to the forum’s exercise of general personal jurisdiction); Bianco v. Concepts
236
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Missouri Supreme Court had held that the insurance company was
actually “doing business” in the state of Missouri, leading to the
inference that jurisdiction was not predicated solely on the mere
243
presence of a designated agent.
Additionally, the Missouri
registration statute arguably required a forum nexus in addition to
registration, as service was considered valid only if the company “had
244
any liabilities outstanding in the state.”
Thus, Pennsylvania Fire’s
holding may have merely entailed the propriety of jurisdiction when
the nonresident corporation appointed an agent and actually
conducted some measure of forum business.
In any event, Pennsylvania Fire predated International Shoe and its
reformulation of the jurisdictional query from fictional constructs to
245
a minimum contacts analysis.
Indeed, Perkins subsequently
minimized any impact the appointment of an agent may have had on
246
The quantum and quality of
the minimum contacts analysis.
activities requiring the appointment of a designated agent under
state law, Perkins pronounced, was a “helpful but not a conclusive test”
for ascertaining whether the nature of the defendant’s forum
247
activities supported jurisdiction for an unrelated cause of action.
The Court again considered the jurisdictional effect of the
appointment of an agent in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
248
Enterprises, Inc., which involved an Ohio statute tolling the statute of
limitations against a foreign corporation that did not have a
249
designated agent for service of process within the state. Relying on
this statute, Bendix, a corporation with its principal place of business
“100”, Inc., 436 A.2d 206, 212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (same); Acacia Pipeline Corp. v.
Champlin Exploration, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Tex. App. 1989) (same). But see In
re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265, 1277 (D. Md. 1981) (opining
plaintiff’s reliance on Pennsylvania Fire for this proposition was misplaced), aff’d, 704
F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983); Freeman v. Dist. Court, 1 P.3d 963, 968 (Nev. 2000)
(concluding Supreme Court “has abandoned the reasoning” of Pennsylvania Fire).
243
Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 184 S.W. 999, 1020 (Mo.
1916), aff’d, 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
244
Pa. Fire, 243 U.S. at 94; cf. In re Mid-Atl. Toyota, 525 F. Supp. at 1277 (reasoning
Pennsylvania Fire therefore “did not hold that consent was a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction in the absence of any contact between defendant and Missouri”).
245
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-18 (1945) (articulating that
the earlier standards of “presence” and “consent” were legal fictions); see also
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality) (noting
that the prior “purely fictional” doctrine of “consent” for jurisdiction over
nonresident corporations appointing an in-state agent was “cast aside” by
International Shoe).
246
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).
247
Id.
248
486 U.S. 888 (1988).
249
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.15 (Anderson 1987).
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in Ohio, contended that its suit for breach of contract against
Midwesco, an Illinois corporation, was not barred by limitations
because Midwesco had not designated an agent in Ohio for service of
250
process. Midwesco responded that such a tolling provision violated
251
the Commerce Clause, and the Supreme Court agreed.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court accepted, without discussion,
that, under the relevant Ohio long-arm statute, the appointment of
an agent for service of process would operate as consent to the
252
assertion of general jurisdiction by the Ohio courts. By appointing
an agent for service of process, the Court postulated Midwesco would
thereby subject itself to the general jurisdiction of Ohio courts as to
“any suit,” irrespective of whether the factual underpinning of the
253
suit had any connection to Ohio.
The Court proclaimed that
designating “an agent subjects the foreign corporation to the general
jurisdiction of the Ohio courts in matters to which Ohio’s tenuous
254
relation would not otherwise extend.” Because requiring a foreign
corporation to submit to general jurisdiction in the absence of
minimum contacts was a “significant burden” exceeding any local
interest of Ohio, the Court held the tolling provision violated the
Commerce Clause by placing an undue burden on interstate
255
commerce.
Bendix, however, did not actually involve the issue of the
substantiality of contacts necessary for the assertion of jurisdiction
256
predicated on unrelated forum activities.
In fact, the Court
explicitly distinguished consensual jurisdiction under the Ohio
statute from “the minimum contacts necessary for supporting
257
personal jurisdiction.” The Court thus did not retreat from its prior
pronouncement that, under the International Shoe minimum contacts
258
test, the presence of an agent is not dispositive.
Instead, the Court presumed the agent’s appointment, under
Ohio law, operated as “consent to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio
259
courts.”
Consent, of course, is another basis for personal
jurisdiction, outside the parameters of the minimum contacts
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259

Bendix, 486 U.S. at 890.
Id.
Id. at 889, 892-93.
Id. at 892.
Id. at 892-93.
Id. at 893-95.
See Bendix, 486 U.S. at 889-95.
Id. at 893.
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).
Bendix, 486 U.S. at 889 (emphasis added).
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260

analysis. Accordingly, Bendix, properly understood, did not involve
the issue addressed by this Article, but instead proceeded on the
assumption (perhaps even an erroneous assumption) that the Ohio
registration statute purported to exact a defendant’s consent to the
261
forum’s jurisdiction for all causes of action asserted against it.
The preceding decisions reveal, then, that the Supreme Court
has employed two distinct modes of analysis since International Shoe to
evaluate whether the appointment of an agent establishes general
jurisdiction. The first considers whether the appointment under the
particular state statute operates as the defendant’s consent to the
jurisdiction of the courts of the state for any and all causes of action,
262
and, if so, whether such exacted consent is constitutional. This was
the issue considered in Bendix, and it also has been addressed by
263
numerous other federal and state courts. But any contemplation of
260

See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982)
(noting a “variety of legal arrangements have been taken to represent express or
implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court” irrespective of the power of
the forum to serve process under International Shoe); cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591-95 (1991) (holding adhesion contract between Florida
cruise company and Washington passengers stipulating Florida as the forum for all
disputes was enforceable); Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16
(1964) (upholding contractual agreement between a New York equipment supplier
and its Michigan customer requiring the customer to appoint an agent for service of
process in New York and consent to the jurisdiction of New York’s courts).
261
Bendix, 486 U.S. at 889, 892-93. The provisions of the Ohio Code, however, do
not clearly establish that the appointment of an agent constitutes a consent to the
general jurisdiction of the Ohio courts. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1703.04.1(A)
(Anderson 1985) provides that “[e]very foreign corporation for profit that is licensed
to transact business in this state . . . shall have and maintain an agent . . . upon whom
process against the corporation may be served . . . .” Id. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit
held after Bendix that the Ohio Code provisions did not in fact operate as a consent
to jurisdiction, reasoning that the Ohio Supreme Court itself “rejected the
proposition that service of process may be equated with personal jurisdiction.”
Pittock v. Otis Elevator Co., 8 F.3d 325, 329 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Wainscott v. St.
Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 351 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio 1976)).
262
Bendix, 486 U.S. at 892-93.
263
See, e.g., Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 181-83 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding statutory registration and appointment provisions of the Texas
Business Corporation Act did not operate as a consent to jurisdiction); Sandstrom v.
ChemLawn Corp., 904 F.2d 83, 89 n.6 (1st Cir. 1990) (opining the appointment of
an agent under Maine’s registration statute was not a consensual submission to
jurisdiction); Pearrow v. Nat’l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir.
1983) (concluding defendant did not consent to jurisdiction under Arkansas
registration statute); Smith v. Lloyd’s of London, 568 F.2d 1115, 1118 & n.7 (5th Cir.
1978) (interpreting Georgia registration statute as requiring more than the mere
presence of an appointed agent for amenability and questioning the constitutionality
of a broader interpretation); In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265,
1278 (D. Md. 1981) (holding exacted consent under West Virginia registration
statute was an insufficient basis for adjudicatory jurisdiction in the absence of
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the appropriate resolution of this issue is outside this Article’s focus
on general jurisdiction predicated on minimum contacts rather than
264
consent.
minimum contacts), aff’d, 704 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1983); Freeman v. Dist. Court, 1
P.3d 963, 968 (Nev. 2000) (holding the appointment of an agent does not operate as
a consent to jurisdiction); Juarez v. United Parcel Serv. de Mex. S.A. de C.V., 933
S.W.2d 281, 284-85 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding “the designation of an agent for
service of process in Texas does not amount to a general consent to jurisdiction”).
But see Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding nonresident
corporation amenable because “Pennsylvania law explicitly states that the
qualification of a foreign corporation to do business is sufficient contact to serve as
the basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction”); Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines,
Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding nonresident corporation’s
registration under Minnesota statute operated as jurisdictional consent for all causes
of action even in the absence of minimum contacts with the forum); Read v. Sonat
Offshore Drilling, Inc., 515 So. 2d 1229, 1230-31 (Miss. 1987) (concluding
nonresident corporation qualified to do, but not actually performing, business in the
forum was amenable in Mississippi for accident occurring Louisiana because
minimum contacts had “nothing to do” with jurisdiction predicated on service on a
registered agent); Mittelstadt v. Rouzer, 328 N.W.2d 467, 469 (Neb. 1982) (holding
Arkansas trucking company consented to Nebraska’s jurisdiction by appointing an
agent as required by the federal Motor Carrier Act, despite the fact the accident with
the Nebraska plaintiffs occurred in Arizona); Augsbury Corp. v. Petokey Corp., 470
N.Y.S.2d 787, 789 (App. Div. 1983) (reasoning registration to do business in New
York is “a form of constructive consent to personal jurisdiction which has been found
to satisfy due process”); Sharkey v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 373 N.W.2d 421, 425-26 (S.D.
1985) (concluding insurer’s registration to do business under South Dakota law was
sufficient to establish jurisdiction even though the policy was executed and the
insured died in Wyoming); Goldman v. Pre-Fab Transit Co., 520 S.W.2d 597, 598
(Tex. App. 1975) (holding Illinois corporation registered to do business under Texas
Business Corporations Act “consented to amenability to jurisdiction for purposes of
all lawsuits” within Texas, including underlying lawsuit arising out of a truck accident
in Louisiana with the Texas plaintiffs). Some courts, perhaps to avoid any
constitutional difficulty from exacted consent, have adopted a hybrid approach,
limiting the efficacy of a corporation’s consent to situations in which the corporation
actually conducts some quantum of business activities in the forum. See, e.g., Harry S.
Peterson Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 434 S.E.2d 778, 780-81 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding service of process on registered agent of corporation performing
unspecified “substantial” business in Georgia sufficient for general jurisdiction);
Nelson v. World Wide Lease, Inc., 716 P.2d 513, 516-18 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986)
(finding Washington corporation amenable in Idaho to dispute-blind jurisdiction
based on its consent under the Idaho registration statute and its actual exercise of
forum business activities under its registration).
264
See supra note 14. Commentary addressing the propriety of appointment and
registration as a consent to jurisdiction includes the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 44 & cmts. a, c (1971), which contends that a foreign
corporation validly consents to its amenability in the state “as to all causes of action”
specified under the particular state registration statute. But see D. Craig Lewis,
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations Based on Registration and Appointment of an Agent:
An Unconstitutional Condition Perpetuated, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1990) (arguing
persuasively that the exaction of consent to jurisdiction for unrelated causes of action
in exchange for the privilege of conducting business in the forum violates the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, due process, and equal protection).
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The second mode of analysis considers whether the mere
appointment of the agent is in itself such a substantial and
continuous activity in the forum to subject the defendant to
jurisdiction under the minimum contacts analysis for general in
personam jurisdiction. Here, Perkins established that the activities
requiring such an appointment under state law do not provide the
265
conclusive standard for general jurisdiction. Accordingly, the mere
fact that a corporation has appointed an agent for service of process,
or should appoint an agent for service of process under state law, is
not sufficient for dispute-blind jurisdiction. A distinction exists
between applying for the privilege of doing business and actually
conducting business within the forum, and only the actual conduct of
business constitutes the requisite purposefully directed activities for
266
general jurisdiction under International Shoe’s progeny.
Some
federal courts have even expressed that the mere designation of an
267
Yet
agent is “of no special weight” in the jurisdictional calculus.
irrespective of the appropriate “weight” to be afforded, courts
routinely opine that the mere appointment of an agent does not
establish the requisite minimum contacts for adjudicatory
268
jurisdiction.
265

Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).
See, e.g., Siemer, 966 F.2d at 181-83 (holding Delaware corporation with
principal place of business in Kansas not subject to general jurisdiction in Texas in
suit brought by foreign nationals for plane crash in Egypt because qualifying to do
business and appointing a registered agent in Texas, “from any conceivable
perspective, hardly amounts to ‘the general business presence’ of a corporation so as
to sustain an assertion of general jurisdiction”); Sandstrom, 904 F.2d at 89-90 (holding
nonresident corporation that secured a license to do business and appointed an
agent for service of process in Maine without actually ever conducting any business in
the forum was not subject to general jurisdiction because “preparations to do
business at some indeterminate future date” was not the purposeful availment “of the
privilege of conducting its affairs in the forum state”); Ratliff v. Cooper Labs., Inc.,
444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971) (determining nonresident drug company’s
application to do business and appointment of an agent did not affect general
jurisdictional calculus because “[a]pplying for the privilege of doing business is one
thing, but the actual exercise of that privilege is quite another”); Armstrong v.
Aramco Servs. Co., 746 P.2d 917, 924 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (positing that a license to
conduct business “in no way obviates the requirement that a nonresident corporate
defendant have conducted substantial or systematic and continuous business activities
in the state”) (emphasis in original).
267
Ratliff, 444 F.2d at 748; see also Siemer, 966 F.2d at 181 (quoting Ratliff).
268
See, e.g., Sofrar, S.A. v. Graham Eng’g Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d 919, 921 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (holding nonresident defendant was not amenable to dispute-blind
jurisdiction because “personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant cannot be
found on the basis of a defendant’s registration to do business in the state and
designation of a corporate agent alone”); Leonard v. USA Petroleum Corp., 829 F.
Supp. 882, 889 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (averring that “[s]ervice on a designated agent
alone does not establish minimum contact”); DVI, Inc. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal.
266
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Thus, the appointment of a statutory agent alone is not of a
sufficiently substantial nature to support the exercise of general
jurisdiction under the International Shoe model. Instead, the actual
course of conduct of business in the forum by the nonresident
corporation must be examined, including the physical situs of the
business transactions and the quantum and quality of such
transactions.
2.

In-State Office or Store

Conducting business operations through an office, store, or
other tangible physical location in the forum state is traditionally
269
sufficient for general jurisdiction.
As an example, the Second
Rptr. 2d 683, 694 (Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that Delaware holding corporation
with a principal place of business in Pennsylvania was not subject to general
jurisdiction in California for its subsidiary’s forum conduct merely because the
holding company designated an agent for service of process in California and
qualified to do business in the state); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ruby, 540 A.2d
482, 486-87 (Md. 1988) (holding that Goodyear’s appointment of a resident agent
“would not alone be sufficient to subject it to suit” in Maryland for cause of action
“entirely unrelated to its contacts with [the] State”); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Abreem
Corp., 449 A.2d 1200, 1201 (N.H. 1982) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over
defendant registered to do, but not doing, business in New Hampshire when forum
was “not related to the parties or the litigation”); Conner v. ContiCarriers &
Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 417-18 (Tex. App. 1997) (plurality holding that
nonresident corporation’s certificate of authority to do business, presence of agent
for service of process, and sporadic business contacts with Texas were insufficient to
establish dispute-blind jurisdiction).
269
See, e.g., Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1390 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
Tennessee professional corporation amenable to general jurisdiction in Mississippi
when it conducted all its affairs every fifth business day in Mississippi clinic);
Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790, 793 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding
nonresident corporation’s manufacturing plant in Mississippi sufficient to support
the forum’s exercise of dispute-blind jurisdiction); Hesse v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 38 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 74, 75-76 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding Best Western subject to general
jurisdiction in California for injury occurring in Mexico to California resident
because it had a business office in California soliciting guests for its affiliate
members, it had designated agent for service of process, and it had licensed 295
members of its organization in California); St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Gitchoff, 369 N.E.2d
52 (Ill. 1977) (predicating jurisdiction on the presence of a forum sales office); Reyes
v. Marine Mgmt. & Consulting, Ltd., 586 So. 2d 103, 109-11 (La. 1991) (holding
Hong Kong corporation’s establishment of corporate office in Louisiana from which
it conducted a substantial portion of its ship management business for five years
subjected corporation to jurisdiction of Louisiana courts in claim by Honduran
seaman injured in international waters off the coast of Oregon); James v. Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co., 965 S.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Tex. App. 1998) (finding requisite minimum
contacts existed for jurisdiction in Texas over Illinois railroad with office in Texas
generating $75 million in business annually, but holding the exercise of general
jurisdiction would violate conceptions of “fair play and substantial justice”); Hein v.
Taco Bell, Inc., 803 P.2d 329, 330-31 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (holding Taco Bell
subject to general jurisdiction in Washington for injury occurring in California to
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270

Circuit in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. held that the two parent
holding corporations of a vast, international conglomerate of
affiliated oil and gas corporations were amenable to dispute-blind
jurisdiction in New York because of their New York investor relations
office through which the companies cultivated American capital
271
markets. Despite the fact that this New York office performed only
minimal activities in comparison to the corporation’s world-wide
activities, the court exposited that the continuous operation of the
272
New York office established the propriety of jurisdiction.
Wiwa and other similar decisions are in accord with the
antecedent opinions relied upon in International Shoe to illustrate
273
general jurisdiction.
Each of these earlier decisions involved
274
corporate agents conducting business from a forum locale.
In
275
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., for instance, Judge Cardozo held
that a Pennsylvania coal company’s solitary New York sales office
276
established its amenability to dispute-blind jurisdiction in New York.
Certainly, then, adjudicatory jurisdiction predicated on a forum
Washington resident as a result of at least sixteen restaurants in Seattle and hundreds
of employees in Washington); see also 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE ¶ 108.41[3] (3d ed. 1997) (“The general jurisdiction contact threshold of
‘continuous and systematic’ typically requires the defendant to have an office in the
forum state . . . .”); cf. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)
(noting that “territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant’s
affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of a suit there”).
270
226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
271
Id. at 92-93. While the office was nominally a part of their American subsidiary
Shell Oil Company, the parent corporations ultimately paid for all the expenses of
the office and the office existed solely to service the needs of the parents. Id. at 93.
272
Id. at 98-99. The investor relations office’s budget was a mere $500,000 per
year while the companies had world-wide sales of approximately $190 billion in 2000.
Id. at 93.
273
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (citing cases).
274
See, e.g., Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 105 (1898) (holding British
corporation amenable to jurisdiction in New York for altercation occurring in Britain
because the corporation was doing business in New York “through a mercantile firm,
its regularly appointed agents”); Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 117 N.E. 913,
914-15 (Mass. 1917) (holding Kansas railroad subject to jurisdiction in Massachusetts
for a suit based upon promissory notes made, issued, and negotiated in another state
because the railroad appointed a Boston independent passenger agent conducting
business from an office in the forum), aff’d, 255 U.S. 565 (1921); Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 916-18 (N.Y. 1917) (concluding New York
could exercise jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania coal company for a cause of action
having no relationship to New York because the coal company had a branch sales
office in New York staffed by a sales agent, eight salesmen, and clerical assistants
from which it regularly solicited and obtained orders for continuous coal shipments
from Pennsylvania to New York).
275
115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917).
276
Id. at 916-18.
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business location has a long pedigree.
Nevertheless, while the presence of a forum office is often
critical, such an office, standing alone, is not always enough to confer
277
general jurisdiction.
Even the Supreme Court’s early decisions
recognized that a forum office did not suffice if the defendant did
278
not conduct business of the requisite nature and character. Thus,
there must also be evidence of continuous, substantial business
279
activities undertaken from the physical location.
As a recent
example, the Fifth Circuit held in Submersible Systems, Inc. v.
280
Perforadora Central, S.A. de C.V. that dispute-blind jurisdiction was
not appropriate merely because of the presence of the defendant’s
281
office within the forum. The defendant had contracted to purchase
a marine drilling rig from a vendor in Mississippi, and maintained an
office at the shipyard with three employees to oversee the
282
construction.
The Fifth Circuit, analogizing to Helicopteros,
pronounced that a forum office merely monitoring the construction
of the purchase did not establish the requisite forum activities to
support jurisdiction for a cause of action wholly unrelated to its in283
state contacts.
Thus, a forum office is not the sine qua non of dispute-blind
jurisdiction. The presence of an office alone in the forum does not
284
establish the propriety of jurisdiction.
And, conversely, while the
absence of a forum office is certainly significant to the jurisdictional
285
calculus, this does not mandate that the exercise of general
277

See, e.g., In re Rationis Enters., Inc., 261 F.3d 264, 269-70 (2d Cir. 2001)
(instructing district court on remand to hold an evidentiary hearing on jurisdiction
because mere fact that nonresident defendant had a local sales office and telephone
listing in the forum was not dispositive); MacInnes v. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 257
F.2d 832, 834-35 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding presence of New York reservation office not
sufficient for amenability over claim by New York citizen injured at Florida resort
when situs of business transactions was Florida); Coastal Video Communications
Corp. v. Staywell Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 562, 571 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“In traditional
terms, the placing of a store or salesman in a state is not sufficient to confer general
jurisdiction over a defendant without some evidence that the store or salesman
actually generated sufficient sales in the forum state for the contact to be considered
continuous and systematic.”).
278
See, e.g., Green v. Chi., Burlington & Quiney Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 530, 532-34
(1907) (concluding that forum office alone did not support jurisdiction).
279
See, e.g., Coastal Video, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
280
249 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2001).
281
Id. at 419-20.
282
Id.
283
Id.
284
See id.; see also In re Rationis Enters., Inc., 261 F.3d at 269-70; Coastal Video, 59 F.
Supp. 2d at 571.
285
See, e.g., Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri, A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.
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jurisdiction over a defendant without a regular place of business in
286
the forum is erroneous.
As the Supreme Court cautioned in Burger King Corp. v.
287
Rudzewicz, jurisdiction “may not be avoided merely because the
288
defendant did not physically enter the forum State.” Burger King’s
justification is that “it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial
life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail
and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need
289
for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted.”
Of course, the indubitable proposition that business is often
conducted without any type of physical presence within the forum
does not inexorably establish that such presence is not necessary for
general jurisdiction, rather than the specific jurisdiction at issue in
290
Burger King.
As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court’s decisions
finding general jurisdiction, as well as the precedent the Court has
cited approvingly that upheld this jurisdictional basis, all involved a
defendant with at least some type of forum locale from which
291
business was conducted on its behalf.
1995) (holding dispute-blind jurisdiction inappropriate over Norwegian shipbuilder
because the “lack of a regular place of business in Washington [was] significant, and
[was] not overcome by a few visits”); Robbins v. Yutopian Enters., Inc., 202 F. Supp.
2d 426, 429 (D. Md. 2002) (finding nonresident defendant advertising and executing
forty-six transactions with forum residents in less than a year not amenable to
dispute-blind jurisdiction because such contacts were “insufficient to conclude that
[the defendant] is ‘essentially domiciled’ in Maryland”).
286
See, e.g., Travel Opportunities of Fort Lauderdale, Inc. v. Walter Karl List
Mgmt., 726 So. 2d 313, 314-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding Delaware
corporation subject to general jurisdiction in Florida because of its $1.75 million in
annual sales to Florida residents via phone orders and mail from its broadcasts of
infomercials on forty-eight cable stations while finding that jurisdiction could not be
asserted over a related defendant based on the mere fact that the parties’ contract
involved a Florida corporation); Alderson v. Southern Co., 747 N.E.2d 926, 940 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2001) (finding Indiana power company amenable to dispute-blind
jurisdiction in Illinois despite the absence of any physical locale in Illinois because it
sold its electric output to an Illinois corporation for use by Illinois residents under a
contract governed by Illinois law).
287
471 U.S. 462 (1985).
288
Id. at 476; see also Ex parte Newco Mfg. Co., 481 So. 2d 867, 869-70 (Ala. 1985)
(quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476); Travel Opportunities, 726 So. 2d at 315 (same).
289
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
290
Id. at 472-73 & n.15, 479-80.
291
See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952)
(holding Philippine mining company’s maintenance of corporate office in Ohio
used to conduct a “continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited
wartime activities of the company” was sufficiently substantial to permit Ohio to
adjudicate the dispute even though plaintiff’s cause of action had no relationship to
company’s Ohio activities); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 105 (1898)
(concluding British corporation amenable to jurisdiction in New York for altercation
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Nevertheless, conditioning general jurisdiction on a place of
business situated within the forum is problematic. Indeed, if the
Court had intended such a superficial benchmark, it certainly could
have decreed that the requisite minimum contacts for general
jurisdiction demand at least a business locale in the forum. But
instead, the Court explicitly rejected the use of any mechanical rules
292
in resolving jurisdictional queries.
And its refusal to employ a
physical locale requirement as a proxy for general jurisdiction was
appropriate since such a construct would, in some cases, lead to
293
absurd results.
294
A quintessential example is Alderson v. Southern Co. One of the
defendants in that case, State Line Energy, an Indiana limited liability
company, owned a power plant abutting the state line between
Indiana and Illinois. The power plant exploded, injuring employees
295
of an Indiana contractor. Although the power plant was physically
296
located just on the Indiana side of the state line, the electric output
of the power plant was almost exclusively provided to an Illinois
corporation for distribution to Illinois residents, pursuant to a power
297
purchase contract executed in Illinois and governed by Illinois law.
occurring in Britain because the corporation was doing business in New York
“through a mercantile firm, its regularly appointed agents”); Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry.
Co. v. Reynolds, 117 N.E. 913, 914-15 (Mass. 1917) (holding Kansas railroad subject
to jurisdiction in Massachusetts for a suit based upon promissory notes made, issued,
and negotiated in another state because the railroad appointed a Boston
independent passenger agent conducting business from an office in the forum),
aff’d, 255 U.S. 565 (1921); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 916-18
(N.Y. 1917) (concluding New York could exercise jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania
coal company for a cause of action having no relationship to New York because the
coal company had a branch sales office in New York staffed by a sales agent, eight
salesmen, and clerical assistants from which it regularly solicited and obtained orders
for continuous coal shipments from Pennsylvania to New York).
292
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
293
See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp., 554 F.2d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding
corporation owning horse track located in New Mexico, but as close to the Texas
state line as possible because El Paso citizens provided the vast majority of its patrons,
subject to jurisdiction in Texas for claims by Texas horse trainer regarding alleged
violations of New Mexico Racing Commission rules).
294
747 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
295
Id. at 930-31.
296
Id. As one witness testified, the main entrance of the plant was just barely on
the Indiana side of the border; indeed, the road leading to this entrance was partially
in Illinois. Id. at 935. The plant was actually connected to the Chicago sewer system,
and Chicago emergency crews responded on the day of the explosion that was the
basis of the suit. Id.
297
Id. at 931. State Line Energy agreed to supply all of its normal operating
capacity to the Illinois corporation, Commonwealth Edison. Commonwealth Edison
also had a right of first refusal on any excess capacity. Id. However, on a couple of
occasions, State Line Energy sold excess capacity to utilities in Ohio and Illinois. Id.
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Under these circumstances, this Indiana company was certainly
amenable to dispute-blind jurisdiction in Illinois, despite the lack of
any type of physical locale in the forum. As the court expounded,
holding that State Line Energy’s lack of an office in Illinois was
dispositive for purposes of jurisdiction would ignore “the economic
reality of its business”—that it sold almost all its product to an Illinois
corporation for use by Illinois residents under a contract governed by
Illinois law and that its plant relied on governmental services, such as
298
sewer and emergency protection, from Chicago, Illinois.
Its
connections with Illinois were thus at least as substantial and
meaningful to its business as its contacts with Indiana, mandating that
general jurisdiction was appropriate in Illinois despite the absence of
an in-state business locale.
Therefore, the absence of a forum office or store, just like the
presence of such a location, is not determinative. Although whether
the defendant maintains a forum business location is a significant
jurisdictional factor, the quality and quantity of business activity
conducted by the defendant in the forum must also be inspected,
which can be an arduous task.
3.

Revenue-Generating Activities

The judicial appraisals of a defendant’s amenability to disputeblind jurisdiction predicated on its revenues attributable to the
forum, or its revenues as a result of solicitation efforts in the forum,
299
appear hopelessly confused. In this context, in particular, existing
doctrine evinces “a bewildering array of seemingly inconsistent
300
results.”
Nevertheless, scrutinizing the lower court decisions
consonant with the Supreme Court’s intimations establishes some
guiding precepts.
While the Supreme Court has issued only two holdings on

at 933. Because the power from the plant was not provided at all to Indiana
residents, State Line Energy requested an exemption from regulation by the Indiana
Utility Regulatory Commission. Id. at 932-33.
298
Id. at 940-41.
299
Compare, e.g., Ex parte Newco Mfg. Co., 481 So. 2d 867, 869 (Ala. 1985) (holding
that 2,000 sales in five years in an amount of $65,000 to $85,000 per year was
sufficient for dispute-blind jurisdiction), with Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d
370, 375-76 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding hundreds of millions of dollars in forum sales
did not suffice for dispute-blind jurisdiction under similar circumstances), and Price
& Sons v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 831 P.2d 600, 601 (Nev. 1992) (concluding
that “[s]ales and marketing efforts in the forum by a foreign corporation, without
more, are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction”).
300
Severinson v. Widener Univ., 768 A.2d 200, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
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general jurisdiction since adopting the minimum contacts test, two
other decisions perhaps provide additional illumination. In Rush v.
302
Savchuk, the Supreme Court did not dispute the proposition, which
was vital to the state court’s holding under review, that State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company had sufficient jurisdictional
contacts for even unrelated causes of action in each of the fifty
303
states. The Court apparently concurred with the premise that, with
respect to a vast nationwide enterprise like State Farm, dispute-blind
304
jurisdiction might be appropriate in a number of states.
305
On the other hand, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. indicates
that not all revenue-generating forum activities satisfy the
substantiality requirement for general jurisdiction. The defendant in
Keeton, an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in
California, sold ten to fifteen thousand copies of its magazine in New
306
Hampshire every month.
This aggregated to the sale of between
120,000 and 180,000 magazines annually, generating at least $219,000
307
in revenue per year at the time suit was filed.
Nevertheless, the
Court hinted these contacts might not justify general jurisdiction,
stating such forum conduct “may not be so substantial as to support
308
jurisdiction over a cause of action unrelated to those activities.”
Unfortunately, though, Rush and Keeton leave many questions
unanswered. First, of course, because neither case announced a
holding regarding whether the activities at issue were of the requisite
substantial nature for general jurisdiction, the value of the Court’s
comments is debatable. Second, even accepting the Supreme Court’s
dicta, the decisions provide minimal detail. Assuming the Supreme
Court agreed with the lower court in Rush that State Farm, a large
national insurer with agents in every state, was amenable to
301

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
302
444 U.S. 320 (1980).
303
Id. at 330.
304
See id. (noting that “State Farm is ‘found,’ in the sense of doing business, in all
50 States and the District of Colombia” and that the insurer’s “forum contacts would
support in personam jurisdiction even for an unrelated cause of action”).
305
465 U.S. 770 (1984).
306
Id. at 772.
307
See id. Keeton filed her lawsuit in October 1980. See Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 549 A.2d 1187, 1188 (N.H. 1988) (detailing procedural history of
lawsuit). At that time, the subscription price for the magazine was $22.00 per year,
or $1.833 an issue, with a cover price of $2.95 per issue. See HUSTLER, Mar. 1980, at 2
(copy on file with Litigated Literature Section, Tarlton Law Library, University of
Texas School of Law). The 2003 subscription price is $41.95 a year, or $3.496 an
issue, with a cover price of $7.99. See http://www.subscription.larryflynt.com.
308
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779-80.
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jurisdiction anywhere in the United States, the Court did not denote
the rationale, or even the defendant’s activities, which justified the
309
imposition of the state’s judicial power.
And in Keeton, the Court
did not imply that revenues alone in the forum could never be
enough for general jurisdiction; rather, the implication was merely
that the magazines sold in New Hampshire in that case may not have
310
met the substantiality requirement.
Thus, Keeton only illustrates
that 120,000 to 180,000 annual magazine sales in the forum may not
suffice, providing no guidance as to either why such sales are
311
insufficient or what, if any, level of sales are sufficient.
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, lower courts rarely cite either
Rush or Keeton in resolving general jurisdiction queries. While the
Keeton dictum occasionally has been relied upon by courts as
additional support for the defendant’s non-amenability under
312
dispute-blind principles, the opinion has been ignored by decisions
finding general jurisdiction. Instead, courts determining that the
exercise of dispute-blind jurisdiction is appropriate often rely on a
313
fiscal approach gauging the defendant’s forum revenues.
The Sixth Circuit, for example, held in Michigan National Bank v.
314
Quality Dinette, Inc. that two closely held Alabama corporations’
combined four hundred sales totaling just over $625,000 in Michigan
309

See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 330 (1980).
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779-80.
311
Id.
312
See, e.g., Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 93 n.9 (1st Cir. 1998)
(concluding forum solicitation efforts of foreign national defendant in Massachusetts
were not as regular as Hustler Magazine, Inc.’s distribution efforts in New Hampshire
that Keeton suggested were not substantial enough to support general jurisdiction);
Ash v. Burnham Corp., 343 S.E.2d 2, 4-5 (N.C. Ct. App.) (comparing the dollar
volume of sales the nonresident defendant corporation made to forum customers to
the level of sales Keeton hinted were insufficient for dispute-blind jurisdiction), aff’d,
349 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1986) (per curiam).
313
See, e.g., Travel Opportunities of Fort Lauderdale, Inc. v. Walter Karl List
Mgmt., Inc., 726 So. 2d 313, 314-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding Delaware
corporation subject to general jurisdiction in Florida because of its $1.75 million in
annual sales to Florida residents via phone orders and mail from its broadcasts of
infomercials); Colletti v. Crudele, 523 N.E.2d 1222, 1229 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (finding
Florida trucking company, realizing $5,000 to $10,000 in revenues from
approximately a dozen annual trips for local industrial consignees to Illinois, subject
to general jurisdiction for accident with Illinois residents occurring in Kentucky);
Gulentz v. Fosdick, 466 A.2d 1049, 1055 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (concluding general
jurisdiction appropriate in Pennsylvania over a Minnesota trucking company for an
accident occurring in Ohio because $735,000 of the company’s $20 million
nationwide gross receipts were attributable to its trucking activities in Pennsylvania,
its trucks traveled 2.6 million miles on Pennsylvania roads, and it purchased over
500,000 gallons of fuel for its trucks in Pennsylvania).
314
888 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1989).
310
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through an independent sales representative and mail order
315
solicitations warranted dispute-blind jurisdiction in Michigan. The
court avowed that such sales, even though representing only three
percent of the companies’ total sales, indicated the requisite
continuous and systematic portion of the defendants’ general
316
And other courts have
business necessary for general jurisdiction.
predicated general jurisdiction on even more limited total revenues
317
and sales made to forum residents.
Other decisions have reached similar results by examining the
318
percentage of total sales or revenues derived from the forum. For
319
instance, in Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize Ltd., the Belizean corporation’s
sale of approximately eighteen percent of its shrimp to Florida
importers was the primary activity supporting dispute-blind
320
jurisdiction.
Yet, while eighteen percent perhaps sounds
substantial, what if the corporation’s worldwide revenues had only
321
been $100,000? Or, as a converse illustration, less than one-tenth of
one percent of California Federal Savings & Loan Association’s
315

Id. at 466.
Id. As support, the Sixth Circuit cited two Michigan state cases, Kircos v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 247 N.W.2d 316, 317 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976), and June v.
Vibra Screw Feeders, Inc., 149 N.W.2d 480, 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967). In June, however,
the defendant’s contacts were actually sufficiently related to the dispute to support
specific jurisdiction, as the Michigan plaintiff sued his former employer for breach of
contract to recover commissions he was allegedly owed for selling the defendant’s
products in Michigan. See id.
317
See, e.g., Ex parte Newco Mfg. Co., 481 So. 2d 867, 869 (Ala. 1985) (holding that
2,000 sales through the telephone, the mail, and an independent manufacturer’s
representative in a five-year period in an amount of $65,000 to $85,000 per year was
sufficient to subject a nonresident Missouri corporation to dispute-blind jurisdiction
in Alabama for an injury occurring in Tennessee to a Tennessee resident); Colletti,
523 N.E.2d at 1229 (finding Florida trucking company with $5,000 to $10,000 in
annual revenues from forum subject to general jurisdiction); Kircos, 247 N.W.2d at
317 (concluding revenues of $32,117 in the last year from Michigan customers
through a Michigan dealer, direct mail, and advertising supported general
jurisdiction).
318
See, e.g., Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize, 739 So. 2d 617, 620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (using foreign defendant’s sale of eighteen percent of its product in Florida as
one of the contacts to support conclusion that defendant had engaged in continuous
and systematic business activities in Florida in claim by Belizean citizen injured in
Costa Rica); Kircos, 247 N.W.2d at 317 (relying on defendant’s realization of an
average of 2.78 percent of its total revenue from Michigan customers to support
general jurisdiction finding).
319
739 So. 2d 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
320
Id. at 620-21. While other forum contacts were listed as well, the percentage of
sales to Florida was always discussed first by the court and appeared central to its
holding. See id. at 619, 620-21.
321
The Woods court did not specify the total worldwide shrimp sales made by the
Belizean corporation. See id.
316
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depositors, deposits, and loans were traceable to Pennsylvania in the
mid-1980’s, but this aggregated to over seven hundred Pennsylvanian
depositors with $10 million in deposits and an equal amount of
322
loans. Certainly, then, percentages alone are meaningless.
More importantly, though, regardless of whether revenues, sales,
or the percentage of either derived from forum residents is the
court’s polestar, primarily relying on a quantitative fiscal analysis
pretermits the qualitative aspect of general jurisdiction. As discussed
previously, Helicopteros mandates that the general jurisdictional
calculus incorporates a qualitative analysis; in other words, quantity is
323
not enough. Indeed, the New Hampshire magazine sales in Keeton
were quantitatively extensive, more so in absolute numbers than in
324
many of the cases finding general jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the
Court implied that such sales were not qualitatively “so substantial” as
325
to support general jurisdiction.
The evident question is how to distinguish forum revenuegenerating activities that are substantial from those that are not.
While the Court did not provide the answer in Keeton, some of its preInternational Shoe opinions that the Court continues to employ when
326
deciding general jurisdiction queries may shed some insight.
For instance, advertising and solicitation of sales alone did not
327
satisfy the precursor to general jurisdiction. It did not suffice that

322

Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir.
1987).
323
See supra Part I.
324
Compare Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), with Ex parte
Newco Mfg. Co., 481 So. 2d 867, 869 (Ala. 1985) (holding that 2,000 forum sales in
an amount of $65,000 to $85,000 per year was sufficient for dispute-blind
jurisdiction), and Colletti v. Crudele, 523 N.E.2d 1222, 1229 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(holding a company with $5,000 to $10,000 in annual forum revenues subject to
general jurisdiction), and Kircos v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 247 N.W.2d 316,
317 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (finding forum revenues of $32,117 in the prior year
supported general jurisdiction).
325
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779-80.
326
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417-18
(1984) (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923));
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 n.6 (1952) (citing, inter
alia, Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917), and Barrow
Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898)); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 315 (1945) (citing, inter alia, Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quiney Railway Co.,
205 U.S. 530 (1907), and People’s Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79
(1918)).
327
See, e.g., People’s Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. at 87 (holding defendant’s activities of
advertising and sending soliciting agents to the forum were insufficient for
jurisdiction); Green, 205 U.S. at 533-34 (decreeing solicitation in forum did not
support amenability).
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the defendant conducted activities in the forum if those activities
328
were merely to solicit transactions occurring in another state. Thus,
329
in Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quiney Railway Co., the Court held
that an Iowa railroad was not amenable to jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania for an injury occurring in California to a Pennsylvania
citizen based on the solicitation efforts of its Philadelphia
330
employees. Such efforts, the Court highlighted, did not culminate
in an in-state transaction when the tickets were sold, delivered, and
331
used in Illinois.
In contrast, in those situations in which the
defendant did undertake in-state transactions and business on a
332
regular basis, the propriety of jurisdiction was upheld.
Notably, these Supreme Court decisions never quantified the
fiscal effects of the defendant’s forum activities. Instead, the Court
focused on the quality and nature of the corporation’s business
activities in the state. Soliciting did not suffice, but conducting instate business transactions on a continuous and systematic basis did.
Thus, the quantity of revenues generated from forum residents is not
what is controlling to ascertain substantiality, but rather how those
revenues are generated.
A number of modern decisions, especially from the federal
appellate courts, apparently concur. These courts refuse to place
primary emphasis on a quantitative analysis of revenues generated
333
from forum residents.
Rather, these decisions emphasize
328

See supra note 327.
205 U.S. 530 (1907).
330
Id. at 532-33.
331
Id. at 534.
332
See, e.g., Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 112-13 (1898) (holding British
steamship corporation amenable to jurisdiction in New York for injury occurring in
Britain based on selling tickets in the forum).
333
See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir.
1996) (finding that, while $4 million in forum sales alone may not have sufficed,
such sales combined with corporation’s relationship with its independent dealers, its
visits to those dealers, and its targeted marketing in the forum satisfied minimum
contacts aspect of general jurisdiction in claim when all alleged acts and omissions
occurred outside the forum, but subsequently holding that the exercise of
jurisdiction was unreasonable); Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 11991200 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding nonresident corporation’s employment of
representatives in Maryland from 1981-1987 soliciting $9 million to $13 million in
annual sales did not support dispute-blind personal jurisdiction because “advertising
and solicitation activities alone do not constitute the ‘minimum contacts’ required
for general jurisdiction”); Conti v. Pneumatic Prods. Corp., 977 F.2d 978, 981 (6th
Cir. 1992) (holding nonresident corporation’s annual forum sales of $900,000
through one of its two Ohio distributors was insufficient to establish general
jurisdiction); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that hundreds of millions of dollars in sales to Texas dealers and companies did not
329
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qualitative aspects of the transactions, including the situs of the
transactions, the defendant’s control of in-state distribution channels,
and, in some unique cases, advertisements specifically targeted or
334
tailored to forum residents.
a.

Situs of transactions

A predominant factor in an appropriate substantiality query is
the situs of the negotiation, execution, and performance of the
revenue-generating transaction. To illustrate, the Fifth Circuit in
335
Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. held that Beech, a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in Kansas, was not amenable to
dispute-blind jurisdiction in Texas, despite selling over $300 million
in manufactured products over a five-year period to eighteen Texas
corporations, because all the sales contracts had been negotiated and
executed, as well as performed through the transfer of title, outside
336
Texas. The court reasoned that, under such circumstances, Beech
337
had not invoked the protection or benefits of Texas law.
Accordingly, even though the defendant’s total revenues derived
from Texas residents were quantitatively prodigious, the court held
that the defendant’s execution of out-of-state contracts with forum
residents did not satisfy the required substantiality for general
jurisdiction.

suffice for dispute-blind adjudicative jurisdiction when such sales were negotiated,
executed, and performed outside Texas); Ash v. Burnham Corp., 343 S.E.2d 2, 3-5
(N.C. Ct. App.) (holding $520,000 of annual sales to forum residents did not support
general jurisdiction), aff’d, 349 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1986) (per curiam); Am. Type
Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 809-10 (Tex. 2002) (determining
that, although the quantity of the nonresident defendant’s contacts, including
revenues derived from $350,000 in annual sales to Texas residents, perhaps
suggested “a significant relationship with Texas,” the quality of its contacts did not
support jurisdiction when it performed its services and executed its contracts outside
of Texas); J&J Marine, Inc. v. Le, 982 S.W.2d 918, 926-27 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding
Alabama corporation’s $3.5 million of shrimp boat sales to Texas residents did not
support general jurisdiction when such sales were negotiated, executed, and title
transferred in Alabama).
334
See infra Parts IV.A.3.a-c.
335
818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987).
336
Id. at 373, 375-76. The action was a perfect example of dispute-blind
jurisdiction, as the suit was brought in Texas by survivors of Louisiana residents who
had purchased an aircraft from Beech in Louisiana and were killed in a crash in
Mississippi during a flight from Mississippi to Louisiana. Id. at 372. The aircraft had
not been designed, manufactured, serviced, or repaired in Texas, and had never
been owned by a Texas resident. Id. at 373. Thus, no one even attempted to argue
that the action “relate[d] in any way to Beech’s contacts with Texas.” Id.
337
Id. at 376.
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A number of decisions have employed a similar approach.
Nonetheless, other courts have dismissed the import of the situs of
339
the transactions to the jurisdictional calculus, while most courts
340
simply ignore it completely.

338

See, e.g., Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding nonresident corporation’s $9 million to $13 million in annual sales to
forum residents did not support dispute-blind personal jurisdiction when orders
were placed directly with the company); Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359,
1362 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding nonresident’s corporation’s bareboat charters to its
Louisiana subsidiaries did not support dispute-blind personal jurisdiction when
charters were executed and payments under the charters were remitted outside the
forum); Gehling v. St. George’s Sch. of Med., Ltd., 773 F.2d 539, 542-43 (3d Cir.
1985) (concluding foreign medical school’s admission of six percent of its students
from Pennsylvania did not establish the school’s amenability to dispute-blind
jurisdiction on plaintiff’s causes of action unrelated to its forum activities because the
income derived from Pennsylvania residents was not the result of in-state activities,
but of educational services provided in Grenada); Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc.
v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 810 (Tex. 2002) (holding Maryland corporation’s
$350,000 annual revenues derived from Texas residents did not suffice for disputeblind jurisdiction when company “perform[ed] all its business services outside Texas,
and carefully construct[ed] its contracts to ensure it [did] not benefit from Texas
laws”); J&J Marine, Inc. v. Le, 982 S.W.2d 918, 926-27 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding
Alabama corporation’s $3.5 million of shrimp boat sales to Texas residents did not
support general jurisdiction when such sales were negotiated, executed, and title
transferred in Alabama); cf. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d
560, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Bearry on the basis that there was no
suggestion that sales at issue were executed outside the state or were deliberately
structured to avoid general jurisdiction); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Babcock Mex.,
S.A. de C.V., 597 So. 2d 110, 112-13 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing importance of
the locale of the transfer of title to general jurisdiction query).
339
See, e.g., Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 710 (8th Cir. 2003)
(concluding that $10 million in loans made by a Georgia bank to Missouri residents
was sufficient to establish dispute-blind jurisdiction over the bank in Missouri even
though all the loans were executed in Georgia); Ex parte Newco Mfg. Co., 481 So. 2d
867, 869 (Ala. 1985) (holding that approximately four hundred annual sales in an
amount of $65,000 to $85,000 to forum residents through the telephone, the mail,
and an independent manufacturer’s representative when title was transferred outside
the forum was sufficient to subject a nonresident Missouri corporation to disputeblind jurisdiction in Alabama for an injury occurring in Tennessee to a Tennessee
resident).
340
See, e.g., Mich. Nat’l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 466 (6th Cir.
1989) (concluding two closely held Alabama corporations’ combined four hundred
sales totaling just over $625,000 in two-year period in Michigan through an
independent sales representative and mail order solicitations warranted disputeblind personal jurisdiction in Michigan without discussing the locale of the transfer
of title other than to note the defendant did not pay any Michigan sales tax); Estate
of Rick v. Stevens, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1030-33 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (holding
Minnesota tractor-trailer leasing corporation amenable to Iowa’s general
adjudicatory jurisdiction—in a claim arising from an accident with an Iowa resident
occurring in Wisconsin—based on its nine unrelated lease contracts with Iowa
residents without any discussion of the locale of the negotiation, execution, and
performance of the lease contracts); Travel Opportunities of Fort Lauderdale, Inc. v.
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But the situs of the transactions should not be ignored. A
critical distinction exists between doing business with the residents of
341
a state and conducting business transactions in the state.
Indeed,
the Supreme Court in Burger King recognized this difference by
decreeing that a defendant’s contract with an out-of-state party does
not necessarily subject the defendant to even specific jurisdiction in
342
the foreign state. On the contrary, “the real object of the business
transaction” must be evaluated, by scrutinizing the parties’
negotiations, the terms of the executed contract, and the parties’
actual course of dealing, to ascertain whether the defendant is
343
amenable to jurisdiction based on a contract.
Certainly this
rationale applies a fortiari to general jurisdiction, which requires
more extensive and substantial forum activities.

Walter Karl List Mgmt., Inc., 726 So. 2d 313, 314-16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding Delaware corporation subject to general jurisdiction in Florida because of
its $1.75 million in annual sales to Florida residents via phone orders and mail from
its broadcasts of infomercials on forty-eight cable stations without any mention of the
situs of the title transfer for such goods). A number of other decisions have also not
considered the situs of the transactions in reaching the converse holding that
dispute-blind jurisdiction was inappropriate because the sales to forum-based
residents were de minimis. See, e.g., Haas v. A.M. King Indus., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d
644, 650 (D. Utah 1998) (concluding “minimal” sales to forum residents did not
establish necessary contacts for dispute-blind jurisdiction); Regent Lighting Corp. v.
Am. Lighting Concept, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (holding that
the defendant’s level of sales to forum residents was insufficient for dispute-blind
jurisdiction); Dominion Gas Ventures, Inc. v. N.L.S., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 265, 267-68
(N.D. Tex. 1995) (holding nonresident defendant “entering into transactions” with
eight forum residents, constituting two to seven percent of it annual revenues, not
amenable to dispute-blind jurisdiction).
341
See, e.g., Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284
F.3d 1114, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding Indian corporation exporting substantial
rice through forum ports was not subject to dispute-blind general jurisdiction as it
was doing business with the forum rather than in the forum); cf. Bancroft & Masters,
Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that,
while Georgia golf club was amenable under specific jurisdiction principles, it was
not subject to general jurisdiction in California based on selling golf tournament
tickets and merchandise to California residents and executing license agreements
with two television networks and a few California vendors because such activities were
“doing business with California, but [did] not constitute doing business in
California”); Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 717 (5th
Cir. 1999) (holding Mexican telephone carrier receiving millions of dollars each
month in settlement revenues under correspondent agreements with carriers in the
United States attributable to Texas residents was subject to specific, but not general,
jurisdiction in Texas because, as such payments were for servicing the Mexican
portion of a call from Texas to Mexico, the Mexican corporation was merely doing
business with United States carriers rather than doing business in Texas).
342
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985).
343
Id. at 478-79 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Hoopeston Canning Co. v.
Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1943)).
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Additionally, the Supreme Court’s intimations in its
jurisdictional decisions are in accord. The Court’s pre-International
Shoe opinions distinguished between the defendant’s in-state
solicitations of transactions that then occurred outside the state,
which were insufficient for jurisdiction, and the defendant’s actual in344
state transactions, which did support amenability.
Plus, this same
distinction could explain the discrepancy between the Rush and
Keeton dicta. An insurance contract is generally governed by the laws
of the state in which the insured or the insured’s property is
345
located;
thus, State Farm was perforce conducting business
transactions in each state that it had insureds. In contrast, there is no
indication that Hustler Magazine, Inc. was negotiating, executing,
and performing contracts in New Hampshire by selling its magazines
in the forum—rather, it used independent distributors to circulate its
346
magazine there.
At most, Hustler may have been doing business
with New Hampshire residents.
To be faithful to the Supreme Court’s guidance, then, disputeblind jurisdiction requires an appraisal of the true object of the
defendant’s forum business transactions by evaluating the situs of the
negotiation, execution, and performance of the revenue-generating
transactions.
Courts must differentiate business transactions
conducted in the forum from doing business with forum residents.
Yet, while the situs of the transactions must at least always be
considered, it is not always dispositive. In some situations, the in-state
347
transactions alone may not be enough to support jurisdiction, while
344

Compare People’s Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918), and
Green v. Chi., Burlington & Quiney Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1907), with Barrow
S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 105 (1898).
345
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 192 (1971).
Additionally, a number of states have promulgated statutes mandating the
application of that state’s laws to insurance contracts with forum residents. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 27-14-22 (1998); ALASKA STAT. § 21.51.300 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 20-1115 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-122 (West 1999);
FLA. STAT. ch. 627.632 (1996 & Supp. 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22.629 (West
1995); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 12-209 (1997 & Supp. 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175,
§ 22 (1998); MINN. STAT. § 60A.08 (1996 & Supp. 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-5-7
(2000); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.200
(1999).
346
See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d,
465 U.S. 770 (1984).
347
See, e.g., Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 92-93 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding
that a British corporation that conducted forum negotiations and extensive
solicitations to obtain $585,000 in orders in a two-year period from a Massachusetts
corporation was not subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting $4 million in forum
sales may not have alone sufficed for dispute-blind jurisdiction).

2004

GENERAL JURISDICTION

877

perhaps under certain unique circumstances, the actual negotiation,
execution, or performance of transactions in the state may not be
348
necessary. Hence, other factors must also be considered.
b.

In-state networks to distribute goods and services

Another important component to the substantiality query is
whether the nonresident defendant employs or controls distributors,
dealers, or agents in the forum to disperse its goods or perform its
services. Sometimes the members of such a “network” are actually
employees of the defendant, which frequently results in the
defendant’s amenability to dispute-blind jurisdiction based on its
349
employees regularly conducting business in the forum.
But, even
when the defendant does not directly employ its distributors, dealers,
or agents, their presence in the forum favors the exercise of
jurisdiction if the defendant utilizes them to conduct business
350
transactions within the state.
351
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., for
instance, the Second Circuit held that the requisite minimum
contacts existed for dispute-blind jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant based on $4 million in forum sales in a seven-year period,
its relationship with its independent dealers in the forum, and its
352
advertisements targeted to the forum.
The court initially
articulated that the defendant’s sales were material to the
jurisdictional calculus because there was no indication that the
transactions were negotiated, executed, or performed outside the
353
forum.
While acknowledging that such sales, standing alone, may
not have established the required minimum contacts, the court
348

See infra Part IV.A.3.c.
See, e.g., LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (holding general jurisdiction appropriate in Ohio over Connecticut
corporation with principal place of business in Virginia that employed multiple
distributors in Ohio through which it made millions of dollars of sales even though
none of the allegedly infringing items was sold in Ohio).
350
See, e.g., Pedelahore v. Astropark, Inc., 745 F.2d 346, 348-49 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding Delaware corporation operating Texas amusement park amenable to
general jurisdiction in suit brought by Louisiana resident for injuries suffered at the
park in part because corporation employed sales representative in Louisiana and
authorized all Louisiana travel agencies to sell tickets to its facilities); Frummer v.
Hilton Hotels Int’l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 853-54 (N.Y. 1967) (concluding the
required “presence” in New York for jurisdiction over a British hotel corporation for
a claim by a New York citizen injured in Britain existed as a result of the defendant’s
corporate agent’s conduct of business in the forum).
351
84 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 1996).
352
Id. at 573.
353
Id. at 571-72.
349
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exposited that the defendant’s relationships with its dealers,
including previously maintaining a forum office and making 150 visits
354
to its forum dealers, “tip[ped] the balance” in favor of jurisdiction.
Metropolitan Life is consistent with one of the Supreme Court’s
pre-International Shoe opinions, Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v.
355
Reynolds. In Reynolds, the Court affirmed by memorandum opinion
356
the jurisdictional holdings of the Massachusetts state court.
The
state court found a Kansas railroad amenable to jurisdiction for a suit
based upon promissory notes made, issued, and negotiated in
another state because the railroad appointed a Boston independent
passenger agent who, while also conducting business on his own
account, engaged in business transactions for the railroad in
357
Massachusetts.
Thus, the fact that the railroad appointed an
independent agent to conduct its business affairs in the forum
supported jurisdiction rather than insulating it from the state’s
judicial power.
Nevertheless, in order to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s
other early pronouncements that the solicitation of business by
358
forum-based employees is insufficient, the existence of a forumbased network or dealer should not suffice for dispute-blind
jurisdiction unless the nonresident corporation is actually
negotiating, executing, or performing transactions in the forum
through such an agent, as in the Reynolds case. As the Court held in
another pre-International Shoe case, Green v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quiney Ry. Co., the presence of even corporate employees in the
forum does not support jurisdiction when their activities do not lead
354

Id. at 570-73. The court, however, subsequently determined that the exercise
of jurisdiction would be unreasonable under the factors from Asahi Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987). See Metro. Life Ins., 84 F.3d at 573-75.
355
255 U.S. 565 (1921).
356
Id.; cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 n.6 (1952)
(explaining that the significance of Reynolds is demonstrated “by the opinions of the
state court below”).
357
Reynolds v. Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co., 113 N.E. 413, 413-15 (Mass. 1916) and
117 N.E. 913, 914-15 (Mass. 1917), aff’d, 255 U.S. 565 (1921).
358
See, e.g., People’s Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918);
Green v. Chi., Burlington & Quiney Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1907); see also
Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213, 215-17 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding defendant’s
business contacts too fragmentary for general jurisdiction when it employed eight
sales representatives in the forum); Ratliff v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748
(4th Cir. 1971) (holding nonresident defendant’s employment of five detail men in
forum to promote its products insufficient to support dispute-blind general
jurisdiction); Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584, 587 (1st Cir. 1970)
(finding jurisdiction over a cause of action unrelated to the defendant’s forum
activities impermissible when the “defendant’s only activities consist of advertising
and employing salesmen to solicit orders”).
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359

to in-state transactions.
Accordingly, most courts recognize, as a
general rule, that the actions of independent dealers and agents
360
alone will not support dispute-blind jurisdiction.
Instead, an instate network should only be a relevant factor to the extent it further
bolsters the supposition that the defendant is conducting business
transactions in the state rather than merely with forum residents.
c.

Targeted advertisements or marketing

The Supreme Court’s pre-International Shoe opinions consistently
held that in-state solicitations and advertisements did not embody the
361
type of forum contacts necessary to support jurisdiction.
Not
surprisingly, then, modern decisions routinely adjudge the placement
of advertisements in nationally-distributed publications as insufficient
362
for general jurisdiction.
A number of courts have likewise found
359

Green, 205 U.S. at 532-34.
See, e.g., Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284
F.3d 1114, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that forum presence of an independent
sales agent importing and distributing Indian corporation’s rice was insufficient to
establish dispute-blind general jurisdiction when the sales agent had no authority to
contract on the corporation’s behalf); Congoleum Corp. v. DLW Aktiengesellschaft,
729 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding “sales and sales promotion by
independent nonexclusive sales representatives” were insufficient to establish
jurisdiction over a West German corporation in California when the cause of action
was unrelated to such forum activities) (internal citation omitted); Adell Corp. v.
Elco Textron, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d 752, 756 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (holding dispute-blind
jurisdiction was inappropriate because “sales by an independent distributor are not
enough by themselves to constitute continuous and systematic contact with Texas”);
Stairmaster Sports/Med. Prods., Inc., v. Pac. Fitness Corp., 916 F. Supp. 1049, 105253 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (concluding independent distributor’s forum sales of
unrelated products insufficient to establish dispute-blind jurisdiction); Fisher
Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 347 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1959) (concluding more contacts
are necessary for assuming dispute-blind general jurisdiction “than sales and sales
promotion within the state by independent nonexclusive sales representatives”);
Carretti v. Italpast, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126, 132 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding minimal
resales by forum distributor purchasing products in Italy insufficient to establish
dispute-blind jurisdiction in California over Italian seller).
361
See, e.g., People’s Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. at 87; Green, 205 U.S. at 533-34.
362
See, e.g., Doering v. Copper Mountain, Inc., 259 F.3d 1202, 1210 (10th Cir.
2001) (concluding “the mere placement of advertisements in nationally-distributed
publications cannot be regarded as ‘continuous and systematic’ in nature”); Bearry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1987) (declaring the nonresident
defendant’s “nation-wide advertising program does not support a finding of general
jurisdiction”); Haas v. A.M. King Indus., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 644, 650 (D. Utah 1998)
(iterating that “mere placement of advertisements in journals of national distribution
cannot be regarded as ‘continuous and systematic’ in nature in a given state”);
Armstrong v. Aramco Servs. Co., 746 P.2d 917, 922 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
nonresident defendant not amenable to general jurisdiction predicated on
advertisements in national publication circulated in the forum); Mayo v. Tillman
Aero, Inc., 640 So. 2d 314, 319-20 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding nonresident
360
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that advertising and solicitation efforts alone, even when targeted or
directed at the forum, do not constitute the requisite “minimum
363
contacts” for general jurisdiction.
But there are unique
circumstances in which perhaps targeted or directed forum
marketing or advertising may suffice.
364
An example is Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp.
In that case, a
corporation operated a horse track that, while sited in New Mexico,
was located as close to El Paso, Texas (where parimutuel horse racing
was illegal) as allowed under New Mexico’s racing and gambling
365
laws.
The track “saturated” El Paso with “substantial advertising”
because it depended almost exclusively on the patronage of El Paso
366
As the Fifth Circuit posited, the
citizens for its revenues.
corporation therefore “was as much doing business in Texas as it was
367
in New Mexico.”
While the court was not entirely perspicuous
regarding the relationship of the corporation’s Texas contacts to the
368
dispute, the court apparently decreed that jurisdiction was proper
under such circumstances “even though the suit [bore] no relation to
the activities deemed necessary and sufficient to constitute minimum
California corporation advertising its pilot training operations in international and
national publications reaching forum residents was not subject to general or specific
jurisdiction).
363
See, e.g., Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding nonresident corporation’s employment of seventeen to twenty-one
representatives in Maryland from 1981-1987 soliciting $9 million to $13 million in
annual sales did not support dispute-blind personal jurisdiction because “advertising
and solicitation activities alone do not constitute the ‘minimum contacts’ required
for general jurisdiction”); Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int’l, C.A., 907 F.2d 1256,
1258-59 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding forum advertisements for Venezuelan corporation’s
Aruba hotel did not establish general jurisdiction in claim by forum resident for
injuries sustained at the hotel); Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735
F.2d 61, 66 n.8 (3d Cir. 1984) (concluding that placing promotional advertisements
in local magazine was insufficient for jurisdiction); Ratliff v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 444
F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding forum advertising did not support disputeblind jurisdiction); Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584, 587 (1st Cir. 1970)
(finding jurisdiction over a cause of action unrelated to the defendant’s forum
activities impermissible when the “defendant’s only activities consist of advertising
and employing salesmen to solicit orders”).
364
554 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1977).
365
Id. at 748. Indeed, the track was so close to El Paso that it was visible from the
district judge’s El Paso apartment. Id.
366
Id.
367
Id; see also Kervin v. Red River Ski Area, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1383, 1391-92 (E.D.
Tex. 1989) (holding New Mexico ski lodge subject to general jurisdiction in Texas
for injury to Texas resident at lodge because of its extensive forum solicitation
activities culminating in forty-seven percent of its business from Texas residents, as
well as its other contacts, such as its prior incorporation in Texas, its recruitment of
employees in Texas, and its use of Texas travel agencies).
368
Wilkerson, 554 F.2d at 749-50.
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369

contacts [in the forum].”
Nevertheless, a corporation’s solicitation of residents from a
neighboring state should not, standing alone, be enough for
370
jurisdiction.
In order to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s
guidance on the substantiality of forum activities, dispute-blind
jurisdiction requires at least the equivalent of in-state business. To
illustrate, a California resort would not appear to be conducting the
equivalent of business transactions in Texas by advertising its resort in
both national and local media in an attempt to draw guests from
Texas and other states. Yet the requisite correlation perhaps exists
when the primary object of the business is to engage in transactions
with residents of a particular adjoining state, such as in Wilkerson
where the horse track was situated next to the state line and actively
369

Id. at 750.
See, e.g., Wolf v. Richmond County Hosp. Auth., 745 F.2d 904, 910-11 (4th Cir.
1984) (holding Georgia hospital not amenable to jurisdiction in neighboring South
Carolina based on its forum solicitation efforts); Giangola v. Walt Disney World Co.,
753 F. Supp. 148, 156 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding Walt Disney World not amenable to
jurisdiction in claim by New Jersey resident for injury in Florida as a result of its
extensive forum advertising campaign); Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Pope, 854 P.2d
461, 462-63 (Or. 1993) (finding Nevada casino’s regular forum advertisements to
attract Oregon residents to its casino insufficient to establish its amenability to either
general or specific jurisdiction in Oregon for claim by Oregon resident injured at the
casino); Bachman v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 724 P.2d 858, 860 (Or. Ct. App. 1986)
(concluding Washington hospital was not subject to general jurisdiction in Oregon
despite advertisements in Oregon paper and telephone listing in Oregon to solicit
Oregon patients across state line to Washington hospital); Riviera Operating Corp. v.
Dawson, 29 S.W.3d 905, 910-11 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding Nevada casino’s
solicitation efforts to attract Texas residents were insufficient to establish general
jurisdiction over claim by Texas resident injured in Nevada). But see Gorman v.
Grand Casino of La., Inc.-Coushatta, 1 F. Supp. 2d 656, 659 (E.D. Tex. 1998)
(holding Louisiana casino subject to general jurisdiction in Texas for injury
occurring in Louisiana to Texas resident predicated on casino’s extensive and
pervasive forum advertising on billboards, television, radio, and other media);
Gavigan v. Walt Disney World, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 786, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding
Walt Disney World amenable to general jurisdiction in suit by Pennsylvania resident
for injuries occurring in Florida because of Walt Disney’s extensive advertising
campaign in Pennsylvania); Marshall v. Inn on Madeline Island, 610 N.W.2d 670,
675-76 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (finding general jurisdiction over Wisconsin inn that
directly targeted Minnesota residents through direct mail and advertisements in
Minnesota publications when Minnesota resident was injured at inn); Maro v. Potash,
531 A.2d 407, 409-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (holding Pennsylvania
concessionaire at Veteran’s Stadium in Philadelphia subject to general jurisdiction in
New Jersey for alleged injury to New Jersey resident at the stadium as result of
stadium’s massive marketing and advertising efforts taken to attract New Jersey
residents, resulting in millions of dollars of revenues for concessionaire over fifteenyear lease). Of course, all these case finding general jurisdiction based on
solicitations from a neighboring state involved at least some contacts with a
relationship to the dispute, although it is not clear under current doctrine whether
specific jurisdiction could in fact be exercised in these cases. See supra note 98.
370
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targeted, as its predominant source of revenue, the business of Texas
371
residents.
Moreover, targeted marketing may be relevant in another
context as well. Continuous targeted advertising and solicitation
efforts culminating in some quantum of in-state transactions are
more substantial forum activities than engaging in the same quantum
of in-state transactions without such directed marketing. By directing
such efforts at the forum, the corporation is engaging in more
qualitatively significant activities, with both corresponding additional
forum benefits and expectations that its in-state transactions will
subject it to the state’s judicial prerogative for any and all causes of
action. Thus, courts occasionally rely on such advertisements as an
additional factor supporting dispute-blind jurisdiction over
corporations negotiating, executing, or performing transactions in
372
the state.
In sum, those forum revenue-generating activities indicating that
the corporation is conducting business transactions in the state,
rather than merely with forum residents, are of a sufficiently
substantial nature to support general jurisdiction. Typically, this
occurs when the corporation negotiates, performs, or executes
transactions in the state, especially if such transactions are aided by
targeted forum advertisements or distributors, dealers, agents, or
employees in the state. But other corporate activities may suffice as
well, including perhaps targeted marketing under the right
circumstances, consonant with the Supreme Court’s directive that
373
“talismanic jurisdiction formulas” are unavailing.
4.

Websites

Modern technology has engendered new jurisdictional
challenges. One of these challenges is the extent to which a
nonresident defendant’s Internet activity subjects it to personal
jurisdiction in another forum. The best known case addressing this
374
issue is Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.
Zippo involved a claim that an Internet domain site, with 3,000
371

Wilkerson, 554 F.2d at 749-50.
See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir.
1996) (finding that, while $4 million of in-state sales alone may not have sufficed,
such sales combined with corporation’s targeted marketing in the forum and
relationship with its independent dealers satisfied minimum contacts aspect of
dispute-blind jurisdiction, but subsequently holding that the exercise of jurisdiction
was unreasonable).
373
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485-86 & n.29 (1985).
374
952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
372
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paying subscribers in the forum state of Pennsylvania, infringed upon
375
another company’s trademark. The only question before the court
was whether the defendant was subject to specific jurisdiction as a
376
result of this conduct. To resolve the jurisdictional query, the court,
relying on “well developed personal jurisdiction principles,”
constructed a sliding scale categorizing a defendant’s Internet usage
377
into a spectrum with three zones. At one end of the spectrum, the
defendant uses the transmission of computer files over the Internet
to enter into contracts with residents of other states, subjecting the
378
defendant to jurisdiction.
At the other end of the spectrum, the
defendant establishes a mere passive website that does nothing more
379
than advertise, which is not sufficient for jurisdiction.
In between
these two extremes are those websites allowing the exchange of
information over the Internet, in which jurisdiction “is determined by
the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of
380
information that occurs on the Website.” The Zippo court held that
because the defendant was purposefully availing itself of the benefits
and protections of the forum’s laws by engaging in electronic
commerce with Pennsylvania residents, the defendant was amenable
381
under specific jurisdiction principles.
Zippo’s sliding scale framework was thus developed in the
particular context of resolving the purposeful availment inquiry for
382
specific jurisdiction.
Indeed, the court distinguished the
defendant’s proffered authority on the basis that the cited cases
383
involved general jurisdiction rather than specific jurisdiction.
Nonetheless—and despite the frequent recognition that general
jurisdiction requires more extensive forum activities than specific
384
jurisdiction —numerous courts have co-opted the Zippo framework
385
Some of these courts have
for general jurisdictional queries.
375

Id. at 1121.
Id. at 1122 (noting plaintiff conceded that only specific jurisdiction was at issue
in the case).
377
Id. at 1124.
378
Id.
379
Id.
380
Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
381
Id. at 1126-27.
382
Id. at 1124-26.
383
Id. at 1126 n.7.
384
See supra note 155.
385
See, e.g., Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir.
2003) (positing, as an alternative basis for general jurisdiction, that the nonresident
defendant’s website was “highly interactive and very extensive” under the “sliding
scale” test); Soma Med. Int’l, Inc. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296376
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decreed that the presence of an interactive website accessible to
forum residents supports the exercise of general in personam
386
jurisdiction. But such holdings ignore the appropriate parameters
of general jurisdiction.
While technological change indubitably may increase the need
for jurisdiction over nonresidents, such change, as the Supreme
387
Court recognized in Hanson v. Denckla, cannot herald “the eventual
demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
388
courts.” Yet this is exactly what would occur if the sine qua non of
general jurisdiction was merely an interactive or commercial website.
Today, such interactive and commercial websites are common. As a
result, contorting the Zippo framework to apply to general jurisdiction
would render countless businesses around the globe subject to the

97 (10th Cir. 1999) (employing sliding-scale categories in evaluating whether website
supported general jurisdiction, but concluding that website was merely a passive
informational site not establishing amenability); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d
333, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999) (adopting Zippo framework, but holding that the
nonresident defendant’s website was passive and therefore did not support general
jurisdiction); Mieckowski v. Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp. 782, 787-88 (E.D. Tex. 1998)
(holding nonresident manufacturer of bunk bed, which was purchased and sold by
its original owner in another state and subsequently asphyxiated a child in Texas,
subject to Texas’s general jurisdiction based on its somewhat interactive website and
forum sales); Efford v. Jockey Club, 796 A.2d 370, 374-75 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)
(employing sliding-scale categories to conclude that nonresident defendant’s website
was insufficient to support general jurisdiction); Townsend v. Univ. Hosp., 83 S.W.3d
913, 922 (Tex. App. 2002) (applying three category sliding scale to hold passive
website containing only contact and product information insufficient to support
general jurisdiction in Texas); Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d
707, 718, 724-25 (Tex. App. 2000) (concluding website allowing Texas residents to
submit comments and questions to representatives of German corporation was
interactive and therefore a factor to consider in determining whether general
jurisdiction existed in Texas for accident occurring in Texas to Texas resident but
involving an automobile originally sold in Germany and not intended for the United
States market); Jones v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 995 S.W.2d 767, 772-73 (Tex. App.
1999) (using three category sliding scale to find defendant’s website “somewhat
interactive” because it allowed users to input data to locate the nearest sales
representative and holding that, although website alone was not sufficient for
jurisdiction, the combination of the defendant’s ability to solicit sales through its
subsidiaries, its contacts related to the litigation, and its website were enough),
disapproved on other grounds, BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789,
794 n.1 (Tex. 2002).
386
See, e.g., Mieckowski, 997 F. Supp. at 787-88 (concluding general jurisdiction
appropriate in part because of defendant’s somewhat interactive website); DaimlerBenz, 21 S.W.3d at 718, 724-25 (concluding interactive website was a factor to
consider in determining whether general jurisdiction existed in Texas); Jones, 995
S.W.2d at 772-73 (finding defendant’s website “somewhat interactive” and therefore
a factor supporting general jurisdiction).
387
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
388
Id. at 251.
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general jurisdiction of every state in the United States. But merely
because a website is interactive and could be accessed by forum
residents does not mean that the nonresident has engaged in the
requisite continuous and substantial forum activities necessary for
390
general jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the better reasoned opinions focus not on the
characteristics of the website, but rather on the nature of the
transactions between the nonresident defendant and the residents of
391
The mere fact that a defendant maintains a
the forum state.
website, even one that can be used for commercial activities with
forum residents, should be insufficient for general, as opposed to
392
specific, jurisdiction.
Instead, the general jurisdictional query
389

Cf. GTE News Media Servs. Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (recognizing that predicating jurisdiction on the accessibility of a website
in the forum would allow any forum in the country to exercise personal jurisdiction
in Internet-related cases).
390
Cf. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding Zippo sliding
scale is “not well adapted to the general jurisdiction inquiry, because even repeated
contacts with forum residents by a foreign defendant may not constitute the requisite
substantial, continuous and systematic contacts required for a finding of general
jurisdiction”).
391
See, e.g., Revell, 317 F.3d at 471 (holding Columbia’s website providing the
opportunity to subscribe to the Columbia Journalism Review and submit applications
for admission to the University was not “substantial” activity in Texas as required
under Supreme Court precedent for general jurisdiction when less than twenty
Texas residents subscribed each year); Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293
F.3d 506, 511-13 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (concluding district court erred in dismissing
action for lack of minimum contacts without providing plaintiff an opportunity to
conduct discovery regarding whether dispute-blind jurisdiction existed based on the
frequency and volume of the defendant’s transactions with forum residents through
its website because the advent of the Internet did not eviscerate traditional
jurisdiction principles); GTE News Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1350 (articulating that the
Internet should not “vitiate long-held and inviolate principles of federal court
jurisdiction”); Robbins v. Yutopian Enters., Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 426, 430 (D. Md.
2002) (holding “active” website did not suffice to establish dispute-blind jurisdiction
when the nonresident defendant had engaged in only forty-six transactions with
forum residents because such activities were “not enough to establish general
jurisdiction, no matter what medium was used to conduct the transactions”); Dagesse
v. Plant Hotel, 113 F. Supp. 2d 211, 223 (D.N.H. 2000) (explaining that a “proper
analysis of the jurisdictional effects of an internet web site must focus on whether the
defendant has actually and deliberately used its web site to conduct commercial
transactions or other activities with residents of the forum”).
392
See, e.g., Revell, 317 F.3d at 471 (concluding Zippo scale was helpful in specific
jurisdiction cases but not general jurisdiction cases); Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865,
874 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that, while specific jurisdiction was appropriate, general
jurisdiction did not exist in Ohio over Washington defendants registering Internet
domain names in part because “maintain[ing] a website that is accessible to anyone
over the Internet is insufficient to justify general jurisdiction”); ALS Scan, Inc. v.
Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 713-15 (4th Cir. 2002) (adopting Zippo
framework for specific jurisdiction, but concluding that even “numerous and
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should revolve around the traditional criteria of the qualitative and
quantitative nature of the actual forum activities conducted by the
defendant. Even the Zippo court presumably would agree, as its
sliding scale was intended to be “consistent with well developed
393
personal jurisdiction principles,” rather than eviscerating the axiom
that the defendant’s amenability to general jurisdiction depends on
394
“substantial” forum activities.
The accessibility of an interactive website, then, should have
approximately the same jurisdictional significance as the
appointment of a statutory agent—neither is of the requisite
substantial nature, standing alone, for the exercise of general
jurisdiction under the International Shoe model. Instead, the actual
course of conduct of business in the forum by the nonresident
corporation is the jurisdictional linchpin. But the remaining
dilemma is how to gauge whether such activities are substantial,
continuous, and systematic enough to justify dispute-blind
jurisdiction.
B. A Suggested Three-Pronged Approach
As discussed previously, International Shoe premised general
jurisdiction on a defendant’s “continuous” forum activities adjudged
“so substantial and of such a nature” that its amenability on causes of
395
action unrelated to such activities was justified.
As worded, this
conception appeared to imply two requirements to satisfy the
requisite connection for due process—that the defendant’s forum
activities must be both of a “substantial nature” and “continuous.”
Helicopteros thereafter confirmed this dual nature of the general
jurisdiction minimum contacts query. Helicol’s purchases and
related trips, while certainly continuous and ongoing, were
nevertheless deemed an insufficient jurisdictional predicate,
exhibiting that the nature of the defendant’s forum activities must be
396
substantial as well.
Conversely, Helicol’s contract-negotiating
397
session in Houston was arguably qualitatively substantial, but the
Court dismissed its import to the jurisdictional calculus because it
repeated electronic connections with persons” in the forum through an Internet
website “do not add up to the quality of contacts necessary for a State to have
jurisdiction over the person for all purposes”).
393
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
394
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
395
Id.
396
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417-18 (1984).
397
Cf. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985).
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could not quantitatively “be described or regarded as a contact of a
398
‘continuous and systematic’ nature.” Thus, both the qualitative and
the quantitative sufficiency of the defendant’s forum activities must
be scrutinized.
Unfortunately, however, as illustrated in the preceding doctrinal
analysis, the lower courts often do not properly appraise both
substantiality and continuity, instead basing jurisdiction on the
399
existence of only one of the necessary constituents. To ameliorate
this omission, then, the minimum contacts analysis for general
jurisdiction should consist of two interrelated components—first, a
qualitative evaluation of the substantiality of the nature of
defendant’s forum activities, and, second, a quantitative analysis of
the continuity and regularity of such activities. Finally, if the
necessary contacts exist, then additional factors must be considered
to insure that the exercise of jurisdiction is both fair and reasonable.
1.

Substantiality and the Defining Activities of a
Commercial Domiciliary

Although several courts have recognized the need for
incorporating a substantiality component in the minimum contacts
analysis for general jurisdiction, the challenge is discerning those
400
activities of a nonresident defendant that satisfy the requirement.
The Supreme Court’s decrees establish that a temporary principal
401
place of business is sufficient, while purchases and related trips in
402
Earlier
the forum are not of the requisite substantial nature.
decisions of the Court add that a defendant’s advertising and
403
solicitation efforts from an in-state office do not suffice, yet
jurisdiction may be predicated on the actual conduct of business in
404
the forum from such a locale. Similarly, according to some modern
opinions, merely doing business with the state’s residents is not
enough, but a defendant conducting business in the state through
negotiating, performing, or executing transactions there may be

398

Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.
See supra Parts III & IV.A.
400
See Twitchell, Doing-Business Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 187 (iterating that the
lower courts requiring “substantial” contacts for general jurisdiction “rarely attempt
to develop the content of this ‘substantiality’ requirement”).
401
See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952).
402
See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.
403
See, e.g., People’s Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918);
Green v. Chi., Burlington & Quiney Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1907).
404
See, e.g., Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 109 (1898).
399
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405

subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction. The enigma, of course, is the
underlying framework justifying these disparate holdings.
The solution proposed by this Article is that the substantiality
query compares the nonresident defendant’s forum activities to the
in-state activities of an entity domiciled or based in the forum. Under
this comparison, the nature of the defendant’s forum operations
should indicate activities at least analogous to the types of in-state
activities that define a commercial domiciliary.
This proposal therefore necessitates some consideration of the
in-state activities that characterize a commercial entity as a
domiciliary of the forum. While the term “domicile” typically is
employed in reference to a natural individual’s permanent “home,”
the law also recognizes that a business entity may have a “home base,”
or domicile, outside the state in which it is incorporated or
406
chartered. The Supreme Court initially acknowledged this concept
407
in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, holding a Delaware corporation
established a commercial domicile in West Virginia by making that
408
state “the actual seat of its corporate government.”
Lower courts
have similarly iterated that a company may obtain a commercial
domicile in the state of its principal place of business, that is, where it
conducts the majority of its activities or directs and manages its
409
affairs.
This common-law conception of commercial domicile thus
appears to be the functional equivalent of the “principal place of
business” standard adopted for corporate citizenship under the
405

See supra Part IV.A.3.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 cmt. i (1971)
(explaining term “commercial domicil” is used to indicate the state in which main
office and principal place of business of corporation is located for taxation
purposes); 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 32 (2001) (iterating that a
corporation may obtain a “commercial domicile” in the state in which it actually
functions and is managed). “Commercial domicile” also has a slightly different
meaning employed in international law and the law of war that is irrelevant for
present purposes. See id.
407
298 U.S. 193 (1936).
408
Id. at 211-12.
409
See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. McColgan, 156 P.2d 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945) (holding
railroad’s commercial domicile was in California when it conducted its day-to-day
transportation operations in the state, thereby obtaining the greatest proportion of
its corporate benefits there); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue,
597 N.E.2d 1327, 1335 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1992) (defining commercial domicile as the
location of the majority of the company’s business or the nerve center of the
business); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Calvert, 414 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Tex. 1967)
(explaining commercial domicile of a corporation is its principal place of business or
the locale from which corporate activities are managed and directed); see also supra
note 406.
406
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411

diversity statute and the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.
In applying this
statutory standard, courts typically focus on one or more of the
following: (1) the locale of the company’s “nerve center” or source of
power, direction, control, or decision-making; (2) the situs of a
substantial portion of its production, service, or other business
activities; or (3) the totality of all the corporation’s activities,
including the location of its nerve center, production facilities,
412
administrative offices, and business operations.
These criteria
illustrate a company must at least be supervising the conduct of its
business, producing its goods and services, or selling its goods or
services in the state to have any possibility of being considered a
locally based business—if it is not performing any of these activities in
the state, its domicile will be in another state in which it does conduct
such activities.
The proposed substantiality query compares these activities
characterizing a business domiciled in the state to the nonresident
defendant’s forum activities.
If the nonresident defendant is
directing its business operations from the state, producing its goods
or services in the state, or selling such goods or services through instate business transactions, it is conducting activities analogous to
those that may demarcate a local business. While a local business is
ultimately considered “local” because it conducts relatively more of
such activities in the forum than anywhere else, the substantiality
prong of general in personam jurisdiction is not concerned with the
quantity of the defendant’s forum activities but rather their
qualitative nature.
The quality of defendant’s forum activities must be, in the words
of International Shoe, “of such a nature as to justify suit” in the absence
413
of any nexus between the litigation and the forum. Shoe’s “of such a
nature” standard appears to contemplate activities of a particular
type, which the Court subsequently confirmed by holding that this
standard is satisfied when the defendant operates a “limited . . . part

410

28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2002). Section 1332(c) provides that a “corporation shall be
deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the
State where it has its principal place of business . . . .” Id.
411
11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(1) (1898). The diversity statute borrowed the term
“principal place of business” from this provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See S.
REP. NO. 85-1830, at 5-6, 31 (1958)), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3102-03,
3133.
412
See, e.g., Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., 7 F.3d 909, 914-15 (10th Cir.
1993); Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 162 (6th Cir. 1993); J.A. Olson Co. v.
City of Winona, 818 F.2d 401, 407-10 (5th Cir. 1987).
413
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
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414

of its general business” in the state.
Thus, the defendant’s forum
activities must be of a special type—those types of activities that are
part of its “general business” and therefore could define the
defendant as a domiciliary. The nonresident accordingly does not
actually have to have its principal place of business or commercial
domicile in the forum; instead, the nonresident must merely conduct
a portion of its general business operations in the state of a
sufficiently substantial nature, which occurs when the nonresident
conducts forum activities analogous to those defining or
characterizing a local business.
This proposed standard corresponds with the Supreme Court’s
prior jurisdictional holdings. In Helicopteros, for instance, Helicol’s
continuous forum contacts included the purchase of helicopters and
training for its pilots from a Texas corporation to support its business
415
of providing helicopter transportation in South America. Helicol’s
forum activities were thus not analogous to the in-state direction of
operations or provision of services that are the hallmark of a local
company. This is evident as Helicol’s purchasing and training
activities could not, irrespective of quantitative prodigiousness,
establish a Texas domicile when Helicol performed those activities
characterizing a local business—executing, performing, and
supervising its helicopter service contracts—outside the forum, in
416
South America. A similar rationale explicates the Supreme Court’s
pre-International Shoe holdings that forum solicitation and advertising
without accompanying in-state transactions are insufficient for

414

Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952); see also
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984).
415
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 409, 417-18.
416
See id. While courts have on rare occasions opined in dicta that purchases
might be a relevant consideration in determining the principal place of business of a
corporation, see J.A. Olson Co. v. City of Winona, 818 F.2d 401, 412 (5th Cir. 1987),
even those cases discussing this possibility have either ignored or downplayed the
importance of corporate purchases in their analyses. See, e.g., id. (omitting any
discussion of purchases in its analysis); Mosser v. Crucible Steel Co. of Am., 173 F.
Supp. 953, 955-56 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (directing parties to provide evidence as to where
corporation made its purchases, but deeming failure of corporation to provide an
answer to this query immaterial when corporation conducted its primary production
and supervisory activities in Pennsylvania). While perhaps purchases could arguably
tip the balance in determining a corporation’s principal place of business if its
production, supervisory, and sales activities were otherwise equivalent in two or more
states, it is inconceivable that a corporation could ever establish a principal place of
business in a state solely through its purchases there when it conducts all its other
operations in another state. Purchases are thus not an activity that can be said to
define or characterize a commercial domiciliary, unless perhaps the entity’s sole
business operations are providing purchasing services to other companies.
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417

general jurisdiction. No matter how much advertising is done in a
forum, the corporation is not acting comparably to a local business if
its production, sales, and supervisory activities are occurring outside
the state.
Conversely, the corporate office in Perkins, from which the
defendant was conducting all of its business operations during the
418
war, was temporarily the defendant’s principal place of business.
Thus, the defendant’s forum activities were closely analogous to the
in-state activities of a commercial domiciliary as its “nerve center” was
at least briefly located in the forum. But less substantial activities
than a temporary principal place of business also support disputeblind jurisdiction. For example, a nonresident defendant regularly
performing business with forum residents from a physical location in
the state is conducting the same types of activities that may
characterize a local business, as one basis for commercial domicile is
engaging in a high proportion of such business transactions in the
state. The mere fact that the in-state activities may be somewhat
trivial in comparison to the defendant’s world-wide business is
immaterial for purposes of the general jurisdiction substantiality
query—what is significant is that the defendant engages in an in-state
business activity (such as selling its goods or services to forum
residents) that may define a purely local business. Hence, as the
Supreme Court’s pre-International Shoe decisions held, a nonresident
with a sales office repeatedly conducting in-state transactions with
419
forum residents is amenable to dispute-blind jurisdiction.
The proposed comparison to the activities of a commercial
domiciliary does not mandate that the maintenance of a forum
business location is required for dispute-blind jurisdiction. A
nonresident can perform the defining activities of a local business
even without having any of its agents permanently ensconced in the
forum. For example, Alderson v. Southern Co. appropriately held that
an Indiana power company with its sole plant in Indiana was
amenable to dispute-blind jurisdiction in Illinois because it sold all of
its product to an Illinois corporation for use by Illinois residents
420
under a contract governed by Illinois law.
The activities the
defendant conducted in Illinois—negotiating, executing, and
performing contracts selling product there on a continuous basis—
417

See People’s Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918).
Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445-48.
419
Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 105 (1898); see also Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 916-18 (N.Y. 1917).
420
747 N.E.2d 926, 940-42 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
418
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are potential predicates for commercial domicile.
On the other hand, merely because a corporation’s product is
eventually purchased in the state does not establish that the
corporation is engaging in activities similar to those of a commercial
domiciliary. A local business typically conducts negotiations for its
revenue-generating activities in the forum or at least makes strategic
decisions regarding such negotiations from the forum. Bearry v. Beech
Aircraft Corp. accordingly reached the correct result in denying
dispute-blind jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation selling
millions of dollars of products to the forum when such sales were
421
negotiated, executed, and performed outside the forum. In such a
case, the nonresident is not conducting the activities in the forum
that a commercial domiciliary would conduct; instead, it is
performing the typical activities of a local business outside the state.
This approach thus appears to provide the courts with an
analytical model that comports with the holdings of the Supreme
422
Court and numerous lower federal and state courts.
While the
421

818 F.2d 370, 375-76 (5th Cir. 1987).
See supra notes 415-21 and accompanying text. Other examples would lead to
similar results. For instance, the proposal explains the insubstantiality, standing
alone, of such potential forum contacts as registering to do business in the state or
maintaining an interactive website. See supra Parts IV.A.1 & 4. Registering to do
business in the forum is not an activity that would define a local business. Likewise,
merely maintaining an interactive website that can be accessed in the state is not by
itself an activity defining a forum domiciliary—only if the entity is conducting
business transactions in the state through the website could it possibly be said that its
activities are comparable to a local company.
The proposal would also explain the disparate holdings of the federal circuits on
the propriety of dispute-blind jurisdiction predicated on an office within the forum.
The Fifth Circuit held in Submersible Systems, Inc. v. Perforadora Central, S.A. de C.V., 249
F.3d 413, 419-20 (5th Cir. 2001), that a three-person forum office to oversee the
construction of a marine drilling rig the nonresident corporation was purchasing was
insufficient to establish dispute-blind jurisdiction, whereas the Second Circuit
concluded in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2000), that
a similarly sized investor relations office was enough for general jurisdiction. Both
these holdings appear correct under this Article’s model. Activities related to the
purchase of the rig were not the type of activities that could establish a corporate
domicile for the nonresident defendant in Submersible Systems, although using an
investor relations office to cultivate capital markets was at least the type of activity
that could establish the domicile of the parent holding corporations in Wiwa. See also
Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790, 793 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that
forum manufacturing plant supported the exercise of dispute-blind jurisdiction, a
correct result under this Article’s proposal because the operation of a manufacturing
plant is the type of activity that may establish a corporation’s domicile).
Finally, the proposal is also in accord with the decisions discussed earlier
emphasizing the qualitative aspects of a nonresident defendant’s revenue-generating
activities in the forum. See supra Part IV.A.3. To illustrate, the Second Circuit
appears to have reached the correct result in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
422
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proposal would not furnish a clear solution to every query, this
actually accords with the Supreme Court’s admonition that
jurisdictional determinations will in some instances be “grey” rather
423
than “black and white.” Yet the proposed comparison does provide
a suitable benchmark, consonant with the Supreme Court’s holdings
and intimations, for differentiating among these “shades of grey,” as
well as a cogent methodology to insure that the courts are asking the
424
right questions.
If employing this methodology reveals that the defendant did
not conduct any activities of a qualitatively substantial nature in the
forum, the assertion of dispute-blind jurisdiction is improper. On the
other hand, if the defendant did engage in activities of the requisite
substantial nature, such activities must also be quantitatively
425
“continuous and systematic”
to insure that the nonresident
defendant is truly acting comparably to a local business.
2.

Continuous and Systematic Forum Activities

The terminology “continuous and systematic” indicates that the
defendant’s forum activities must be constant and occurring at
regular intervals. But this apparently facile formulation masks two
uncertitudes. First, under what circumstances are a defendant’s
activities sufficiently regular and constant to justify the assertion of
dispute-blind jurisdiction? And, second, over what period of time
should the defendant’s forum activities be evaluated?
In many cases, of course, resolving the first query will not be
Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 570-73 (2d Cir. 1996), by holding that the minimum
contacts necessary for general jurisdiction were established by the nonresident
defendant’s $4 million in sales presumably executed in the forum, its relationships
with its forum dealers, and its advertisements targeted to the forum. Extensive sales
transactions executed within the state through forum advertisements and a forum
distribution network are the types of activities that could establish a corporate
domicile.
423
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
424
Perhaps it could be argued that this proposal is merely a refinement of the preexisting central business activities model for general jurisdiction. See supra Part III.D.
Certainly there are similarities between the two approaches—both attempt to
evaluate substantiality through a measure of the importance of the nonresident’s instate activity. Nevertheless, the proposed comparison to the defining in-state
activities of a local business differs in two material respects that minify the infirmities
of the central business activities template. First, this proposal offers a more concrete
standard for substantiality which is not as susceptible to the vagaries plaguing judicial
interpretations of those activities that are “central” to a business. See id. Second, the
comparison to a local business provides an underlying rationale for general
jurisdiction that is absent from the central business model. Compare supra Part III.D,
with infra Part V.B.
425
See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952).
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problematic. A nonresident defendant operating a forum place of
business on a daily basis or making multiple daily sales in the forum is
engaging in the requisite constant, regularly occurring forum
426
activities.
Conversely, solitary or sporadic forum activities by the
defendant are insufficient to support dispute-blind jurisdiction,
which explains Helicol’s non-amenability despite its arguably
qualitatively substantial forum contract negotiation session. As the
Helicopteros Court remarked, a single forum activity “cannot be
described or regarded as a contact of a ‘continuous and systematic’
427
nature.”
Other courts have likewise held that sporadic forum
activity occurring on an infrequent basis—even if qualitatively
substantial—is insufficient to allow the state to exercise its general
428
adjudicative authority.
The difficulty, however, involves those defendants conducting
perhaps weekly, monthly, or quarterly activities in the forum. Are instate activities occurring at such intervals sufficiently continuous and
systematic? To resolve this dilemma requires some contemplation of
the objective of the “continuous and systematic” requirement. In
other words, why are “continuous and systematic” activities a
prerequisite for the assertion of general jurisdiction?
My suggestion is that constant, regular forum conduct
demonstrates a quantum of activities analogous to those of at least
426

See, e.g., LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2000).
427
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
428
See, e.g., Covenant Bank for Sav. v. Cohen, 806 F. Supp. 52, 57-58 (D.N.J. 1992)
(holding advertising in forum newspaper on two occasions in fourteen-month period
and sporadic servicing of loans made to forum residents were not the “regular and
substantial” forum activities required for general jurisdiction); Curran v. Fisherman
Marine Prods., Inc., 773 So. 2d 285, 288-89 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding nonresident
corporation’s $150,000 in forum sales of shrimp in fourteen transactions over an
eleven-year period was “ad hoc and sporadic” rather than “continuous and
systematic” as required to support general jurisdiction); Bosarge v. Master Mike, Inc.,
669 So. 2d 510, 512 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding similarly that nonresident
defendant’s six contacts over a four-year period were “ad hoc and sporadic”); Arcon,
Inc. v. Malone, No. 12-01-00214-CV, 2002 WL 1428497 (Tex. App. June 28, 2002)
(holding nonresident corporation’s six forum construction projects performed
irregularly over a three-year period were not continuous and systematic as required
for general jurisdiction). This principle may also be the explanation supporting the
apparently well-settled rule that a nonresident defendant’s participation at a forum
trade show is insufficient for general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Doering v. Copper
Mountain, Inc., 259 F.3d 1202, 1210 (10th Cir. 2001); Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v.
Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1995); Michel v. Rocket Eng’g Corp., 45 S.W.3d
658, 673 (Tex. App. 2001). While the courts have not yet articulated the rationale
for this maxim, one possibility is that such forum trade shows are usually only held
once or perhaps twice a year rather than the much more frequent contact typically
required for activities to be described as “continuous and systematic.”
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small local businesses. Thus, not only must the nonresident
defendant perform forum activities qualitatively comparable to the
activities defining a commercial domiciliary, it must also conduct
these activities with a frequency that approximates at least some
forum businesses as well. It is not necessary that the defendant
conducts forum activities to such an extent that the state becomes its
domicile or principal place of business; instead, the comparison is
whether the defendant’s in-state activities are quantitatively
equivalent to at least some local businesses.
A forum-based enterprise typically would not only engage in one
429
or two qualitatively substantial activities in the forum each year;
thus, such sporadic activities are insufficient to complete the analogy
to the operation of a local company. On the other hand, a
nonresident defendant operating a forum store on a daily basis or
making multiple sales on a daily basis is acting similarly to a number
of undisputedly local businesses with respect to both the type and
quantum of activities conducted.
Because the linchpin to this Article’s proposed minimum
contacts analysis is whether the nonresident defendant’s forum
actions are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those of a
forum-based enterprise, the requisite frequency of forum activity to
satisfy the “continuous and systematic” prong depends on the type of
activities the defendant is conducting in the forum and a comparison
to local businesses performing similar activities. This technique may
be illustrated by analyzing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Ritenhouse v.
430
Mabry.
In Ritenhouse, the court held that a medical professional
corporation conducting business every fifth business day from a
forum clinic performed the necessary “systematic and continuous”
431
activities for general jurisdiction.
The nonresident defendant’s
forum activities there consisted of operating an in-state medical
clinic, which certainly is qualitatively comparable to the activities of
many local medical centers. But is the weekly operation of a clinic
sufficiently continuous and systematic?
Under this Article’s
approach, the relevant comparison is whether a local clinic might be
open only once a week. Although this is admittedly a close question
because most clinics operate more frequently, it is not unheard of (at
429

There may be exceptions, however, for businesses negotiating contracts for
large-scale projects that take months or even years to complete, such as commercial
buildings. See infra note 433 and accompanying text.
430
832 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1987).
431
Id. at 1390. The court found that the cause of action did not arise out of the
professional corporation’s contacts with the forum because the patient was a referral
at a time when the corporation did not conduct any business in the forum. Id.
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least in rural parts of the country) for a doctor to have a facility in a
small community open on a weekly basis.
Yet while Rittenhouse is thus arguably correct in the context of the
operation and conduct of a medical clinic from a forum location on a
weekly basis, the same result would not be appropriate for a
nonresident defendant merely performing a single weekly forum sale
432
of a standard household good.
Under such circumstances, the
nonresident would not be acting comparably to a local business,
which presumably would engage in more frequent in-state
transactions. Of course, this will depend somewhat on the type of
transactions the defendant is performing in the state. Some
businesses might perform larger-scale projects in the forum that even
a local company would only execute on a monthly or quarterly
433
basis.
Thus, the realities of the defendant’s activities in the forum must
be contemplated. Although the archetypical “continuous and
systematic” activities would occur each business day, activities
occurring less frequently, albeit still on a regular basis, may suffice if
such activities are the types of activities that a forum-based enterprise
might conduct on a comparable basis.
This comparison also provides guidance on resolving the second
quandary, the relevant time period for assessing whether the
defendant’s forum contacts satisfy the “continuous and systematic”
standard. Perkins appears to have adopted the Supreme Court’s preInternational Shoe jurisprudence that the ultimate resolution of the
defendant’s amenability for unrelated causes of action hinges upon
434
its forum activities at the time it is served with summons.
432

Cf. Modern Mailers, Inc. v. Johnson & Quin, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1048, 1053-54
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding nonresident defendant’s $230,000 in forum sales over a
three-year period was not a “continuous and substantial” activity when company did
not have daily or regular contact with the forum).
433
As an example, oil rig brokers might typically transact only a few sales a year.
For a case law example employing this principle, see Michigan National Bank v.
Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 466 (6th Cir. 1989), noting that the defendants’
performance of “at least one sale in Michigan each and every month” when the
average sale exceeded $1,000.00 indicated the defendants “conducted a ‘continuous
and systematic part of their general business’ in Michigan.” While the Sixth Circuit’s
holding is perhaps dubious, the case does illustrate the necessity of considering the
realities of the nonresident defendant’s business.
434
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444-45, 448 (1952)
(holding assertion of jurisdiction was not unfair when corporation was engaging in
continuous and systematic business activities in Ohio at the time its president was
served with process). Pre-International Shoe opinions frequently iterated that the
nonresident must be doing business within the state at the time of service of
summons to be amenable to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. Whitney Cent.
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Nonetheless, a mere one-time snapshot of the defendant’s in-state
contacts, standing alone, would not necessarily provide a basis for a
meaningful comparison to a local business. Thus, the nonresident’s
activities over a period of time preceding service must also be
considered, as the Supreme Court implicitly recognized in Helicopteros
435
by analyzing Helicol’s Texas activities over a seven-year period.
Evaluating the defendant’s activities over a period of time insures that
its activities are truly quantitatively analogous to a business domiciled
in the state and not merely an anomaly on a particular date.
The lower courts specifically addressing this issue generally
concur, positing that a period “reasonable under the circumstances”
436
should be employed.
Typically, under this standard the courts
perpend the defendant’s contacts over the two to seven years
437
preceding the filing of suit. While the evaluation of the defendant’s

Nat’l Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 172-73 (1923) (recognizing sole question for decision was
whether, at the time of service of process, defendant was doing business in the state
in such a manner as to warrant the inference it was present there); Rosenberg Bros.
& Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517-18 (1923) (same); Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.) (stating that
an essential requirement for jurisdiction is that the corporation is served while it is
present within the state). The Supreme Court’s insistence that the defendant must
have been engaging in the requisite forum activities before being served with process
appears appropriate as service is the procedure by which the state asserts in personam
jurisdiction over the nonresident. See Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484
U.S. 97, 104 (1987); Miss. Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946).
435
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 409-11 (1984).
436
See, e.g., Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 717 (5th
Cir. 1999) (concluding general jurisdiction should “be assessed by evaluating
contacts of the defendant with the forum over a reasonable number of years, up to
the date the suit was filed”); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d
560, 569-570 (2d Cir. 1996) (demonstrating through case law examples that contacts
are commonly assessed over a reasonable period of time before the plaintiff’s filing
of the complaint); Haas v. A.M. King Indus., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 644, 648 (D. Utah
1998) (agreeing with Metropolitan Life that a period of time “reasonable under the
circumstances” until the date of filing suit should be employed to assess compliance
with the “continuous and systematic” standard).
437
See, e.g., Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 92-93 & n.8 (1st Cir. 1998)
(considering all contacts established in the two years preceding the filing of the
complaint); Metro. Life Ins., 84 F.3d at 570 (employing a six-year period prior to the
filing of the lawsuit); Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1198-1200 (4th Cir.
1993) (examining defendant’s activities in the six years before suit was filed); Mich.
Nat’l Bank, 888 F.2d at 466 (analyzing defendant’s annual sales for the two years
preceding the lawsuit); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 372-76 (5th Cir.
1987) (employing a five-year period); Reyes v. Marine Mgmt. & Consulting, Ltd., 586
So. 2d 103, 109-11 (La. 1990) (analyzing contacts over a five-year period); Bachman
v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 724 P.2d 858, 862 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (employing a three-year
period before suit was filed). Some courts have reasoned that a longer relationship
with the forum may be a factor favoring the exercise of jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1125
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activities should also include the intervening period between filing of
438
suit and service of process, this distinction probably would seldom,
439
Rather, the key is that a period of time
if ever, be material.
predating the state’s attempt to exercise its sovereign authority over
the nonresident defendant must be scrutinized to insure that the
nonresident is acting comparably to a forum domiciliary. In some
instances, inspecting the defendant’s post-service activities to assure
that any in-state activities that commenced shortly before service
continued thereafter may be permissible in order to demonstrate that
the defendant is conducting ongoing business in the state
440
comparable to local companies.
To summarize, if the court determines the defendant’s forum
conduct includes those qualitatively substantial activities that may
define a commercial domiciliary, the court should next discern
whether such activities occurred in a comparable frequency to at least
some local businesses over a reasonable period of time preceding the
service of summons. If so, the requisite minimum contacts exist for
general jurisdiction.
But before dispute-blind adjudication is
appropriate, the court must also cogitate whether exercising
jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of “fair play and

(9th Cir. 2002) (reasoning that defendant’s sole forum activity of grain shipments
over a one-year period was less continuous and systematic than the seven years of
purchases in Helicopteros); Noonan, 135 F.3d at 93 (noting that defendant’s two-year
history of forum activities was “far less continuous than the ten years of activity” in an
earlier precedent); Hein v. Taco Bell, Inc., 803 P.2d 329, 330 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)
(relying on twenty-four years of forum contacts as factor supporting the exercise of
general jurisdiction).
438
See supra note 434 and accompanying text. None of the lower courts has
proffered a rationale for preferring the date of filing over service. See, e.g., Noonan,
135 F.3d at 93 n.8; Metro. Life Ins., 84 F.3d at 569-70; Nichols, 991 F.2d at 1198; Haas,
28 F. Supp. 2d at 648. Nor is such a rationale readily apparent. The date the lawsuit
is filed, while important for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction and the statute of
limitations, has little, if any, connection to the forum’s assertion of personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. Instead, as the Supreme Court has
recognized, service of process is the mechanism the state uses to assert its sovereign
prerogative over the nonresident defendant. See Omni Capital, 484 U.S. at 104; Miss.
Pub., 326 U.S. at 444-45.
439
In most instances, service is accomplished shortly after the filing of the
complaint. Indeed, in many state courts and in the federal courts, the plaintiff’s
action may be dismissed if service is not accomplished within sixty to 120 days after
the filing of the complaint. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (requiring service of
summons and complaint to be made within 120 days after filing of the complaint).
440
See, e.g., Gavigan v. Walt Disney World, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 786, 787-88 (E.D. Pa.
1986) (considering evidence of nonresident defendant’s extensive forum advertising
campaign beginning six months before suit was filed but continuing for some time
thereafter).
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441

substantial justice.”
3.

“Fair Play and Substantial Justice” Considerations

The due process limitations on a state’s adjudicatory power
depend in part on the “reasonableness” or “fairness” of maintaining
442
the lawsuit in the forum.
The Supreme Court has therefore
directed that other factors besides the defendant’s forum contacts
should be considered “to determine whether the assertion of
personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial
443
The relevant factors include the burden on the
justice.’”
defendant, the state’s interest in adjudging the dispute, the plaintiff’s
interest in acquiring an effective remedy, the judicial system’s interest
in efficiency, and the interests of the states in their substantive social
444
policies.
445
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court
relied on these factors to hold that California’s assertion of
jurisdiction over a Japanese corporation embroiled in an
indemnification dispute with a Taiwanese corporation in California
state court “would be unreasonable and unfair,” regardless of the
446
defendant’s forum contacts.
But the Supreme Court did not
specifically resolve whether these factors also apply to assertions of
general jurisdiction rather than the specific jurisdiction that was at
447
issue in Asahi and its prior decisions adopting these criteria.
Yet there is no cogent rationale precluding the application of
these five fairness or reasonableness factors to dispute-blind queries.
Indeed, the factors were derived from International Shoe’s decree that
due process demands that a defendant have “minimum contacts”
with the forum “such that the maintenance of the suit does not
448
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”
Because the term “minimum contacts” subsumes both specific and
441

See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
443
See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (quoting
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).
444
Id. at 477.
445
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
446
Id. at 116. The Court posited that the burden on the defendant was severe,
while the interests of the plaintiff and the state in adjudicating the dispute in
California were slight. Id. at 114-15. Additionally, the Court asserted that extreme
caution and restraint were necessary before employing American conceptions of in
personam jurisdiction in the international context. Id. at 115.
447
See, e.g., id. at 116; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
448
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
442
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general jurisdiction, the factors gauging “fair play and substantial
justice” should consequently apply to general jurisdiction as well.
Moreover, the need for the fairness factors is frequently more
pronounced in general jurisdiction cases. As an example, asserting
dispute-blind jurisdiction over foreign national corporations often
implicates Asahi’s admonition that “‘great care and reserve’” should
be exercised before “‘extending our notions of personal jurisdiction
449
into the international field.’” The international relations and
comity concerns underlying Asahi are only heightened by applying
the American conception of general jurisdiction, which is viewed with
450
abhorance by many other nations,
to disputes without any
relationship to the United States. Employing this jurisdictional basis
to adjudicate controversies solely between two foreign nationals
impacts the justified expectations of the parties as well as the
451
“procedural and substantive policies of other nations.”
The only
method under the current due process jurisdictional model to
alleviate this concern and insure a careful weighing of the procedural
and substantive international interests at stake is through the fairness
452
or reasonableness factors.
449

Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (quoting United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S.
378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
450
See Juenger, supra note 206, at 162.
451
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115.
452
Cf. id. Certainly, additional potential techniques other than the Due Process
Clause exist to limit the exercise of general jurisdiction against foreign nationals,
such as a treaty or a jurisdictional statute. See Twitchell, Doing-Business Jurisdiction,
supra note 5, at 212-13. But treaty prospects appear bleak, at least for the immediate
future, since negotiations regarding the Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments reached an impasse.
Additionally, in the absence of a treaty, it is highly unlikely that Congress will enact a
jurisdictional statute. While yet another possibility is that a more stringent minimum
contacts standard for the amenability of foreign national corporations might have
been developed, this also has not occurred.
The Supreme Court has never intimated that a different contacts analysis applies
to foreign nationals. Neither Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 416-18 (1984), nor Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 44748 (1952), emphasized the foreign citizenship of the defendants. In fact, Helicopteros
primarily relied for its substantiality holding on an earlier precedent involving a
domestic corporation, indicating that the rigor of the minimum contacts analysis
does not depend on the defendant’s nationality. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417-18
(citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)). While the
Solicitor General did file an amicus brief in Helicopteros urging that predicating
jurisdiction on purchases would harm United States exports, any effect this may have
had on the Court is not reflected in the written opinion, other than perhaps serving
as an explanation for the Court’s dubious conclusion that specific jurisdiction had
been conceded. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
The decisions of the lower federal and state courts have likewise not developed a
different minimum contacts analysis for general jurisdiction over foreign nationals.
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Thus, the Asahi factors should be incorporated into the general
jurisdiction calculus. Their underlying concerns are often implicated
in dispute-blind queries. Moreover, the factors’ genesis, in the
International Shoe tenet of “minimum contacts” consonant with
notions of “‘fair play and substantial justice,’” implies that the
considerations apply to any minimum contacts analysis, regardless of
453
the relationship of the contacts to the dispute. Finally, scrutinizing
these factors in resolving general jurisdiction queries is consistent
454
with the weight of judicial doctrine. Indeed, several decisions have
specifically held that the exercise of jurisdiction under the particular

While one case, Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 1998), implied that
“courts must exercise even greater care [in evaluating the defendant’s contacts]
before exercising personal jurisdiction over foreign nationals,” the court did not
actually provide any details on how to exercise the requisite “greater care,” instead
merely relying on a precedential comparison to general jurisdiction opinions
involving domestic corporations. Id. at 93. Thus, there is no direct support in the
case law for a more stringent minimum contacts analysis for foreign national
corporations.
Moreover, in today’s global, interconnected economy, predicating the minimum
contacts analysis on the defendant’s national citizenship is fallacious. Because of the
deficiencies of specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction is sometimes necessary to
assure American plaintiffs an accessible forum against foreign businesses. See
Borchers, supra note 4, at 132, 139; Juenger, supra note 206, at 159-60. Often this is
not burdensome for the foreign corporation, which indeed may have been formed,
owned, and controlled by United States citizens. See, e.g., Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48.
Thus, rather than creating an arbitrary distinction in the minimum contacts analysis
based on the citizenship of the defendant, the preferable course is to employ the
reasonableness factors to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction in those cases falling
under the Asahi paradigm—where the plaintiff’s and forum’s interests in
adjudicating the dispute are slight while the burden on the defendant is severe.
453
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
454
See, e.g., Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284
F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (positing that, even assuming the requisite minimum
contacts for general jurisdiction were present, the exercise of jurisdiction would still
be unreasonable under the fairness factors); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco
Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding exercise of general jurisdiction
would be unreasonable under five-factor test from Asahi); Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v.
Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that “Asahi’s
interpretation of International Shoe as entailing separate contacts and reasonableness
inquiries is not limited to the specific jurisdiction context”); Dalton v. R & W Marine,
Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1990) (determining the exercise of general
jurisdiction over the two nonresident defendants would violate the Asahi factors);
Donatelli v. Nat’l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 465 (1st Cir. 1990) (describing
minimum contacts and five “fair play and substantial justice” criteria as the two stages
to the judicial inquiry into general jurisdiction); Williams Elec. Co. v. Honeywell,
Inc., 854 F.2d 389 (11th Cir. 1988) (same); Reyes v. Marine Mgmt. & Consulting,
Ltd., 586 So. 2d 103, 108-09 (La. 1991) (listing cases using fairness factors in general
jurisdiction query). But see Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Behagen v.
Amateur Basketball Ass’n, 744 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1984).
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circumstances of that case would be unreasonable, although
455
sufficient contacts existed for general jurisdiction.
In sum, the proposed model for dispute-blind jurisdiction
encompasses three queries.
First, whether the nonresident
defendant’s activities occurring in the state are of a substantial
nature, judged by comparing the in-state conduct of the defendant to
the defining activities of a commercial domiciliary. Second, whether
these substantial forum activities are also “continuous and
systematic,” that is, whether the activities occur in a comparable
frequency to some local companies engaging in similar activities.
Third, assuming the requisite minimum contacts exist, whether the
exercise of jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial
justice,” appraised by cogitating the burden on the defendant, the
plaintiff’s interest in the forum, the forum’s interest in adjudging the
controversy, the judicial system’s interest in efficiency, and the
procedural and substantive policies of other states and nations.
Employing this paradigm would provide a measure of decisional
coherence to dispute-blind jurisprudence while remaining faithful to
the Supreme Court’s pronouncements and intimations. The only
remaining issue is what, if anything, does this model display
regarding the foundational rationale for the constitutional
limitations on the assertion of general jurisdiction.
V. THE QUIXOTIC PURSUIT OF A THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
Commentators have debated for decades now the underlying
theoretical foundation for the constitutional limitations on a state’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Some
have urged that the limitations emanate primarily from notions of
456
state sovereignty, while others posit that conceptions of fairness are
455

See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins., 84 F.3d at 573-74 (holding exercise of general
jurisdiction would be unreasonable under five-factor test from Asahi even though
minimum contacts test for general jurisdiction satisfied); James v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.,
965 S.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding the exercise of general
jurisdiction would violate conceptions of “fair play and substantial justice” under fivefactor test after concluding sufficient contacts existed for general jurisdiction); cf.
Amoco Egypt Oil, 1 F.3d at 851-52 (declining to resolve minimum contacts query
because exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable); Dalton, 897 F.2d at 1363
(averring that the exercise of general jurisdiction would violate the Asahi factors even
if the requisite minimum contacts existed); Juarez v. United Parcel Serv. de Mex. S.A.
de C.V., 933 S.W.2d 281, 285-86 (Tex. App. 1996) (declining to decide minimum
contacts issue for general jurisdiction because the assertion of jurisdiction would
violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice).
456
See, e.g., Cebik, supra note 4, at 23-25 (suggesting jurisdictional limitations
dependent upon sovereign interests of the states); Stein, Interstate Federalism, supra
note 4, at 706, 722 (avowing that sovereignty implications are incorporated in
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457

the underlying value. Yet critics protest that the very notion of any
due process jurisdictional limitations is aberrant. Some objectors
contend the source of constitutional limitations should be the Full
458
Faith and Credit Clause, while various others avow the premise of
any constitutional limitations on a state’s adjudicatory power is
indefensible, unless perhaps the forum is so inconvenient that it
459
impairs the defendant’s ability to mount a defense.
This Article does not attempt to resolve all these issues. Instead,
the objective is exploring the inferences regarding the theoretical
foundation for general jurisdiction that may be appropriate in light
of the preceding doctrinal analysis and three-pronged proposed
model. To accomplish this goal, the Article first analyzes the
Supreme Court’s guidance on the source of the due process
constitutional limitations on adjudicatory jurisdiction before
proffering its suppositions.
A. A Precedential and Theoretical Evaluation of Sovereignty and
Fairness
The Supreme Court’s early decisions described the limitations
current due process calculus because otherwise state lines would be irrelevant to
jurisdictional power).
457
See, e.g., Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of ‘State Sovereignty’ and the Curse of
Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 73536 (1983) (criticizing the role of sovereignty and state interests in adjudicatory
jurisdiction doctrine); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1133 (1981) (advocating
a due process analysis predicated on “injustice or undue harm to the individual
litigant” that would dismiss any role for state sovereignty or federalism in the
jurisdictional calculus).
458
See, e.g., Roger Transgrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 852-53 (1989) (proffering a jurisdictional framework under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause because “[e]ven if the Fourteenth Amendment had
never been adopted, states would be subject to significant constitutional restraints in
exercising jurisdiction over noncitizens”).
459
See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal
Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 94100 (1990) [hereinafter Borchers, Death of Constitutional Personal Jurisdiction ]
(averring that the Due Process Clause should not limit assertions of state court
adjudicatory jurisdiction, unless perhaps the forum is so inconvenient that it impedes
the defendant’s ability to proffer a defense); Harold L. Korn, Rethinking Personal
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Mass Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2183, 2184
(1997) (concurring with other commentators that personal jurisdiction should not
be a constitutional issue); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on StateCourt Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretive Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and
Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 735, 835-37, 846 (1981) (urging
that the only constitutional limitation on personal jurisdiction consistent with the
intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment is the requirement that the
defendant have an opportunity to be heard).

904

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:807

on adjudicatory jurisdiction as stemming from the mutually exclusive
sovereignty of the co-equal states in our federal system of
460
461
government.
In Pennoyer v. Neff, for instance, the Court, in
adopting a rule equating a court’s jurisdictional reach with the
physical presence of a person or properly attached property within
the forum, relied on the supposedly well-established public law
principles that “every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory” and the
corollary proposition “that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction
462
and authority over persons or property without its territory.”
The
Court explained that the extra-territorial assertion of jurisdiction over
a person or property by a state “would be deemed an encroachment
upon the independence of the State in which the persons are
domiciled or the property is situated, and be resisted as
463
usurpation.”
International Shoe later shifted the emphasis from the mutually
exclusive sovereignty of the states to fundamental conceptions
regarding fairness and the defendant’s relationship to the sovereign
power of the state. In the words of International Shoe, the state’s
exercise of jurisdiction, without the required minimum contacts,
464
offends “‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”
Minimum contacts exist if it is reasonable, “in the context of our
federal system of government,” to compel the defendant to
465
adjudicate in the forum.
The Due Process Clause therefore
precludes a state from exercising jurisdiction over a “defendant with
466
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.” These passages
illustrate that both fairness and sovereign power supported the
International Shoe standard.
But since International Shoe, the Court has sometimes emphasized
fairness and sometimes emphasized the sovereign power of the states
as the basis for due process limits on jurisdiction. Perkins, for
instance, concluded that the sine qua non of the jurisdictional query
460

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197-204 (1977) (recognizing that its early
decisions, which defined the jurisdiction of the state courts in accordance with the
“principles of public law” regulating “the relationships among independent nations,”
rested upon “the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States”).
461
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
462
Id. at 722. Pennoyer might have erred in its interpretation of these supposed
international norms, however. See Juenger, supra note 206, at 146-47.
463
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723.
464
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
465
Id. at 317.
466
Id. at 319.
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467

is “general fairness to the corporation.”
The Court in Shaffer v.
468
Heitner similarly described the International Shoe standard as “fairness
469
Yet other cases emphasized a sovereignty
and substantial justice.”
470
rationale. Hanson v. Denckla explained that personal jurisdiction
limitations involve more than just the defendant’s litigation burdens
but instead are “a consequence of territorial limitations on the power
471
of the respective States.”
In its most comprehensive analysis of the issue to date, the Court
in World-Wide Volkswagen articulated that the minimum contacts
analysis served two functions: (1) protecting the defendant from
undue litigation burdens, and (2) preventing state courts from
overstepping their authority vis-à-vis other “co-equal sovereigns in the
472
federal system.” While recognizing that the burdens of litigation in
another state had substantially decreased as a result of advances in
transportation and communication, the Court avowed that the
geographical boundaries of the states continued to have jurisdictional
significance due to “the principles of interstate federalism embodied
473
Thus, even if the exercise of jurisdiction by
in the Constitution.”
the forum was reasonable, “the Due Process Clause, acting as an
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the
474
State of its power to render a valid judgment.”
The Court’s next decision, Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
475
Compagnie des Bauxites, created some uncertainty. The Court there
espoused that the personal jurisdiction requirement “represents a
restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a
476
matter of individual liberty.”
While recognizing its earlier
pronouncements also discussed personal jurisdiction in terms of
federalism and sovereignty, the Court reasoned that such sovereign

467

Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
469
Id. at 206; id. at 211 (referring to the “fairness standard of International Shoe”);
see also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (espousing that the essence of
the due process calculus is whether, based on the defendant’s activity in the forum,
“it is ‘reasonable’ and ‘fair’ to require him to conduct his defense in that State”).
470
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
471
Id. at 250-51 (noting that the “restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts . . . are more than a guaranty of immunity from inconvenient or distant
litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the
respective States”).
472
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
473
Id. at 293.
474
Id. at 294.
475
456 U.S. 694 (1982).
476
Id. at 702.
468
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power restrictions are not the result of a constitutional federalism
principle but instead are “ultimately a function of the individual
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause,” which is the
sole source of the limitations on a state’s exercise of personal
477
jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the state’s sovereign interests in the due process
jurisdictional calculus should not be disregarded as a result of
Bauxites. The mere fact that the Due Process Clause is the source for
the limitations on state judicial power does not support abolishing
considerations of the forum state’s sovereign power and interests.
Instead, an aspect of the liberty interest the Due Process Clause
protects is the freedom from assertions of judicial power by a
sovereign with whom the defendant has no “contacts, ties, or
478
relations.”
Thus, as the Court explained two years after Bauxites,
part of the “fairness” of compelling a defendant to appear is whether
the defendant’s forum contacts give rise to a legitimate state
479
sovereign interest.
Some commentators nonetheless object that the Due Process
Clause’s explicit guarantee of individual rights—rather than state
interests—is incompatible with a jurisdictional doctrine predicated
480
partially on sovereignty.
Admittedly, from a textual and original
intent perspective, this argument has some initial appeal. The Due
Process Clause provides that the states shall not deprive “any person
481
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Textually,
this phraseology appears to countenance a process-based individual
right, especially considering the clause’s emphasis on precluding
government deprivations of defined individual interests without the
requisite “due process.” In addition, a historical lens reveals no
evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended
that an individual’s due process rights would encompass a right to be
free from state jurisdictional assertions unless minimum forum

477

Id. at 702-03 n.10.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
479
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775-76 (1984).
480
See, e.g., Borchers, Death of Constitutional Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 459, at
92-93 (maintaining “the due process clause is a guarantor of personal rights,” which
has absolutely no relationship to a conception of the clause “as an ‘arbitrator’
between jealous states” or “‘battling’ sovereigns”); Stephen E. Gottlieb, In Search of a
Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1291, 1299 (1983)
(contending that “[s]overeignty does not have a place in the original design of the
due process clause”); Redish, supra note 457, at 1120 (recognizing that the Due
Process Clause references “the rights of ‘persons,’ not states”).
481
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
478
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482

contacts existed.
On the other hand, however, the doctrinal conception of “due
process of law” has long since been unhinged from potential narrow
interpretations emanating from the literal text or intent of the
provision. Shortly after the enactment of the Due Process Clause, the
Court indicated that due process could be violated by state regulation
483
unreasonably interfering with liberty or property rights. Since that
time, the Court has consistently emphasized that the linchpin of the
due process guarantee “‘is protection of the individual against
484
arbitrary action of government.’”
In accord with this
understanding, the Court has repeatedly employed the Due Process
Clause over the last century to prevent all types of arbitrary state
interferences with liberty and property rights, including proscribing
485
state action that shocks the conscience, imposes unfair retroactive
486
487
legislative liability, awards excessive civil punishments, arbitrarily
488
applies a state’s law to a controversy, or interferes with recognized
489
private sexual
personal autonomy rights such as abortion,
490
491
492
493
While
conduct, contraception, marriage, and child rearing.
482

See, e.g., Borchers, Death of Constitutional Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 459, at
88-89 (noting that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment never
referenced personal jurisdiction); Redish, supra note 457, at 1124-25 (same);
Whitten, supra note 459, at 805-07 (same).
483
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1877). Even before the Civil War, there
are potential indications that the Court considered the phrase “due process of law”
in the Fifth Amendment to include a substantive reasonableness component. See,
e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857); Murray’s Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856). At least two
commentators have urged that a substantive aspect to due process was widely
acknowledged even earlier. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of
Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366 (1911); Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due
Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941.
484
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (quoting Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
485
See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
486
See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 547-51 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (providing fifth vote to invalidate Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit
Act of 1992 relying on due process grounds rather than takings analysis employed by
the plurality); id. at 554-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Kennedy
that the Due Process Clause was the “natural home” for an argument regarding
unfair retroactive legislation, but concluding Act did not violate due process).
487
See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1520
(2003).
488
See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985).
489
See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000); Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 16465 (1973).
490
Lawrence v. Garner, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2476-82 (2003).
491
See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
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these disparate holdings cannot all be supported by the literal text or
494
original intent of the Due Process Clause, their common strand is
their mooring in judicial conceptions of the reasonableness of the
state’s action in relation to the private interests at stake. Thus,
irrespective of the ongoing (and perhaps intractable) debate
495
regarding the propriety of these holdings, employing the Due
Process Clause to prohibit unreasonable state assertions of
jurisdiction comports with the Court’s use of the guarantee to
496
prevent other arbitrary judicial, legislative, and executive actions.
Of course, recognizing that the Due Process Clause protects
persons from arbitrary governmental conduct provides little guidance
in determining when the government’s conduct is actually “arbitrary”
and therefore unconstitutional. In resolving this query, the Court
does not merely evaluate the nature of the individual right at issue
alone, but instead analyzes the right in relation to the strength of the
497
governmental interest and the necessity of the regulation at issue.
Thus, in considering whether an individual’s due process rights have
been violated, it is necessary to weigh the governmental interest
supporting the state’s actions. And this governmental interest
necessarily includes state sovereignty and federalism concerns in
certain contexts.
As an illustration, the Court has incorporated state sovereignty
492

See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
494
See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7-5, at 1318
(3d ed. 1999) (recognizing that substantive due process decisions are “both textually
and historically suspect” under the Due Process Clause).
495
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES
§ 1.4, at 16-18 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing “heated scholarly and public debate” over
the protection of unenumerated rights under the Due Process Clause).
496
While it might be argued that the Supreme Court’s minimum contacts test for
due process limitations on adjudicatory jurisdiction is sui generis from the usual
substantive due process analysis identifying the liberty interest at issue and evaluating
the governmental interest in light of the appropriate level of scrutiny, the Supreme
Court has also created distinct tests for several other liberty interests. For instance,
regulations interfering with a woman’s liberty interest in choosing an abortion are
subject to an “undue burden” analysis under Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921-22
(2000), and executive governmental actions in an emergency situation are evaluated
under the “shocks the conscience” test discussed in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 847 (1998). Additional examples include the due process tests for
exemplary damages and choice of law, discussed infra in notes 498-503 and
accompanying text.
497
See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 495, § 10.1, at 765-67. Fundamental rights
are subject to strict scrutiny requiring that the regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling governmental interest, whereas non-fundamental rights must only pass
the minimal rational basis test. See id.
493
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considerations into the due process analysis for reviewing punitive
damage awards and choice of law determinations. State Farm Mutual
498
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell and BMW of North America v.
499
Gore both held that the exemplary damage awards at issue violated
the substantive component of a litigant’s due process rights, in part
because the respective awards infringed upon the sovereign interest
of other states in our federal system by exacting punishment for acts
500
committed outside the forum. Similarly, Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
501
Shutts relied in part on the Due Process Clause to invalidate the
application of Kansas law to all members of a class when the vast
majority had no connection to Kansas because “for a State substantive
law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State
must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
502
creating state interests.” Shutts relied on earlier cases that likewise
recognized the importance of “state interests” in determining
whether a litigant’s due process rights have been violated through the
503
imposition of a forum’s substantive law.
These cases demonstrate
that state sovereign interests properly influence the reasonableness,
under the Due Process Clause, of the exercise of certain state powers.
Sovereignty concerns likewise necessarily impact the
reasonableness of the state’s assertion of jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant. Only three potential governmental interests
supporting a state’s assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction are readily
apparent: state sovereign interests, providing a convenient forum to
redress the injuries of its inhabitants, and insuring the efficient
resolution of disputes. But the latter two interests are inappropriate
in a number of cases. The plaintiff’s residence is both overinclusive
and underinclusive, as the plaintiff’s status as a forum resident is not
504
a sufficient jurisdictional basis, nor does his or her status as a
505
The interest in insuring the
nonresident preclude jurisdiction.
efficient resolution of disputes is likewise problematic, as the Court
498

123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
500
State Farm, 123 S. Ct. at 1522-23; BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 572-74.
501
472 U.S. 797 (1985).
502
Id. at 818 (internal citation omitted).
503
Id.; see also Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547
(1935); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930). Dick is especially instructive
because the Court rested its analysis entirely on the Due Process Clause without any
consideration of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Dick, 281 U.S. at 408-10.
504
See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978) (holding the state’s
interest in protecting its minor residents does not grant personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant).
505
See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984).
499
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has recognized that a need for efficiency, while a consideration in the
506
due process calculus, is not dispositive.
Thus, the minimum
contacts analysis necessarily incorporates state sovereign interests,
which often is the only viable governmental interest to balance
against the defendant’s interest.
Moreover, current jurisdictional doctrine supports this
conclusion, as state boundaries would become utterly meaningless in
the due process calculus if sovereignty was not a consideration. Yet
the Supreme Court has never retreated from its statement in WorldWide Volkswagen regarding the relevance of state lines for
507
jurisdictional purposes. In fact, numerous decisions appraising the
due process jurisdictional limitations involve defendants located in
508
contiguous states to the forum. In many of these cases, defending
the lawsuit there would hardly constitute an undue burden, yet the
court nevertheless dismisses the action on jurisdictional grounds, due
509
in part to the extra-territorial assertion of state sovereignty.
Bauxites thus did not purport to—nor could it have—excised
sovereignty concerns from the Due Process Clause under our current
jurisprudential model; instead, it merely held that the underlying
source of the constitutional limitations emanate not from Article III
or some independent constitutional federalism principle (which
could not be waived by the litigants), but from an individual’s due
510
process rights.
Bauxites in actuality confirmed the “restriction on
state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.,” but
clarified that this restriction “must be seen ultimately as a function of

506

Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972) (“[T]he Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of
the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were
designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing
concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government
officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.”) (internal citation
omitted).
507
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
508
See, e.g., Wolf v. Richmond County Hosp. Auth., 745 F.2d 904, 910-11 (4th Cir.
1984) (Georgia/South Carolina border); Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc.,
759 F. Supp. 264, 270 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (New Jersey/Pennsylvania border); Bachman v.
Med. Eng’g Corp., 724 P.2d 858, 860-62 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (Oregon/Washington
border).
509
See Wims, 759 F. Supp. at 270 & n.2 (transferring case from Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to District of New Jersey because in personam jurisdiction could not be
exercised over New Jersey resident in Pennsylvania, but opining the controversy was
“somewhat overblown, as the Federal Courthouse in Camden, New Jersey is less than
two miles from this Courthouse”); see also Wolf, 745 F.2d at 910-11; Bachman, 724 P.2d
at 860-62.
510
Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702 & n.10 (1982).
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the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.”
Accordingly, the Due Process Clause, in preventing the exercise of
arbitrary assertions of governmental power, insures both that the
exercise of jurisdiction is fair and that the state has a sufficient
sovereign interest to exercise its authority to compel the defendant to
appear. The question now is the extent to which these dual interests
might justify this Article’s suggested model.
B. The State Sovereignty Justification for the Analogy to a Local
Business

The linchpin of this Article’s proposed three-pronged approach
is whether the defendant is engaging in continuous activities in the
forum analogous to the activities characterizing a forum-based
enterprise. On a broad level, of course, this approach is an attempt
to ascertain the “reasonableness” of the assertion of general
jurisdiction. But this level of abstraction is too generic to be a
satisfactory underlying premise because any potential standard would
necessarily depend on some notion of reasonableness. Thus, the
more pertinent issue is the extent to which a theory incorporating
fairness concerns and/or state sovereign interests may support
predicating the defendant’s amenability on an analogy to the
activities of a commercial domiciliary.
One difficulty with this inquest is that “fairness” is not a word
with a singular meaning, not even in the jurisdictional context. It
512
includes protecting the defendant against undue litigation burdens,
insuring the defendant has a reasonable expectation that the claim
513
could be brought in the forum, and mandating that the defendant
obtained some forum benefits in exchange for its submission to the
514
state’s jurisdictional power.
Yet none of these three “fairness”
511

Id. at 702 n.10.
See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)
(explaining that the minimum contacts requirement “protects the defendant against
the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum”); Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (articulating that the jurisdictional query
depends in part on the court’s “‘estimate of the inconveniences’ which would result
to the corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or principal place of business”).
513
See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980) (holding exercise of
personal jurisdiction unfair when defendant had no expectation that his purchase of
insurance in Indiana could subject him to suit in Minnesota); World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 297 (requiring that “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there”).
514
See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (concluding
it is reasonable to require a defendant to submit to the state’s sovereign power if his
alleged obligations arise from his enjoyment of the benefits and protections of the
512
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rationales appears to support the proposed minimum contacts
standard.
The undue burden rationale has minimal application in most
dispute-blind cases. The defendants typically have the financial
resources to defend themselves, especially considering that modern
technological advances, such as electronic filings, facsimile
transmissions, e-mail, video conferences, and even “older”
developments like overnight mail and telephone conferences have
made it far “less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a
515
State where he engages in economic activity.” Although as a result
of these developments many defendants would not be burdened by
litigating in the forum, courts still often decline to find general
516
jurisdiction. Even in those circumstances in which a defendant may
be unduly burdened by litigating in the forum, the minimum
contacts portion of the analysis does not typically evaluate this
concern—instead the courts consider the defendant’s burden as one
517
of the five Asahi factors.
The second rationale, focusing on the defendant’s expectations,
is too circular to provide a meaningful theoretical justification for
general jurisdiction. A party’s “expectation” that it might be subject
to suit depends primarily on the jurisdictional rules governing the
assertion of sovereign power. Any prospectively-applied jurisdictional
standard would presumably impact expectations, thus precluding the
defendant from being “surprised” and thereby comporting with this
rationale.
Unless an expectation theory provides a specific
explanation for predicating general jurisdiction on a comparison to a

forum’s laws); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (holding that requiring corporation to
defend suit in forum in which it incurs obligations arising out of its activities there is
reasonable and just because the corporation is enjoying the benefits and protections
of the forum’s laws).
515
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); cf. Cody v. Ward, 954 F.
Supp. 43, 47 n.9 (D. Conn. 1997) (noting that “widespread use of facsimile
equipment and overnight mail and the courts’ increasing use of telephone
conferences in lieu of live conferences reduces the burden on nonresidents of
litigation in a distant state”).
516
Cf. Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264, 270 (E.D. Pa.
1991) (transferring case from Eastern District of Pennsylvania to District of New
Jersey because in personam jurisdiction could not be exercised over New Jersey
resident in Pennsylvania, but opining the controversy was “somewhat overblown, as
the Federal Courthouse in Camden, New Jersey is less than two miles from this
Courthouse”).
517
See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987)
(discussing severe burdens on Japanese corporation being forced to defend lawsuit
in California); cf. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (noting burden on
defendant will always be a primary concern in fairness factors).
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local business rather than using some other standard, it is not a
meaningful theoretical foundation.
Perhaps one could argue that a legitimate expectation exists
based on an innate concept of equivalent treatment—because the
nonresident defendant is conducting operations in the forum similar
to state-based entities, it should therefore expect similar jurisdictional
consequences to attach. This argument’s desideratum, however, is
that the state-based entity’s domicile in the state creates an additional
connection with the forum, not possessed by the nonresident
defendant, establishing at least a tenuous relationship between the
cause of action and the forum. As an example, assume a major
corporation with a principal place of business in Texas is sued for
alleged employment discrimination suffered by a New York employee
at the hands of New York supervisor. While such a cause of action
may not arise in Texas for purposes of specific jurisdiction, there is
presumably at least an indirect relationship to Texas headquarters
through the chain of command. In contrast, such a relationship
would not presumably exist if the major corporation was merely
doing business in Texas rather than being headquartered in the state.
The commercial domiciliary, then, will typically have an added
relationship with the forum, increasing its expectation of being
subject to the state’s jurisdictional power. Thus, an expectations
theory alone does not appear to justify the proposed model.
A reciprocal benefits or exchange theory offers the most
promise. The premise supporting this theory is that the nonresident
defendant is obtaining benefits from the state similar to those
commercial domiciliaries enjoy by conducting forum activities
quantitatively and qualitatively analogous to a local business. Because
such a local business is undoubtedly subject to the state’s general
adjudicatory authority, a nonresident performing similar activities
should be as well. This conception bears some resemblance to
Professor Brilmayer’s political insider approach, under which general
jurisdiction is appropriate when the “defendant reaches the quantum
of local activity in which a purely local company would engage” such
518
that “relegating the defendant to the political processes is fair.”
While Professor Brilmayer evaluates the defendant’s quantity of
519
forum activity in light of the exertion of political influence, rather
than the qualitative and quantitative comparison to the in-state
activities characterizing a domiciliary proposed here, both
approaches consider the nonresident’s activities in light of those of a
518
519

Brilmayer et al., General Look, supra note 230, at 742.
See id.
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local business. And perhaps the nonresident’s comparable benefits
and protections from the state’s laws could justify the assertion of
general adjudicatory power.
Although this quid pro quo theory is intuitively appealing, it
appears difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s most recent
520
personal jurisdiction pronouncement, Burnham v. Superior Court.
Burnham held that the Due Process Clause did not bar California’s
exercise of “transient” or “tag” jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant personally summoned while in the state to answer a lawsuit
521
unrelated to his forum activities.
Although the Court was
unanimous in its result, it splintered hopelessly on the supporting
rationale. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion employed a historical
approach, contending that transient jurisdiction is permissible
“because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that
define the due process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play
522
and substantial justice.’”
In contrast, Justice Brennan’s
concurrence attempted to justify the assertion of general jurisdiction
on an exchange theory, maintaining Mr. Burnham received
significant state-provided benefits, such as the rights to travel, to
police, fire, and emergency medical services, and to enjoy the “fruits
523
But Justice Brennan’s theory appears
of the State’s economy.”
facile.
California’s exercise of jurisdiction over Mr. Burnham in a
divorce action as an “exchange” for the forum benefits he received
during a three-day visit would be neither a fair bargain nor consistent
with prior precedent. As Justice Scalia retorted, the three days of
protection Mr. Burnham received from California while visiting the
state were “powerfully inadequate to establish, as an abstract matter,
that it is ‘fair’ for California to decree the ownership of all Mr.
Burnham’s worldly goods acquired during the 10 years of his
524
marriage, and the custody over his children.”
Moreover, this
525
“exchange” cannot be reconciled with Kulko v. Superior Court, where
the Court held that exercising jurisdiction in a child support action
520

495 U.S. 604 (1990).
Id. at 607 (Scalia, J., plurality). Because transient jurisdiction thus allows the
exercise of jurisdiction over any cause of action irrespective of its relationship to the
forum, it is a form of general jurisdiction. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 6.2 (3d ed. 2000) (concluding “transient” jurisdiction predicated on in-state
service is a “truly” general basis of jurisdiction).
522
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (Scalia, J., plurality).
523
Id. at 637-39 (Brennan, J., concurring).
524
Id. at 623 (Scalia, J., plurality).
525
436 U.S. 84 (1978).
521
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against Mr. Kulko predicated on the his three-day stop-over during
which he was married in the state “would make a mockery of the
limitations on state jurisdiction imposed by the Fourteenth
526
Amendment.” While Mr. Kulko’s visit was years earlier, he actually
obtained greater ongoing benefits than Mr. Burnham did from the
laws of California based on his marriage there. The only additional
contact Mr. Burnham possessed—that he was served with process
while in the state—appears irrelevant to the reasonableness of the
“exchange.” Despite Justice Brennan’s Burnham concurrence, then,
an exchange theory is not a viable framework for analyzing a state’s
general adjudicatory power over those served with process in the
forum. The reciprocal benefits theory accordingly cannot provide a
unified framework for dispute-blind jurisdiction.
Because the underlying theory does not seem to be fairness, the
due process limitations on the exercise of general jurisdiction
apparently stem from limits on state sovereign authority. This
rationale is supported by the origins of the dispute-blind doctrine,
prior precedent, and constitutional theory.
As discussed previously, general jurisdiction is the modern
527
progeny of the pre-International Shoe construct of “presence,” which
528
relied on physical power as its foundation.
Dispute-blind
adjudicatory jurisdiction accordingly derives “from the power
529
Under this premise, the state’s status as an
premise of Pennoyer.”
independent sovereign in our federal system grants it sovereign
530
authority over its domiciliaries and those within its borders.
Although International Shoe shifted the analysis from power to
531
reasonableness, the state still undoubtedly retains jurisdictional
532
and
authority over residents and individual domiciliaries
corporations either incorporated or with their principal place of
533
business or commercial domicile in the forum.
The state likewise
526

Id. at 92-93.
See supra Parts II, III.E, IV.
528
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (stating that “[t]he foundation of
jurisdiction is physical power”).
529
Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction, supra note 206, at 380.
530
See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1940); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
531
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
532
See, e.g., Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463. While Milliken predated International Shoe, its
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice . . . implicit in due process”
standard was incorporated into the minimum contacts analysis. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at
316 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463).
533
See, e.g., Twitchell, Myth of General Jurisdiction, supra note 4, at 633 & n.111
(noting that dispute-blind jurisdiction “over corporations where they are
527
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may reasonably exercise jurisdiction over those acting—either by
their in-state presence or forum business activities—like residents or
domiciliaries at the time the state asserts its power through service of
process.
This understanding provides a basis to reconcile the Kulko and
Burnham holdings. While Mr. Kulko availed himself to a greater
extent of the benefits and protections of California’s laws by being
married in the state, he bore no similarity to a California resident at
534
the time he was served with process, as he resided in New York. In
contrast, Mr. Burnham was, in many respects, indistinguishable from
the residents of California when the state asserted its sovereign
prerogative via summons. Although he did not have the right to vote
in a state or local election, he was subject to California’s laws while he
was present there using its roads, purchasing goods and services in
the state, paying state and local taxes, and being protected by police,
fire, and emergency services. His similarity to a resident at the time
of service provided the necessary state “contacts, ties, or relations” for
535
the exercise of the state’s sovereign authority over him.
The same analysis may explicate the minimum contacts standard
proposed in this Article. The necessary contacts, ties, or relations
exist for dispute-blind jurisdiction when the defendant is behaving in
the forum, for most intents and purposes, as a commercial
domiciliary by engaging in the same types of forum activities in a
comparable quantity. The sovereign state has undoubted sovereign
power to regulate the activities of its commercial domiciliaries. When
a nonresident defendant performs similar forum activities in
comparable quantities as a domiciliary, the same sovereign state
interests are implicated—the only difference is that the nonresident
defendant has a more substantial connection with another state, but
that does not diminish the state’s sovereign interests in regulating an
entity that is virtually indistinguishable from other local businesses.
If, on the other hand, the defendant is not behaving as a typical
domiciliary, the state does not have any general sovereign authority

incorporated or where they have their principal place of business” is “so well
accepted that it is never challenged”).
534
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S 84, 92-95 (1978).
535
See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). Admittedly, none of the
opinions in Burnham explicitly relied on a sovereignty rationale. But Justice Scalia’s
plurality opinion is not inconsistent with the theory urged here, as he relied
primarily on the historical understanding that in-state service was sufficient for
jurisdiction. Id. at 616-19. This historical understanding was predicated, of course,
on the power premise of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877), and its
antecedents.
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to regulate the nonresident’s conduct, invalidating the state’s
assertion of jurisdiction over claims unrelated to the defendant’s
forum activities.
This sovereignty rationale also appears consistent with the
Supreme Court’s insistence that the ultimate resolution of the
defendant’s amenability to dispute-blind jurisdiction hinges upon its
536
in-state activities when served with summons.
The service of
summons, of course, is the vehicle for the state’s assertion of
537
Evaluating the defendant’s
sovereign power over the defendant.
contacts at the time the state asserts authority rather than when the
cause of action arose makes sense only if state sovereign interests are
the predominant underpinning for dispute-blind jurisdiction.
On the other hand, a potential objection to this sovereignty
framework is that it does not adequately explain why the state should
have sovereign authority to assert plenary judicial authority over the
defendant. Is such an approach grounded in American federalism,
constitutional dogma, international conceptions of sovereign power,
or some other political science theory? But arguably, under our
constitutional scheme, this is the wrong question. The relevant
question under our Constitution is not “why” the state may assert its
power, but rather why it is precluded from exercising its authority.
The Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
538
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
This provision, plus the structure of our federalism, allows the states
to act unless the Constitution prohibits the activity. The states possess
the whole of the police power, subject only to constraints by the
Constitution, thereby granting the states flexibility to serve as
539
laboratories for experimentation.
Thus, the states may assert general adjudicatory jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants unless barred by the Due Process Clause.
This clause, as interpreted by International Shoe, precludes a state from
exercising jurisdiction over a “defendant with which the state has no
536

See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444-45, 448
(1952); Bank of Am. v. Whitney Cent. Nat’l Bank, 261 U.S. 171, 173 (1923);
Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517 (1923).
537
See, e.g., Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987);
Miss. Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946).
538
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
539
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
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540

contacts, ties, or relations.”
The thesis of this Article is that such
due process limitations on a state’s exercise of general in personam
jurisdiction primarily stem from the absence of any sovereign
connection to those nonresident defendants that do not engage in
forum activities closely analogous to state domiciliaries.
Two provisos are necessary. First, while this interpretation of the
Due Process Clause does not limit the state’s exercise of general
jurisdiction to the extent often advocated by other commentators on
541
policy grounds,
a state, of course, does not have to assert
542
jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by due process.
The Due
Process Clause operates only as a limitation on a state’s adjudicatory
543
power, not a command that such power must be employed. Thus,
the policy choices regarding whether the state should adopt a broad
“doing-business” basis for jurisdiction must be distinguished from the
constitutionality of the assertion of dispute-blind jurisdiction. With
respect to these constitutional limits on general in personam
jurisdiction, the minimum contacts aspect of due process is
transgressed only when the state attempts to subject a nonresident
defendant not functioning as a domiciliary to its sovereign power.
Second, the state sovereignty emphasis for the proposed
minimum contacts analysis does not preclude considering other
factors as well in making the jurisdictional determination. Even if the
defendant has the requisite minimum contacts with the forum, the
fairness or reasonableness factors thereafter insure that the state’s
jurisdictional ambit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice” under the particular circumstances. Thus,
although the state may have a sovereign interest based on the
defendant’s forum activities, exercising jurisdiction may in rare cases
be unduly burdensome for the defendant, especially if the plaintiff’s
interest in the forum is slight. The third prong of the proposed
analysis, then, limits the assertion of jurisdiction in accordance with
the principle of fairness.
Therefore, to some extent, both sovereignty and fairness
concerns underlie the suggested analysis.
The predominant
consideration is the sovereign interest of the state to establish the
required connections and relationships between the defendant and
the forum to satisfy the minimum contacts standard. But even when
such a sovereign interest exists, the “fair play and substantial justice”
540
541
542
543

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440-41 (1952).
See id.
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concerns may preclude the state from employing its adjudicatory
power.
VI. CONCLUSION
The existing doctrinal approaches to dispute-blind jurisdiction
are deficient. None of them provides a basis for the nonresident
defendant to predict which activities will subject it to the sovereignty
of the forum for all causes of action. Nor do any of these approaches
proffer a non-fictional, cogent underlying rationale justifying the
exercise of such power.
This Article suggests a three-pronged inquiry to ameliorate the
shortcomings of the current models. The first two components of
this query, which are somewhat interrelated, appraise the qualitative
and quantitative sufficiency of the defendant’s forum activities in
comparison to a local business. Initially, the qualitative sufficiency is
judged by analogizing the defendant’s in-state operations to the
activities that characterize a commercial domiciliary.
This
comparison is satisfied if the nonresident defendant is conducting
those types of activities in the forum—such as directing its business
operations from the state, producing its goods or services in the state,
or selling such goods or services through in-state business
transactions—that typically define a local business. Assuming this
qualitative substantiality component is met, the second query
examines the quantity and continuity of the defendant’s activities by
ascertaining whether such activities have occurred in a comparable
frequency to at least some local businesses over a reasonable time
preceding the service of process. Finally, assuming the necessary
minimum contacts exist under the first two prongs, the last issue is
whether jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial justice,”
determined by considering the burden on the defendant, the
plaintiff’s interest in the forum, the forum’s interest in adjudicating
the dispute, the judicial system’s interest in efficiency, and the
procedural and substantive policies of other states and nations.
Under this proposed model, the due process limitations on the
exercise of general jurisdiction stem primarily from the absence of
sovereign state interests over those defendants not conducting
activities in the forum similar to a domiciliary owing its allegiance to
the state. This sovereignty emphasis, of course, corresponds with the
derivation of dispute-blind jurisdiction from the power premise of
Pennoyer. While certainly fairness is not irrelevant, as it is the
motivating factor behind the fair play and substantial justice criteria,
the predominant underpinning for the due process limitations is the
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lack of the required sovereign connection between the forum and the
defendant.
The Article’s suggested approach and underlying theoretical
foundation would provide a measure of decisional coherence to
dispute-blind jurisdiction. It is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
holdings on general jurisdiction both before and after International
Shoe, as well as comporting with the recent decrees of a number of
federal appellate courts. It could perhaps allow us to depart from the
morass and clarify general jurisdiction.

